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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis investigates the driving forces behind economic development and the
business cycle using methods of modern macroeconomics. A thorough analysis
of the nature of short–term fluctuations yields, not only during times of crisis,
important ramifications for policy makers. Furthermore, understanding the de-
terminants of economic development delivers important insights. This is particu-
larly meaningful today, in the aftermath of a global economic and financial crisis,
while at the same time Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) have been growing
rapidly and turned out to be a major driver of the global economy during the past
years. As a result, this thesis focuses on the analysis of economies at different
stages of development during different historical periods. While Chapter 2 is
devoted to aspects of economic development and the business cycle in Emerging
Market Economies (EMEs), Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the cases of Switzerland
and Germany during the Great Depression by analyzing their economic slumps
and its peculiarities individually. For this purpose, I apply Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models of various types. While the models used
in Chapters 2 and 4 belong to the class of small open economy Real Business
Cycle (RBC) models, Chapter 3 uses a New Open Economy Macroeconomics
(NOEM) framework, which corresponds to a New Keynesian model with small
open economy characteristics. All essays include an empirical part, in which I
apply modern time series techniques. The models are estimated through Bayesian
approaches. The structural orientation of this thesis allows for a detailed analysis
of the economies considered. The following chapters emphasize that the cur-
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rent level of economic and financial development, as well as the historical and
political circumstances crucially affect the future economic development and the
effectiveness of macroeconomic policy interventions.
Chapter 2 “Business Cycles in EmergingMarkets: the Role of Liability Dol-
larizaton and Valuation Effects” is joint work with Stefan Notz. The purpose
of this chapter is to investigate the importance of certain credit market imper-
fections in Emerging Markets. To this end, we develop a small open economy
DSGE framework featuring both permanent and transitory productivity shocks,
differentiated home and foreign goods, liability dollarization, and endogenous
exchange rate movements. Furthermore, our model incorporates liability dol-
larization as a particular form of financial frictions in EMEs. We estimate our
model using Bayesian techniques for a number of EMEs and our main findings
are that (i) trend shocks are the main determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations,
(ii) accounting for liability dollarization ameliorates the model fit, (iii) valuation
effects on average stabilize changes in the net foreign asset position.
Chapter 3 “A Small Open Economy in the Great Depression: the Case of
Switzerland” is joint work with Ulrich Woitek and Tobias Straumann. This part of
the thesis investigates the causes of the slow recovery of the Swiss economy of the
Great Depression in the 1930s. In historical accounts of the world economic crisis
of the 1930s, Switzerland is known for its staunch defense of the gold standard
and the rise of corporatist policies. Yet, so far, the literature has not discussed the
implications of these two features. This paper tries to show how the combination
of hard–currency policy and nominal rigidities introduced by corporatist policies
proved to be fatal for growth. Estimating a New Keynesian small open economy
model for the period 1926–1938, we show that the decision to participate in the
Gold Bloc after 1933 at an overvalued currency can be identified as the main
reason for the unusual long lasting recession and that price rigidities from 1931
to 1936 significantly slowed down the adjustment process.
Chapter 4 “The Role of Labor Market Imperfections and Credit Constraints
in the German Great Depression” is based on my contribution to a joint project
with Ulrich Woitek. The aim of this project is to analyze the determinants of the
German business cycle for the period under analysis. For this purpose, I estimate
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a DSGE model with heterogeneous agents, open economy characteristics, and
labor market inefficiencies. Allowing for three exogenous shocks (total factor
productivity, government spending, and labor market inefficiencies), I find that
labor market distortions played a major role in driving the German business cycle
during the Interwar Period. Moreover, the analysis suggests a rather limited scope
for expansionary government policies and that workers were hit more severely
by the crisis than capitalists.
The following Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 provide more detailed reviews of the
three essays.
1.1 Review of Chapter 2
We develop a DSGE model of a small open economy to study business cycle
phenomena and the importance of financial frictions in EMEs. To this end, we
allow for differentiated home and foreign goods as well as endogenous exchange
rate movements. As in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Chang and Ferna´ndez
(2013), total factor productivity (TFP) contains both a transitory and permanent
component. We also build on Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) and Garcı´a-Cicco
et al. (2010) by introducing a debt–elastic interest rate as a reduced form financial
market imperfection. Moreover, our model features the phenomenon of liability
dollarization (Reinhart et al., 2014), which can be interpreted as a specific type of
financial frictions in EMEs. Consequently, we account for the fact that emerging
markets traditionally have had difficulties in borrowing in domestic currency on
international capital markets (see Reinhart et al. 2003, Eichengreen and Hausmann
2005, and Lane and Shambaugh 2010).
The innovation of liability dollarization introduces the presence of valuation
effects in our model in a straightforward manner. That is, valuation effects refer
to changes in the net foreign asset position that do not arise from the current
account but are due to fluctuations in exchange rates and asset prices. The size of
these price effects in external balance sheets has been increasing over the last two
decades. Consequently, this observation has attracted great academic attention in
recent years. Thus, our work is also related to a currently active area of research,
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which highlights the importance of fluctuations in exchange rates and asset prices
for a country’s external balance sheet (Gourinchas and Rey 2007a, Gourinchas and
Rey 2007b, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007, and Gourinchas et al. 2010).
We estimate our model using Bayesian techniques for a number of emerging
markets (Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey) and developed economies (Canada,
Sweden, and Switzerland) and thereby control for potential heterogeneity across
countries. Contrary to previous studies in this strand of the literature, we include
a (vector–)autoregressive measurement error component to capture off–model
dynamics along the lines of Ireland (2004). Regarding business cycles in emerg-
ing markets, our main findings are that (i) even though we incorporate finan-
cial frictions in the framework, trend shocks are the main driving force behind
macroeconomic fluctuations, (ii) accounting for liability dollarization ameliorates
the model fit and thus highlights the importance of modeling this financial mar-
ket imperfection, and (iii) valuation effects on average stabilize changes in the net
foreign asset position.
1.2 Review of Chapter 3
There are remarkable differences in the performance of small open European
economies returning to gold in the Interwar Period. Whereas the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland returned to the prewar parity in 1924/25, it took Den-
mark and Norway until 1926/28 because of significant trade deficits 1919/20 and
weaknesses in the banking system. Strong trade links with the United Kingdom
forced the Scandinavian countries off gold in 1931, while sufficient gold reserves
allowed Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland to stay on gold until 1935/36.
The gold standard mentality (Eichengreen and Temin, 2000; Moure´, 2002), i.e.
the belief that a devaluation would lead to inflation and that the gold standard
was the only reliable guarantee for prosperity and stability, led economies to stay
on gold as long as possible – a decision which implied a lagged recovery from
the Great Depression (e.g. Balderston, 2003; Feinstein et al., 2008). As Straumann
(2010, p. 129-142) shows, this was also the case for Switzerland.
We choose a New Keynesian small open economy model in the spirit of Galı´
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and Monacelli (2005) to study the causes of the slow recovery of the Swiss economy
of the Great Depression in the 1930s. In this vein, we allow for nominal rigidities in
order to account for the extraordinarily sticky prices observed during this period.
We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques, thus going beyond the
calibration exercises in Bordo et al. (2007) and Bordo and James (2007) for the Swiss
economy. Furthermore, our data used for the estimation exercise represents a new
monthly data set covering the period January 1926 – December 1938. Following
Ireland (2004), the model incorporates a vector autoregressive measurement error
component capturing the dynamics in the data which are not represented by the
economic part.
Our results show that the decision to participate in the gold bloc after 1933 at
an overvalued currency can be identified as the main reason for the unusual long
lasting recession. Even the recovery of the world economy starting in 1932/1933,
and thus a boost of foreign demand could not offset the negative effects resulting
from disadvantageous terms of trade. A counterfactual experiment demonstrates
that in case of leaving gold earlier (e.g. together with the UK in 1931), the Swiss
economy would have recovered much faster, almost immediately reaching the
pre–crisis output level.
Moreover, we find strong evidence for a large degree of cartelization in the
Swiss economy during the Interwar Period in line with the qualitative evidence,
which resulted in severe price rigidities. A counterfactual analysis predicts that
a decrease in price rigidities would have lead to a weaker downturn and a faster
recovery of the economy. In the literature, democratic corporatism is seen as an
insurance tool for small open economies to cope with the exposure to shocks from
abroad. The paper highlights the costs of corporatism during the recovery from
the Great Depression.
1.3 Review of Chapter 4
We develop a DSGE model to study the driving forces of the German business cy-
cle during the Interwar Period. In this vein, we contribute to ongoing discussions
on the reasons of the German Great Depression. While on the one hand economic
5
policy of austerity under the chancellorship of Heinrich Bru¨ning (March 1930 to
June 1932) is being blamed for deepening the depression and thus paving the
path for the success of the NSDAP, Borchardt (1982) highlights internal and ex-
ternal constraints the economy was exposed to. Furthermore, he argues that the
Germany economy was suffering structural problems while entering the Great
Depression. In particular, he highlights the divergence of the evolution of the real
wage and labor productivity in the 1920s, eventually resulting in excessive real
wages. All these issues are still unresolved, and the project aims to contribute to
this debate.
The point of departure is an extension of the model by Fisher and Hornstein
(2002), thus modeling some of the key features of the German economy at the be-
ginning of the 1930s. That is, we set up a DSGE model incorporating three sources
of inefficiencies (total factor productivity, government expenditure, and a labor
wedge). Furthermore, we make it an open economy, incorporate financial market
frictions, and allow for heterogeneous agents (capitalists and workers). This last
extension enables us to analyze the implications of shocks or policy choices and
its impact on different agents. Moreover, the model can help to address the issue
of the structural problems of the German labor market, measuring labor market
frictions explicitly.
We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques using high quality monthly
time series collected by the Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung in the 1920s and
1930s. Our results suggest that severe labor market frictions characterized the
German business cycle during the Interwar years, which underpins the presence
of structural problems in the economy. Also, variations in total factor produc-
tivity significantly contributed to the downturn. On the other hand, variations
in government expenditure did rather play a minor role. Consequently, counter-
cyclical demand side policies would not have sufficed to countervail the severe
downturn.
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Chapter 2
Business Cycles in Emerging
Markets: the Role of Liability
Dollarization and Valuation Effects
2.1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the world economy has witnessed a growing impor-
tance of Emerging Market Economies (EMEs). While their share of global output
at purchasing power parity was about 30 percent in 1990, it has risen to more
than 50 percent by 2013 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).1 As
a consequence, EMEs have increasingly influenced the global business cycle and
are catching up to the rich world at a remarkable pace. What is striking, however,
is that business cycles in these countries reveal noticeably different patterns com-
pared to developed economies. This naturally raises the questions of why do we
observe these discrepancies.
In recent years, considerable attention in research on international macroeco-
nomics has been devoted to understanding business cycle fluctuations in EMEs.
Many researchers have documented certain empirical regularities among these
countries (see Neumeyer and Perri 2005, Aguiar and Gopinath 2007, and Garcı´a-
Cicco et al. 2010). First, EMEs are generally exposed to more severe business cycle
1See The Economist, article ”When giants slow down“, July 27th, 2013.
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fluctuations than developed economies. Second, EMEs have strongly counter-
cyclical net exports and their international capital inflows are subject to so–called
”sudden stops” (see Calvo 1998, Calvo and Reinhart 2000, and Mendoza 2010).
Third, consumption volatility exceeds income volatility.2
This paper develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
of a small open economy (SOE) to address these business cycle phenomena and
the importance of credit market imperfections in EMEs. The basic structure of
our framework goes back to the workhorse SOE real business cycle (RBC) model
of Mendoza (1991). We build on Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and introduce a
permanent productivity shock in addition to a conventional transitory produc-
tivity shock in our theoretical economy. Moreover, we contribute to the existing
RBC literature on emerging markets by featuring differentiated home and foreign
goods as well as exogenous foreign demand shocks in our model. In this vein,
we also incorporate endogenous real exchange rate fluctuations in our setup.
As Chari et al. (2007) point out, one can think of the non–stationary technology
component as efficiency wedge which captures various forms of market distor-
tions. Nevertheless, since our analysis aims at investigating the role of specific
financial frictions in emerging market business cycles we also augment our frame-
work along this dimension. In particular, similar to Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) we
introduce credit market imperfections in form of a debt–elastic country premium
on the interest rate. Indeed, this reduced form financial friction is a convenient
way to account for a positive link between higher external indebtedness and bor-
rowing costs, which seems to be empirically plausible (see Uribe and Yue 2006 or
Arellano 2008).
More importantly, a major contribution of our work is that we also analyze the
phenomenon of liability dollarization as a further form of financial frictions in our
framework.3 Emerging markets have traditionally depended heavily on external
funds in form of short–term debt to finance their growth opportunities (see Kose
and Prasad 2010). In contrast to advanced economies, however, international
2Another salient characteristic of emerging market business cycles is that real interest rates
tend to be countercyclical, very volatile and lead the cycle (see Neumeyer and Perri 2005 and
Uribe and Yue 2006). This feature, however, is not subject of the analysis in this paper.
3The term “liability dollarization” was coined by Calvo (2001).
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capital market imperfections have impeded EMEs to issue debt denoted in their
own currency. As a result, these countries have held the bulk of their external debt
in major international currencies such as US dollars. The inability of borrowing
abroad in domestic currency faced by emerging markets, which Eichengreen
et al. (2005) refer to as the ”Original Sin“ phenomenon, is a well–known fact
and has been documented in a number of previous studies (see Reinhart et al.
2003, Eichengreen and Hausmann 2005, and Lane and Shambaugh 2010).4 Our
paper does not investigate the reasons behind liability dollarization in emerging
markets, but studies its implications. To this end, we extend our benchmark model
and assume that the small open economy can only borrow in foreign currency.
In our empirical exercise, we apply a mixture of country–specific calibration
and Bayesian estimation. Related studies have predominantly investigated partic-
ular emerging markets and partly tried to derive conclusions for EMEs in general.
However, given the fact that EMEs share the aforementioned stylized business
cycle features, we think it is crucial to expand the analysis to a broader selection of
countries and thus also allow for potential heterogeneity. Therefore, we study the
cases of Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. Besides, we additionally estimate our
benchmark model for a cohort of developed countries, namely Canada, Sweden,
and Switzerland. This enables us to confront the results obtained for emerging
and advanced economies.
To estimate our models, we take real time series data on output, consumption,
interest rates, and exchange rates. A substantial contribution of our work is how
we capture off–model dynamics in our estimation. In particular, we follow Sargent
(1989) and Ireland (2004) by including a (vector–)autoregressive measurement
error component. To our knowledge, this has not been done yet in this strand of
the literature and goes beyond the procedures applied by existing studies (e.g.
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. 2010 or Chang and Ferna´ndez 2013).
Estimation results show that financial frictions are generally more pronounced
in EMEs than in industrialized countries, which is in line with the conclusion of
4In recent years, several emerging markets have implemented various policies to tackle dollar-
ization. The process of dedollarization is generally protracted and in most cases incomplete (see
Kokenyne et al. 2010). While some countries have been successful, others have failed to achieve
persistent dedollarization (see Reinhart et al. 2014). Nevertheless, our empirical analysis uses data
from a period in which liability dollarization was a prevalent feature of external finances in EMEs.
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Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010). Besides, off–model dynamics appear to be of minor
importance for the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates in general. This result
suggests that our model is capable of explaining a great deal of the variation in
the data. Moreover, we show that for the group of EMEs, the model with liability
dollarization by and large outperforms the benchmark setup in capturing the
dynamics in the variables we use for estimation. This outcome provides a strong
argument in favor of the introduction of liability dollarization in the model.
Our analysis suggests that the co–existence of financial market imperfections
and trend shocks helps us to explain macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging
markets. In EMEs, the transitory productivity process is the driving force behind
output in the short–run, whereas non–stationary technology shocks determine
income fluctuations in the long–run. Contrary to that, transitory productivity
shocks determine output fluctuations over all horizons in developed economies.
Hence, although we incorporate various financial frictions in our model, we still
find support for the famous hypothesis by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) that ”the
cycle is the trend“ in emerging markets. That said, our findings contradict the
conclusions of other studies, which argue that this notion rests upon the absence
of certain market distortions. For instance, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang
and Ferna´ndez (2013) show that once one incorporates financial frictions in the
framework, the permanent shock strongly loses importance. Likewise, a recent
paper by Boz et al. (2011) studies a real business cycle model in which agents learn
to differentiate between permanent and transitory disturbances. These authors
argue that it is more severe informational frictions in EMEs that explain observed
business cycle patterns even without a predominance of the non–stationary com-
ponent in total factor productivity.5
Our work is also related to a currently active research area, which highlights
the importance of fluctuations in exchange rates and asset prices for a country’s
5Nevertheless, the notion of trend shocks as being the drivers of the business cycle can to
some extent be supported by a closely related area of research in international macroeconomics.
The literature on the empirics of the ”intertemporal approach to the current account” highlights
the importance of permanent shocks in explaining current account dynamics (see Glick and
Rogoff 1995, Hoffmann 2001, Hoffmann 2003, Kano 2008, or Corsetti and Konstantinou 2012).
In particular, Hoffmann and Woitek (2011) show that the world economy was predominantly
characterized by permanent shocks in the period between World War I and World War II, exactly
like today’s emerging markets according to our findings.
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external balance sheet (see Tille 2003, Gourinchas and Rey 2007a, Gourinchas
and Rey 2007b, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007, and Gourinchas et al. 2010). These
changes in the net foreign asset position, which are not due to capital flows, are
called valuation effects and drive a wedge between the change in the net foreign
asset position and the current account. Accounting for the fact that EMEs are
not able to borrow on international markets in their own currency, our model
yields further interesting insights with respect to the role of external balance sheet
effects, which, though investigated in other areas (see Ce´spedes et al. 2004, Tille
2008, or Nguyen 2011), has hitherto been unrecognized in this line of research.
In particular, we find that valuation effects stabilize the change in the net foreign
asset position induced by trend productivity shocks, whereas they amplify it
after foreign demand shocks. In contrast, transitory technology shocks lead to
valuation effects that may reinforce or mitigate the changes in the external balance
sheet. Given that EMEs are characterized by a prevalence of trend shocks, we
find that valuation effects act stabilizing on average.
Furthermore, the model featuring liability dollarization can account for vari-
ous business cycle phenomena in EMEs. In particular, our model generates more
severe macroeconomic fluctuations in EMEs than in advanced economies, and
predicts a volatility of consumption that exceeds the one of output. Moreover, the
model produces a countercyclical trade balance. But based on our estimation, it
fails to quantitatively match the strong countercyclicality of net exports observed
in the data. Finally, we show that the model succeeds in reproducing the reversal
of capital flows to Mexico during the Tequila Crisis between 1994 and 1995.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we start
with some descriptive business cycle statistics of selected countries and briefly
discuss certain empirical features of valuation effects in EMEs. Section 2.3 outlines
our benchmark model as well as the setup with liability dollarization. In Section
2.4, we describe the data and introduce our calibration and estimation technique.
Estimation results are presented in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 discusses the
dynamics of our model in greater detail. Some concluding remarks appear in
Section 2.7.
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2.2 Descriptive Analysis
Before we introduce our theoretical framework, which we later use to investigate
macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs, we take a look at some descriptive statistics
first. We begin with illustrating the distinct empirical regularities about business
cycles in EMEs contrary to industrialized countries. To this end, we calculate
standard business cycle moments for numerous EMEs and compare them with
those obtained for a group of developed small open economies. Subsequently, we
document the stabilizing impact of valuation effects on the external balance sheet
in EMEs.
2.2.1 Business Cycle Features
The now well–established term “Emerging Market“ was originally introduced by
Antoine van Agtmael in 1981, describing developing countries that experience
rapid economic progress and potentially catch up with developed economies (see
Van Agtmael 2007). Today, there exists a wide range of definitions of an emerging
market and numerous different classifications. For that reason, we rely on three
well–known classifications and focus our descriptive analysis on the so–called
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and CIVETS (Columbia, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Egypt, Turkey, South Africa) countries as well as selected economies from the list
of emerging markets compiled by the Dow Jones Indexes.
At this point, we use annual data from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) on output, consumption, exports, imports, and the real exchange rate.6 For
the real exchange rate we construct an index, which we normalize to 100 in
the year 2005. To derive real per capita variables for output and consumption,
we divide each series by population and subsequently deflate output using the
GDP deflator, and consumption using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). To study
business cycle fluctuations, we detrend all variables except for the net exports to
output ratio. For this purpose, we apply the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (HP)
6We use real exchange rates vis–a`–vis the US. The choice of annual rather than higher frequency
time series enables us to investigate a longer time period. Nevertheless, we did the same exercise
using quarterly data and found no qualitative difference in the results.
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filter on logged series with smoothing parameter 100.7
Descriptive sample statistics are displayed in Table 2.1. Various stylized busi-
ness cycle facts are worth emphasizing.8 First, fluctuations in macroeconomic ag-
gregates in EMEs are generally more pronounced than in developed economies.
For instance, our selected countries on the Dow Jones list exhibit average standard
deviations of output, consumption and net exports that are more than twice as
high as in the group of industrialized economies. This salient feature is visual-
ized in Figure 2.1, which plots the cyclical component of GDP for each country.
The graph clearly demonstrates the excess business cycle volatility in emerging
markets relative to advanced economies. Second, consumption volatility exceeds
output volatility in EMEs, whereas the standard deviation of consumption is on
average lower than that of output in developed countries. Third, the net exports
to output ratio tends to be fairly countercyclical. For instance, the mean correla-
tion of GDP and the net exports to output ratio is as much negative as −0.45 for
the CIVETS countries. By contrast, advanced economies exhibit a rather weak
link between these variables. In fact, our calculations yield a correlation of merely
−0.04 on average.
Somewhat surprisingly, previous studies in this line of research have not put
particular focus on the business cycle features of the real exchange rate. Table 2.1
indicates that there are differences between EMEs and advanced countries along
this dimension, too. The real exchange rate is more volatile in emerging markets
than in developed economies. Moreover, real appreciations are associated with
a fall in the trade balance to GDP ratio in EMEs. The mean correlation between
these variables is −0.36 across all EMEs. On the other hand, the link between
net exports and real exchange rates appears to be much weaker in the group of
developed economies, for which we find basically no correlation on average.
The empirical regularities documented here are very robust. Nevertheless, we
also detect some minor differences within the cohort of emerging markets. For
7We are aware of the shortcomings of this filtering method. Hence, we also looked at first
differences of the logged series as well as cubically detrended logged series to check the robustness
of our findings. Indeed, business cycle moments seem to be rather insensitive with respect to the
filter choice.
8We confidently call certain business cycle patterns as ”stylized facts” because they have already
been documented in a number of earlier studies. See, among others, Neumeyer and Perri (2005),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), and Kose and Prasad (2010).
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Table 2.1: Business Cycles in EMEs and Developed Economies
σ(Y) σ(C) σ
(
NX
Y
)
σ(e) σ(C)σ(Y) ρ
(
NX
Y ,Y
)
ρ
(
NX
Y , e
)
BRIC
Brazil (BRA) 2.93 12.17 2.42 21.67 4.16 −0.30 −0.37
Russia (RUS) 5.64 8.51 4.80 17.79 1.51 −0.28 −0.75
India (IND) 2.16 4.00 1.37 6.13 1.85 −0.13 −0.32
China (CHN) 3.11 3.55 2.76 7.85 1.14 0.08 0.00
Mean 3.46 7.06 2.84 13.36 2.17 −0.16 −0.36
CIVETS
Colombia (COL) 2.65 4.70 3.44 11.50 1.78 −0.27 −0.50
Indonesia (IDN) 3.89 4.80 3.47 15.58 1.23 −0.37 −0.28
Vietnam (VNM) 1.29 2.15 4.15 6.46 1.67 −0.50 −0.54
Egypt (EGY) 1.88 2.83 4.07 22.57 1.51 −0.42 −0.54
Turkey (TUR) 4.11 6.10 2.81 9.99 1.49 −0.66 −0.68
South Africa (ZAF) 2.02 3.35 3.70 10.94 1.66 −0.47 −0.21
Mean 2.64 3.99 3.61 12.84 1.56 −0.45 −0.46
Dow Jones List
Argentina (ARG) 5.67 10.32 3.75 30.96 1.82 −0.76 −0.29
Chile (CHL) 5.55 7.66 36.56 19.77 1.38 −0.26 0.09
Malaysia (MYS) 3.82 6.06 9.80 7.33 1.58 −0.37 −0.31
Mauritius (MUS) 4.01 7.14 5.87 7.49 1.78 −0.23 −0.40
Mexico (MEX) 3.26 5.76 3.21 11.15 1.77 −0.27 −0.65
Morocco (MAR) 3.02 3.08 4.20 9.97 1.02 −0.06 −0.03
Thailand (THA) 4.13 4.31 5.50 7.10 1.04 −0.54 −0.38
Mean 4.21 6.33 9.84 13.40 1.48 −0.36 −0.28
Mean EMEs 3.48 5.68 5.99 13.19 1.67 −0.34 −0.36
Developed
Australia (AUS) 1.66 1.40 1.26 8.54 0.84 −0.10 0.07
Austria (AUT) 1.57 2.08 2.30 11.72 1.32 0.00 −0.13
Canada (CAN) 2.19 2.24 1.94 4.97 1.02 0.03 −0.37
Sweden (SWE) 2.12 2.21 3.12 9.80 1.04 −0.03 −0.14
Switzerland (CHE) 2.21 1.89 3.60 11.40 0.86 −0.16 0.05
Mean 1.63 1.64 2.04 7.74 0.85 −0.04 −0.09
Notes: Data are annual and taken from the IFS. All series, except for the net exports to output
ratio, are real per capita variables, have been logged and filtered using the HP filter with smooth-
ing parameter λ = 100. Standard deviations are reported in percentage points. The samples are:
Brazil, 1980–2010; Russia, 1995–2010; India, 1970–2010; China, 1986–2010; Colombia, 1970–2010;
Indonesia, 1970–2010; Vietnam, 1995–2010; Egypt, 1982–2009; Turkey, 1987–2010; South Africa,
1960–2010; Argentina, 1970–2010; Chile, 1970–2009; Malaysia, 1970–2010; Mauritius, 1970–2010;
Mexico, 1970–2010; Morocco, 1975–2008; Thailand, 1960–2010; Australia, 1960–2010; Austria,
1978–2010; Canada, 1950–2010; Sweden, 1950–2010; and Switzerland 1970–2010.
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Figure 2.1: Business Cycles in Output
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Notes: Deviations of logged real GDP per capita from HP trend. Table notes of Table 2.1 on data
information apply here, too.
instance, the degree of countercyclicality of the net exports to output ratio varies
across EMEs. While Turkish GDP is highly negatively correlated with the net
exports to output ratio, there is hardly any relation between these two variables
in China. Similar discrepancies can be found regarding the excess volatility of
consumption. In Mexico, the standard deviation of consumption is almost twice
as high as the standard deviation of GDP. Conversely, there is virtually no excess
volatility of consumption in Thailand and Morocco. Furthermore, although real
depreciations are generally attended by higher net exports in EMEs, we do not
observe this particular feature in Chile, China, and Morocco.
A large literature has been devoted to analyzing these business cycle phenom-
ena in emerging markets. Yet previous studies have predominantly focused on
Latin American countries. Especially, Argentina (Kydland and Zarazaga 2002,
Neumeyer and Perri 2005, and Garcı´a-Cicco et al. 2010) and Mexico (Aguiar and
Gopinath 2007, Boz et al. 2011, and Chang and Ferna´ndez 2013) have been at
the center of earlier research. Given the potential heterogeneity across EMEs,
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we would like to contribute to the existing literature by investigating a broader
selection of countries. In the empirical part of our paper in Sections 2.5 and 2.6,
we therefore parametrize our DSGE model introduced below for the emerging
markets of Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey as well as the advanced economies
of Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland. This allows us to get more general insights
into the different business cycle patterns in these two county groups.
2.2.2 Valuation Effects
Valuation effects refer to changes in a country’s net foreign asset position that do
not arise from cross–border financial flows but are due to movements in asset
prices or exchange rates. Accordingly, valuation effects (VAL) are the difference
between the change in the net foreign asset position (∆NFA) and the current
account (CA):
VAL = ∆NFA − CA.
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between valuation effects
and the current account in EMEs. Our descriptive exercise relies on annual data
on the stock of foreign liabilities in Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey over the time
period from 1980 to 2007 provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Current
account data are taken from the IFS database. We use foreign debt instead of
net foreign assets, because it is the empirical counterpart to the net foreign asset
position in the theoretical model analyzed in this paper.9 As a consequence, we
calculate valuation effects simply by subtracting the current account from the
negative change in the foreign debt position.10
Figure 2.2 portrays annual valuation effects as well as the current account, both
as a percentage of current GDP. As is evident from the graph, there is a negative
link between the current account and valuation effects. This is especially the case
9Note that foreign short–term debt traditionally accounts for a large part of the total external
balance sheet in emerging markets (see Kose and Prasad 2010). Consequently, movements in the
net foreign asset position in these countries essentially reflect changes in foreign liabilities. It is
therefore not surprising that we obtained similar results when we performed this exercise based
on the actual net foreign asset position.
10Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) point out that differences between the change in the net foreign
asset position and the current account may also arise from other factors than valuation effects,
such as measurement errors or omissions in the data. Therefore, we have to be careful when
interpreting the magnitude of valuation effects computed here.
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Figure 2.2: Valuation Effects and the Current Account in Emerging Markets
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−7.5
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
7.5
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 G
DP
Year
Mexico
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−7.5
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
7.5
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 G
DP
Year
South Africa
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−7.5
−5
−2.5
0
2.5
5
7.5
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 G
DP
Year
Turkey
 
 
Valuation Effects Current Account
Notes: Valuation effects and the current account in Mexico, South Africa and Turkey as a
percentage of GDP. To compute valuation effects, we subtract the current account from the
negative change in foreign liabilities. Data on foreign debt are taken from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), while current account data are retrieved from the IFS database.
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for Mexico and South Africa but less obvious for Turkey. The sample correlation
between the two series is −0.58, −0.75, and −0.05 for Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey, respectively. This means that a current account deficit is associated with
positive valuation effects, which actually dampens the deterioration of the net
foreign asset position. Hence, our descriptive analysis hints at a stabilizing nature
of valuation effects.
2.3 The Model
Consider a real business cycle model of a small open economy. The domestic
economy is inhabited by a unit mass of atomistic, identical, and infinitely lived
households. Agents form rational expectations and seek to maximize lifetime
utility by consuming two differentiated commodities: a home–produced good as
well as a foreign good imported from the rest of the world. Some key ingredients
of our framework are borrowed from Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). In particu-
lar, production technology features both a permanent and a transitory stochastic
component. In addition, we augment our setup with financial frictions as pro-
posed by Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010). That is, agents have access to an incomplete
international credit market, on which the price of debt is determined according
to a debt–elastic interest rate rule.
In what follows, we choose the domestically produced good as nume´raire
and normalize its price in the home country to one, i.e. pH,t = 1. Thus, all
variables are expressed in units of the home good. Section 2.3.1 presents our
benchmark model. In Section 2.3.2, we introduce a further financial distortion in
our framework by assuming that domestic agents can only borrow in foreign
currency on international capital markets. We call this modified setup the liability
dollarization model. Section 2.3.3 provides a summary of both models and shows
how we solve them. A detailed description of the liability dollarization model
including the derivation of optimality and steady state conditions is presented in
Appendix A.1.
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2.3.1 Benchmark Model
Producing Economy
The home economy produces a differentiated domestic final good in a perfectly
competitive environment. Technology is described by a neoclassical production
function of the form
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α, (2.1)
with Yt, lt, Kt, and α denoting aggregate output of the home good, labor input,
aggregate capital, and the economy’s capital share, respectively. Moreover, zt and
Γt describe two different exogenous technology processes. On the one hand, the
economy is exposed to transitory fluctuations in total factor productivity captured
by zt, which follows a stationary first–order autoregressive (AR) process in logs:
zt = z
ρz
t−1 exp(
z
t ), with 
z
t ∼ N(0, σ2z). (2.2)
On the other hand, we build on Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and assume that
the producing economy is not only hit by transitory shocks but also by trend
shocks. For this reason, production technology features a non–stationary labor
augmenting productivity component represented by Γt, which equals the cumu-
lative product of growth shocks:
Γt = gtΓt−1 =
t∏
s=0
gs, where gt = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t−1 exp(
g
t ), with 
g
t ∼ N(0, σ2g).
(2.3)
The underlying structure of the non–stationary technology process implies that
a realization of gs will never die out and therefore has a permanent impact on
Γt, for all t ≥ s. Parameters |ρz| < 1 and |ρg| < 1 determine the persistence of the
two exogenous processes. zt and 
g
t represent shocks to the transitory and per-
manent technology process, respectively, with σ2z and σ2g being the corresponding
variances. Finally, µg refers to the long–term or steady state gross growth rate of
the economy.
Let It denote investment in the capital stock at date t. The evolution of the
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capital stock is described by the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It − φ2
(Kt+1
Kt
− µg
)2
Kt. (2.4)
The last term in equation (2.4) introduces quadratic capital adjustment costs.
Parameter φ determines the weight of adjustment costs and δ is the depreciation
rate.
Representative Household
The representative household’s objective is to maximize expected lifetime utility
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tu(Cτ, 1 − lτ), (2.5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, u(.) is period utility, which is
assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in both arguments, and (1 − lt)
denotes time spent on leisure activities in period t. Ct is a composite consumption
index characterized by a standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) aggregate:
Ct =
[
θ
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
,
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of home goods in consumption, and η ∈ (0,∞) is the
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between differentiated home and foreign
goods. Consequently, CH,t and CF,t correspond to consumption of the home and
foreign good, respectively.
We follow Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and assume that preferences are de-
scribed by a canonical Cobb–Douglas Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
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utility function:11
u(Ct, 1 − lt) =
[
Cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
]1−σ
1 − σ ,
where σ co–determines the degree of relative risk aversion, and γ ∈ (0, 1) describes
the consumption weight in utility.12
Our theoretical economy features only one non–contingent financial asset.
At each time t, the representative agent can issue Dt+1 one–period bonds on
international capital markets at a predetermined risk–free rate rt. Accordingly,
the household faces the following period resource constraint:
Yt + Dt+1 ≥ ptCt + It + Dt(1 + rt−1), (2.6)
where pt denotes the price of composite consumption. Equation (2.6) embeds the
standard interpretation. It simply requires that total expenditures at date t in form
of consumption, investment and debt repayments (RHS) are financed by income
plus new loans (LHS).
Since variables Yt, Ct, CH,t, CF,t, It, Kt, and Dt exhibit a stochastic trend, they
need to be detrended in order to ensure stationarity of the system. Let lower
case letters xt indicate the stationary counterpart of Xt. We can then detrend our
relevant variables in a straightforward manner:
xt ≡ Xt
Γt−1
.
We can now return to the optimization rationale of the representative agent
stated in (2.5). We can split the problem into two stages: intratemporal and in-
tertemporal optimization. First, intratemporal household optimization yields the
11This instantaneous utility function is non–separable in consumption and leisure and thereby
leads to income effects on labor supply. A number of studies in this strand of the literature
(Mendoza 1991, Neumeyer and Perri 2005, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. 2010, Boz et al. 2011, and Chang and
Ferna´ndez 2013) use a quasi–linear period utility function pioneered by Greenwood et al. (1988),
so–called GHH preferences, and generalized by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). A key characteristic
of this preference specification is that it rules out any income effects on labor supply.
12Note that this functional form of utility implies that the Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk
aversion corresponds to 1 − γ(1 − σ) rather than σ. Accordingly, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is given by 11−γ(1−σ) .
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following demand functions for the home and foreign consumption good:
cH,t = θp
η
t ct, (2.7)
and
cF,t = (1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct. (2.8)
In addition, the price index of composite consumption is determined by
pt =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η
, (2.9)
where pF,t denotes the price of the foreign good expressed in units of the home–
produced good.
Next, we consider the intertemporal optimization problem. Final good produc-
ing firms are owned by the representative household, who hires labor and rents
capital for which it pays competitive prices. Thus, we can combine the detrended
versions of the production function (2.1), the law of motion of capital (2.4), and the
aggregate resource constraint (2.6) to state the stationary maximization problem
at time t as
max
{cτ,lτ,kτ+1,dτ+1}
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(Γγ(1−σ)τ−1 u(cτ, 1 − lτ))
s.t.
yτ + (1 − δ)kτ + gτdτ+1 ≥ pτcτ + gτkτ+1 + φ2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ + dτ(1 + rτ−1),
taking as given kt, dt, as well as the transversality condition lim
j→∞
Et
[∏ j−2
s=0
dt+ j
1+rt+s
]
=
0. The solution to this maximization problem renders the following optimality
conditions:
1
ct
(
cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[
1
ct+1
(
cγt+1(1 − lt+1)1−γ
)1−σ ·
pt
(
α yt+1kt+1 + (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1 kt+2kt+1 − µg
)
gt+1 kt+2kt+1 −
φ
2
(
gt+1 kt+2kt+1 − µg
)2)
pt+1
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)) ], (2.10)
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1
ct
(
cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
= βgγ(1−σ)−1t Et
[
1
ct+1
(
cγt+1(1 − lt+1)1−γ
)1−σ pt
pt+1
]
(1 + rt), (2.11)
and
pt
1 − γ
γ
ct
1 − lt = (1 − α)
yt
lt
. (2.12)
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) represent the intertemporal Euler Equations with re-
spect to capital and bond holdings, respectively. Condition (2.12) specifies the
standard labor–leisure trade–off.
International Prices and Trade
Interest Rates
We assume that the interest rate rt on international debt borrowed at date t and
due in period t+1 is increasing in expected future external debt relative to income:
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[Dt+1
Yt+1
]
− D
Y
)
− 1
)
. (2.13)
The reason why we introduce this interest rate rule in our setup is twofold. First,
as Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) point out, it is a convenient way to make
the deterministic equilibrium independent of initial conditions and thus to close
the model. Second, it allows us to feature financial frictions in our theoretical
economy in a reduced form.
According to equation (2.13), the cost of debt depends on the steady state inter-
est rate r, the economy’s steady state debt to GDP ratio DY , and the expected level
of debt over GDP in the next period Et
[
Dt+1
Yt+1
]
. Note that for ease of interpretation
we use the debt to GDP ratio to determine the interest rate rather than the level
of total debt. Intuitively, a country finds it hard to borrow on soft terms and is
charged a premium over the equilibrium interest rate if it is expected to face high
debt relative to the size of its economy in the future.13
13Admittedly, there is no micro foundation upon which we build our interest rate rule. Nev-
ertheless, the imposed positive relationship between debt over GDP and borrowing costs in our
framework is consistent with findings in the sovereign debt literature. For instance, Arellano
(2008) develops a model, which shows how higher indebtedness increases the probability of de-
fault and thus raises the interest rate. Likewise, a large body of empirical research has emphasized
the importance of a country’s external debt in explaining interest rate spreads (see Uribe and Yue
2006). Furthermore, as Uribe (2006) demonstrates, we could also introduce a borrowing con-
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In our benchmark setup, we follow Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and interpret ψ
as a catchall parameter for financial frictions and financial development. A high
value of ψ implies that the interest rate reacts more sensitively to changes in the
expected future debt to GDP ratio, which reflects severe capital market distortions
in the economy.14 Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) highlight the importance of the size
of ψ for the analysis of business cycles in both developed economies and EMEs.
In light of this, our empirical analysis below permits ψ to take on values that are
substantially greater than zero. Therefore, we allow for variation in the interest
rate, which entails important implications for the dynamics in our model.15
Exchange Rate
The household’s optimization problem abroad is analogous to the home country.
Since we consider an SOE framework, the home economy is infinitesimally small
relative to the rest of the world. That is, the foreign country is approximately
closed and only consumes goods produced abroad. As a result, the foreign price
index of the foreign consumption composite p?t boils down to the foreign price of
goods produced in the rest of the world p?F,t, i.e. p
?
t = p
?
F,t. We assume that the law
of one price holds such that
pF,t =
p?F,t
st
=
p?t
st
,
straint in our small open economy framework to generate an endogenous country spread. In such
a model, a premium over the equilibrium interest rate emerges if the debt ceiling is binding. In
light of this, we believe that our interest rate rule provides a convenient way to capture credit
market imperfections even though it leaves out an endogenous explanation within the model.
14At this point it is intuitive to look at the log–linearized version of the interest rate rule given
by
r̂t r =
d
y
ψEt
[
d̂t+1 − ŷt+1
]
⇔ ∆rt
∆Et
[(
d
y
)
t+1
] ≈ ψ,
where hatted variables denote log–deviations from steady state and ∆ indicates absolute changes.
Accordingly, r̂t · r approximately corresponds to the absolute deviation of the interest rate from
its steady state value r. Hence, we can identify the effective debt–elasticity of the interest rate as
ψ
r · dy . More specifically, parameter ψ determines by how many percentage points the interest rate
at date t increases if, ceteris paribus, we expect the debt to income ratio to rise by one percentage
point in period t + 1.
15ψ needs to be positive in order to induce stationarity. However, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
and other related studies set ψ equal to 0.001, i.e. virtually equal to zero. In doing so, these
authors basically shut down interest rate changes and thereby eliminate any feedback effects from
the interest rate on other macroeconomic variables (see Garcı´a-Cicco et al. 2010).
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where st = p?H,t defines the price of the home good in the foreign country. In fact,
st can be interpreted as the ”nominal exchange rate” determining the price of the
domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency, since we have normalized the
domestic price of the home good to one (pH,t = 1). As a result, we can define the
real exchange rate as the price of the domestic composite consumption good in
units of the foreign composite consumption good:
et =
ptst
p?t
=
ptst
p?F,t
=
ptst
pF,tst
=
pt
pF,t
. (2.14)
Net Exports and Current Account
We assume that the consumption index of agents abroad is also characterized by
a CES aggregate. For simplicity, we also assume that variables in the domestic
economy and the rest of the world exhibit the same stochastic trend component,
i.e. Γt−1 = Γ?t−1. Let c
?
t denote detrended foreign consumption such that we can
derive foreign demand for the home good, from the perspective of the home
country, as
c?H,t = θ
?pη
?
F,t c
?
t , (2.15)
where θ? ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of home goods in foreign consumption, and
η? ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution abroad.
Consequently, net exports in the home economy can be easily calculated as the
difference between exports and imports:
nxt = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t. (2.16)
Furthermore, the current account is given by the trade balance minus interest
payments on external debt:
cat = −rt−1dt + nxt. (2.17)
As in any standard intertemporal model of the current account (see Obstfeld and
Rogoff 1996), the current account in our benchmark economy simply equals the
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change in the country’s net foreign asset position:
∆n f at+1 = −gtdt+1 + dt = cat. (2.18)
General Equilibrium
In a general equilibrium, all markets have to clear. Equilibrium in the market for
the home–produced good requires that output equals domestic absorption plus
foreign demand:
yt = cH,t + it + c?H,t. (2.19)
Finally, foreign consumption is assumed to follow an exogenous first–order
AR process in logs:
c?t+1 = (c
?
t )
ρc exp(ct+1), with 
c
t ∼ N(0, σ2c ). (2.20)
This specification introduces external disturbances in our setup, which potentially
allows foreign demand shocks, along with permanent and transitory productivity
shocks, to drive the dynamics in the model.
2.3.2 Liability Dollarization
A well–known characteristic of EMEs is that they have had difficulties in borrow-
ing in their own currencies on international capital markets.16 In fact, the bulk of
external debt in these countries has traditionally been issued in major currencies
like US dollar, euro, sterling, or Swiss francs (see Eichengreen et al. 2005). Being
denominated in foreign currency, the amount of outstanding loans is subject to
substantial exchange rate fluctuations which may induce non–negligible external
balance sheet effects. In order to account for this phenomenon, which is often re-
ferred to as liability dollarization, we now extend our benchmark framework from
the previous subsection along this dimension.
The basic structure of the model coincides with our benchmark model. Thus,
most of equations and optimality conditions from Section 2.3.1 simply carry over.
16This phenomena has been documented by an extensive literature. See, for instance, Reinhart
et al. (2003), Lane and Shambaugh (2010) and contributions in Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005).
26
As we have set up our model in real terms, liability dollarization means that the
home country can only borrow in units of foreign consumption. Accordingly, the
resource constraint of the economy adjusts to17
Yt + pt
Dt+1
et
≥ ptCt + It + pt Dtet (1 + rt−1). (2.21)
This has an immediate impact on household optimization such that we obtain an
intertemporal Euler Equation with respect to foreign debt of
1
ct
(
cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
= βgγ(1−σ)−1t Et
[ 1
ct+1
(
cγt+1(1 − lt+1)1−γ
)1−σ et
et+1
]
(1 + rt). (2.22)
Note that liability dollarization changes the price of consumption at date t ex-
pressed in units of date t + 1 relative to the benchmark case in equation (2.11).
In particular, it alters the impact of the exchange rate fluctuations on the optimal
intertemporal consumption allocation of the representative household.
In addition, our interest rate rule modifies to
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[
pt+1Dt+1
et+1Yt+1
]
− pD
eY
)
− 1
)
. (2.23)
It is worth emphasizing that with interest rates determined by equation (2.23), pa-
rameter ψ can no longer be interpreted as a catchall variable for financial frictions
as we do in the benchmark economy (see equation (2.13)). When households issue
new debt, they do not know how much they have to repay in the future because
exchange rate variations change the value of outstanding debt. Hence, the fact
that countries are forced to borrow in foreign currency itself represents a special
form of capital market distortions. In the model at hand we can therefore encom-
pass the extent of financial frictions by the interplay of liability dollarization and
debt–elastic interest rates.18
17Note that international debt D is expressed in units of the foreign composite consumption
good such that De is denoted in units of the domestic consumption good. Hence, we have to
multiply De by the price of domestic consumption p in order to obtain foreign debt expressed in
units of the home–produced good.
18Note that the log–linearized version of the interest rate rule is given by
r̂t r =
pd
ey
ψEt
[
p̂t+1 + d̂t+1 − ŷt+1 − êt+1
]
⇔ ∆rt
∆Et
[( pd
ey
)
t+1
] ≈ ψ.
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Importantly, the value of outstanding international debt depends on the evo-
lution of the real exchange rate. As a result, the change in the country’s net foreign
asset position no longer equals the current account but is now adjusted for valu-
ation effects stemming from exchange rate changes. We can write the detrended
current account as
cat = nxt − rt−1pt dtet . (2.24)
Moreover, we derive the change in detrended net foreign assets as the sum of the
current account and valuation effects:
∆n f at = −gtpt dt+1et + pt−1
dt
et−1
(2.25)
(2.21)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = yt − ptct − it − rt−1pt dtet + pt−1
dt
et−1
− pt dtet
(2.19)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t − rt−1pt
dt
et
+ dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
(2.16)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = nxt − rt−1pt dtet + dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
(2.24)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = cat + valt.
Hence, the stationary version of valuation effects at date t is given by
valt = dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
. (2.26)
2.3.3 Model Solution
Once the variables incorporating the stochastic permanent component have been
detrended, the models introduced above constitute stationary systems of non–
linear expectational difference equations. In the benchmark model the system is
featured by 18 variables (yt, ct, rt, et, it, lt, cH,t, cF,t, c?H,t, pt, pF,t, nxt, cat, kt, dt, zt, gt,
c?t ) in the stationary versions of equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8),
(2.9), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), (2.13), (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.19), and (2.20). The
model with liability dollarization forms a system of 20 variables (yt, ct, rt, et, it, lt,
cH,t, cF,t, c?H,t, pt, pF,t, nxt, cat, ∆n f at, valt, kt, dt, zt, gt, c
?
t ) in the detrended versions of
equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.12), (2.14), (2.15), (2.16),
The interpretation of the size of parameter ψ is the same as in the benchmark case.
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(2.19), (2.20), (2.21), (2.22), (2.23), (2.24), (2.25), and (2.26).
For each setup, we use a first–order approximation of the respective model
solution and log–linearize the system around its deterministic steady state (See
Appendix A.2). All equations being log–linearized, we end up with a linear
system of first–order expectational difference equations, which we solve using the
method proposed by Klein (2000). The solution yields a state space representation
yt =Zαt
αt =Tαt−1 + Rηt,
(2.27)
where yt is an (n× 1) vector of control variables and αt is the (m× 1) unobservable
state vector, which is driven by the exogenous processes ηt of dimension (x ×
1). Therefore, the matrix R, which links the state variables to the exogenous
processes, has dimension (m × x).19 This representation enables us to estimate
certain structural parameters of our models using country–specific data, which
will be described in detail in the next section.
2.4 Estimation and Calibration
To gauge the models’ ability to explain macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs, we
quantify our theoretical economy for three EMEs: Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey. Furthermore, to assess the peculiarity of business cycles in emerging
markets, we also parametrize the benchmark model for a group of developed
small open economies, represented by Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland.
We choose a mixture of country–specific calibration and Bayesian estimation.
In particular, we estimate the parameters determining the exogenous processes in
the model as well as the debt–elasticity of the interest rateψ. All other parameters
are calibrated. Given our focus on the role of liability dollarization as a form of
financial frictions in EMEs, we estimate both models for Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey, whereas for our developed economies, we only analyze the benchmark
framework.
19Accordingly, in the benchmark model, we have x = 3, m = 5, and n = 13. In the liability
dollarization model, we have x = 3, m = 5, and n = 15.
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2.4.1 Data
The time unit t in our theoretical economy is counted as quarters. To estimate
our linearized models, we use quarterly time series on real per capita GDP and
consumption, real interest rates and real exchange rates. All data are taken from
the IFS database. The time series of real per capita output and consumption are
seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X–12 ARIMA procedure. Our
selection of countries and sample period is motivated by data availability and
comparability with existing literature. Table 2.2 summarizes the sample period
used for estimation for each country.
Table 2.2: Data for Estimation
EmergingMarkets Developed Economies
Mexico (MEX) 1981Q1–2011Q4 Canada (CAN) 1960Q1–2011Q4
South Africa (ZAF) 1960Q1–2011Q4 Sweden (SWE) 1981Q1–2011Q4
Turkey (TUR) 1987Q1–2011Q4 Switzerland (CHE) 1970Q1–2011Q3
Notes: All data are taken from the IFS database. Variables used for estimation are real GDP per
capita, real consumption per capita, the real interest rate, and the real exchange rates.
To calculate real per capita variables, we divide the respective nominal se-
ries by population and subsequently deflate output using the GDP deflator and
consumption using the CPI. Population data are only available on an annual fre-
quency. Hence, we pin down population in the respective second quarter at the
reported annual figure and interpolate missing data points using annual growth
rates. Our construction of real interest rates is similar to the approach chosen
by Neumeyer and Perri (2005). That is, we subtract domestic expected inflation
based on the GDP deflator from the annual nominal interest rate, which is then
transformed into a 3–month rate.20 Expected inflation is calculated as the average
of actual inflation in the current period and the three previous quarters. Finally,
for each country we construct a real exchange rate index, which is normalized
to 100 in 2005Q2 by multiplying the respective nominal US dollar exchange rate
(US dollar per national currency) by the domestic CPI and dividing by the US
20For Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland we use T–bill rates, whereas
for Turkey we take the deposit rate. Note that Neumeyer and Perri (2005) subtract expected
US inflation from the dollar interest rate based on the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index
(EMBI) spread. We use domestic expected inflation instead because our model describes the
behavior of a domestic representative agent as opposed to an international investor.
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CPI. Moreover, we follow Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and filter our data prior to
estimation by removing the cubic trend from the real series in logs.
2.4.2 Calibration
Table 2.3 reports the calibration of our parameters. We keep the majority of
structural parameters constant across both models and countries, and assign
conventional values suggested by previous literature. In doing so, we try to
retain a high degree of comparability with earlier contributions. In particular,
we follow Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and set the subjective discount factor β
equal to 0.98, the weight of consumption in the utility function γ equal to 0.36,
the parameter governing the curvature of the utility function σ equal to 2, the
weight of the adjustment costs φ equal to 4, the capital share in the production
function equal to 0.32, and the rate of depreciation δ equal to 0.05. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the mean value of both the transitory productivity
process z and the foreign consumption process c? to 1. There is no consensus in
the literature concerning which value to choose for the elasticity of intratemporal
substitution between home and foreign goods (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000).
We assume that the price elasticity of goods is the same throughout the world
and follow Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) by setting its value equal to unity, i.e.
η = η? = 1. Moreover, we pin down θ = 0.8 and θ? = 0.2 to match a consumption
import share both at home and abroad of 20 percent. This choice is motivated by
empirical figures reported in Burstein et al. (2005).
Two parameters are fixed country–specifically. We calibrate the mean of the
non–stationary productivity process µg at the average quarterly gross growth rate
of real per capita GDP. We pin down the steady state external debt to GDP ratio at
the average annual net foreign asset position.21 That is, we set DY in the benchmark
model and pDeY in the model with liability dollarization equal to 35.63 percent, 24.36
percent, 23.20 percent, 31.08 percent, and 18.63 percent for Mexico, South Africa,
Turkey, Canada, and Sweden, respectively. Switzerland is a net creditor to the
rest of the world and thus exhibits a positive average net foreign asset position
21Average net foreign asset positions are calculated based on annual data between 1970 and
2007 collected by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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relative to GDP of 90 percent.
Table 2.3: Calibrated Values
General Parameters
β discount factor 0.98 θ? foreign share of home goods 0.20
γ consumption weight in utility 0.36 η domestic elasticity of intratemporal
σ curvature of utility 2.00 substitution 1.00
φ weight of adjustment costs 4.00 η? foreign elasticity of intratemporal
α capital share 0.32 substitution 1.00
δ depreciation rate 0.05 z mean of z process 1.00
θ domestic share of home goods 0.80 c? mean of c? process 1.00
Country–specific Parameters( p
e ·
)
D
Y external debt ratio µg mean gross growth rate
MEX 0.36 MEX 1.0018
ZAF 0.24 ZAF 1.0026
TUR 0.23 TUR 1.0063
CAN 0.31 CAN 1.0049
SWE 0.19 SWE 1.0046
CHE −0.90 CHE 1.0029
Notes: In the benchmark model, we pin down DY . In the model with liability dollarization, we
calibrate pDeY at the reported value of the external debt to income ratio.
2.4.3 Estimation
Similar to recent studies in this field of research (e.g. Garcı´a-Cicco et al. 2010 or
Chang and Ferna´ndez 2013), we adopt a Bayesian viewpoint. Besides computa-
tional advantages, this allows us to incorporate prior beliefs about the structural
parameters in a straightforward manner. As pointed out above, the size of param-
eter ψ, which determines the debt–elasticity of interest rates, may have important
implications for the dynamics in the model. However, ex–ante we do not have
strong beliefs about the size of the debt–elasticity of interest rates. To this end,
we estimate parameter ψ as well as the parameters governing the exogenous
structural shocks in the model.
A major contribution of this work is that our estimation procedure allows for
a dynamic structure in the ”measurement error”, which captures the off–model
dynamics in the data. To our knowledge, this represents a novel approach in this
strand of the literature. Related previous studies deal differently with the crucial
issue on how to address these residual dynamics of our observable variables in
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the estimation.22 Naturally, our SOE setup is too stylized to account for all the
dynamics in real macroeconomic time series. Hence, we build on Sargent (1989)
and Ireland (2004) and include a (vector–)autoregressive ”measurement error”
component to capture the dynamics in the data that cannot be replicated by the
structural model itself. Accordingly, our state space representation in equation
(2.27) modifies to
yt =Zαt + t
αt =Tαt−1 + Rηt, ηt ∼ N(0,Σ)
t =At−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,Ω)
(2.28)
where t is an (nestimation×1) vector of measurement errors and nestimation denotes the
number of observables we use for estimation, which is four in our case. We assume
that the off–model dynamics inherent in each variable follow an autoregressive
process such that all off–diagonal entries of the (nestimation × nestimation) coefficient
matrix A are restricted to zero.
We apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation using the
Metropolis–Hastings algorithm within the Gibbs sampler23 to derive the posterior
distributions of the parameters. First, we implement Gibbs sampling to simulate
the posteriors of the parameters defining our exogenous processes ρz, σ2z , ρg, σ2g, ρc
and σ2c , A, and Ω. Then, at each simulation iteration, conditional on the current
Gibbs draw, we add a Metropolis–Hastings step in order to approximate the pos-
terior distribution of ψ. We therefore apply a random walk Metropolis Hastings
algorithm, in which we choose the variance of the proposal density such that we
get an acceptance ratio of about 20 to 40 percent. We estimate the whole model
with different starting values in order to control for the possibility of multiple
modes in the posterior distribution.
Apart from the volatility in the off–model dynamics, our prior beliefs are con-
stant across all models and countries. They are summarized in Table 2.4. We
22For instance, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and Ferna´ndez (2013) impose a simple White
Noise process on the measurement error. In addition, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) tightly restrict the
variance of the measurement error, so that it cannot explain more than 6 percent of the variation
in the respective observable variable.
23See Appendix C.4 for further detail regarding the estimation algorithm.
33
impose a normal distribution with mean 0.5 and variance 0.02 on the autore-
gressive coefficients of structural shocks. Regarding the persistence parameters
of measurement errors, it is more difficult to come up with informative priors.
Therefore, we implement rather diffuse priors and assume they follow a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance 0.05. Since the normal distribution has
infinite support, we enforce stationarity by restricting the AR coefficients to lie
within the unit circle. Priors on the volatility of the structural exogenous processes
are harmonized and are described by an inverse Gamma distribution with shape
parameter 2.05 and scale factor 0.0105.24 Furthermore, we fix the prior distribu-
tion of the measurement error variance country–specifically such that its mean
matches the variance of the respective observable time series used for estimation.
Finally, we impose a fairly flat uniform distribution with support [0.001, 5] on our
financial frictions parameter ψ.
Table 2.4: Prior Distributions
Prior Dist. Prior Prior Dist. Prior Prior Dist. Prior
90% Bands 90% Bands 90% Bands
Harmonized Priors
ψ U(0.001, 5) –
ρz N(0.5, 0.02) [0.269,0.733]
ρg N(0.5, 0.02) [0.269,0.733]
ρc N(0.5, 0.02) [0.269,0.733]
ρy N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
ρc N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
ρr N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
ρe N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
σ2z IG(2.05, 0.011) [0.002,0.028]
σ2g IG(2.05, 0.011) [0.002,0.028]
σ2c IG(2.05, 0.011) [0.002,0.028]
Country–Specific Priors
Mexico South Africa Turkey
σ2y IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.002) [0.000,0.006]
σ2c IG(2.01, 0.003) [0.001,0.010] IG(2.00, 0.002) [0.000,0.006] IG(2.01, 0.004) [0.001,0.012]
σ2r IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.001]
σ2e IG(2.16, 0.021) [0.004,0.050] IG(2.21, 0.025) [0.005,0.056] IG(2.15, 0.020) [0.004,0.050]
Canada Sweden Switzerland
σ2y IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.003] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.004] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.001]
σ2c IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.003] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.001]
σ2r IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000]
σ2e IG(2.02, 0.007) [0.001,0.019] IG(2.00, 0.022) [0.005,0.062] IG(2.24, 0.028) [0.005,0.060]
24This prior distribution implies a mean of 0.01 and variance of 0.002.
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2.5 Estimation Results
This section discusses the estimation results for the six countries under investi-
gation. First, we present the posterior distributions of our estimated parameters.
Then, we run a “horse race” between the benchmark model and the liability dol-
larization setup with respect to their ability to capture the dynamics in our four
observable variables.
2.5.1 Parameter Distributions
In the following, we focus on the estimation results concerning the structural part
of the model. Table 2.5 displays the posterior distribution of the estimated struc-
tural parameters. A complete description of all estimated parameters, including
those determining the off–model dynamics, can be found in the Appendix.
All results are based on 150,000 draws of which the initial 100,000 (125,000)
draws were burned for EMEs (developed economies). We keep only every 25th
(10th) draw for EMEs (developed economies) in order to avoid autocorrelation
problems. Furthermore, we have performed a convergence test for each speci-
fication. Columns four and seven in Table 2.5 report the p–values of Geweke’s
χ2–test (see Geweke 1992). We can never reject the null of convergence at conven-
tional significance levels. Therefore, we are rather confident that our posterior
distributions have converged.
Let us first consider the estimates of parameter ψ. We do not only find het-
erogeneity with respect to the choice of the model but also regarding the country
group. What is striking is thatψ is considerably higher in the benchmark economy
than in the model featuring foreign currency debt. Thus, once we introduce liabil-
ity dollarization as a further form of capital market imperfections, the estimated
debt–elasticity of interest rates becomes less pronounced.25 This is particularly
the case for the Mexican economy, where we observe an extreme discrepancy in ψ
25Admittedly, this finding is not very surprising. In the liability dollarization setup, variation
in the interest rate can additionally be attributed to exchange rates fluctuations. Compare the
interest rate rules in equations (2.13) and (2.23). Since real exchange rates in EMEs tend to be
procyclical, volatility on the right–hand side of the interest rate rule unambiguously rises once
we introduce liability dollarization, while it remains unchanged on the left–hand side such that
factor ψ must decline.
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Table 2.5: Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Posterior Posterior χ2 Posterior Posterior χ2
Median 90% Bands Test Median 90% Bands Test
EmergingMarket Economies
Mexico
Benchmark Liability Dollarization
ψ 4.342 [3.315,4.885] 0.27 0.216 [0.0880,0.488] 0.96
ρz 0.622 [0.487,0.744] 0.58 0.708 [0.5741,0.828] 0.50
ρg 0.751 [0.637,0.845] 0.58 0.790 [0.6316,0.890] 0.26
ρc 0.689 [0.458,0.875] 0.37 0.547 [0.3648,0.726] 0.21
σ2z 0.034 [0.028,0.043] 0.91 0.036 [0.0289,0.044] 0.79
σ2g 0.040 [0.031,0.052] 0.26 0.029 [0.0213,0.039] 0.83
σ2c 0.128 [0.082,0.201] 0.89 0.189 [0.1056,0.370] 0.45
South Africa
Benchmark Liability Dollarization
ψ 1.664 [1.115,2.668] 0.31 0.275 [0.1578,0.420] 0.93
ρz 0.918 [0.874,0.958] 0.50 0.782 [0.6795,0.863] 0.92
ρg 0.827 [0.767,0.886] 0.86 0.797 [0.6900,0.869] 0.95
ρc 0.626 [0.442,0.815] 0.43 0.654 [0.4663,0.798] 0.59
σ2z 0.015 [0.014,0.018] 0.85 0.020 [0.0172,0.023] 0.91
σ2g 0.012 [0.010,0.014] 0.22 0.016 [0.0123,0.021] 0.86
σ2c 0.082 [0.059,0.110] 0.34 0.086 [0.0579,0.137] 0.56
Turkey
Benchmark Liability Dollarization
ψ 4.067 [2.743,4.830] 0.50 0.455 [0.1259,1.182] 0.86
ρz 0.691 [0.552,0.803] 0.25 0.648 [0.5124,0.763] 0.24
ρg 0.629 [0.508,0.741] 0.46 0.705 [0.5614,0.811] 0.10
ρc 0.646 [0.428,0.822] 0.49 0.507 [0.3384,0.655] 0.48
σ2z 0.062 [0.049,0.078] 0.87 0.059 [0.0455,0.075] 0.49
σ2g 0.080 [0.060,0.107] 0.14 0.074 [0.0528,0.101] 0.66
σ2c 0.201 [0.114,0.384] 0.12 0.192 [0.1026,0.428] 0.20
Developed Economies
Canada Sweden
ψ 2.335 [1.646,3.573] 0.14 2.490 [1.486,4.103] 0.89
ρz 0.901 [0.852,0.948] 0.38 0.885 [0.829,0.939] 0.95
ρg 0.757 [0.676,0.832] 0.91 0.597 [0.488,0.706] 0.15
ρc 0.920 [0.860,0.958] 0.53 0.738 [0.523,0.878] 0.53
σ2z 0.013 [0.011,0.015] 0.70 0.022 [0.018,0.025] 0.46
σ2g 0.009 [0.008,0.011] 0.56 0.018 [0.015,0.022] 0.80
σ2c 0.047 [0.038,0.058] 0.88 0.074 [0.055,0.102] 0.55
Switzerland
ψ 0.165 [0.141,0.193] 0.54
ρz 0.880 [0.826,0.931] 0.55
ρg 0.596 [0.486,0.699] 0.52
ρc 0.697 [0.515,0.835] 0.92
σ2z 0.014 [0.013,0.016] 0.48
σ2g 0.012 [0.010,0.014] 0.89
σ2c 0.093 [0.067,0.129] 0.25
Notes: Results are based on 150,000 draws from the posterior distribution of which for EMEs the first 100,000 and for
developed economies the first 125,000 draws were burned. To avoid autocorrelation issues, we only keep every 10th draw
for developed economies, and every 25th for EMEs. The χ2 figure denotes the p–value of Geweke’s χ2–test for convergence
(4% taper). Variances are reported in percentages.
36
across models. For instance, evaluated at the median of the posterior distribution,
a slight increase in the external debt to income ratio of merely one percentage point
lifts the cost of borrowing by as much as 4.34 percentage points in the benchmark
economy, whereas in the extended model interest rates rise by only 0.22 percent-
age points. In light of this simple numerical exercise, the model with foreign
currency debt seems to deliver debt–elasticities that are more reasonable in terms
of their economic significance.
Looking at the benchmark economy, our estimation results suggest that the
magnitude of reduced form financial frictions is more severe in EMEs than in
developed economies. In fact, apart from South Africa, the mode of the posterior
distribution of ψ obtained for EMEs is greater than its counterpart in the group
of developed countries. In general, our findings for EMEs are to some extent
consistent with the results reported by Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010). On the one
hand, our estimates for Mexico and Turkey in the benchmark model indicate a
perceptibly higher debt–elasticity of the interest rate compared to their study’s
findings for Argentina. On the other hand, the elasticity obtained in the liability
dollarization framework is lower for all three EMEs than the one documented by
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010).
Turning to the parameters of the structural processes, we find that autocorre-
lation coefficients tend to be relatively high. This is especially the case for South
Africa. By and large, however, we do not find large differences in the persistence
parameters both across models and countries. For the group of emerging markets,
the median of ρg, the parameter governing the persistence of the non–stationary
productivity process, ranges from about 0.6 to 0.8. These estimates are clearly
higher than those reported by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Garcı´a-Cicco et al.
(2010). Nonetheless, they fall into the range of the results obtained by Chang and
Ferna´ndez (2013) and Boz et al. (2011) for Mexico as well as Nguyen (2011) for the
United States.
Interestingly, the variances of our structural shocks seem to differ between
models and country groups. Estimated variances of the two technology pro-
cesses are generally higher in EMEs than in advanced economies. Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) highlight the necessity of a high standard deviation of the per-
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manent relative to transitory productivity shock in their model in order to account
for certain business cycle phenomena in EMEs. In the benchmark model, we in-
deed find a higher ratio of volatilities σgσz for EMEs, except South Africa, than for
developed economies. However, our estimation exercise suggests a much lower
relative volatility of trend shocks in EMEs compared to Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007).26 What is more, we find that the ratio of standard deviations at the median
of the posterior is even lower in the model with liability dollarization than in the
benchmark model for Mexico and Turkey, while it is the same in both model ver-
sions for South Africa.27 Nonetheless, as we will demonstrate in Section 2.6, our
model with liability dollarization performs reasonably well in matching business
cycle patterns in EMEs despite a relatively low σgσz .
2.5.2 Model Fit
Next, we analyze the importance of the structural part relative to the off–model
part in driving the dynamics of the observable variables. For this purpose, Fig-
ure 2.3 depicts the fraction of the forecast error variance attributed to structural
shocks, i.e. permanent and transitory technology as well as foreign demand
shocks, confronted to the fraction explained by the off–model dynamics. While
evaluating the respective setup at the median of the posterior distribution, we
compute the mean forecast error variance decomposition across all EMEs in both
the benchmark economy and the model with liability dollarization. This allows us
to study the extent to which our structural model is able to capture the dynamics
in our observables. Hence, we can easily assess and compare the fit of our setups.
26Looking at the median of the posterior distributions, we calculate a ratio of volatilities σgσz
equal to 0.8321, 0.9045, and 0.9258 for Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, respectively. In the
benchmark (liability dollarization) model, we get a ratio of 1.0847 (0.8975) for Mexico, 0.8944
(0.8944) for South Africa, and 1.1359 (1.1199) for Turkey. For a comparison, GMM estimates
obtained by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) imply ratios as high as 4.0189 for Mexico and as low as
0.7460 for Canada. To gauge the relative importance of trend shocks, these authors calculate the
random walk component of the Solow residual, which also takes the persistence of shocks into
account. The size of the random walk component in our estimation can be found in Appendix
A.3.3.
27What is striking is that estimation results for South Africa are in various aspects different from
those obtained for Mexico and Turkey. This peculiarity might be explained by the fact that in
contrast do other emerging markets, South Africa has for decades had deep and well developed
financial markets. Also, as pointed out by Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005), it is one of the few
emerging markets, which traditionally has been able to issue bonds denoted in their own currency
on international capital markets.
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Figure 2.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Model Comparison
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
F r
a c
t i o
n  
o f
 F
E
V
 E
x p
l a
i n
e d
Benchmark - Y
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Benchmark - C
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Benchmark - r
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Benchmark - e
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
F r
a c
t i o
n  
o f
 F
E
V
 E
x p
l a
i n
e d
Horizon
L. Dollarization - Y
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Horizon
L. Dollarization - C
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Horizon
L. Dollarization - r
2 8 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Horizon
L. Dollarization - e
 
 
Structural Part Off-Model
Notes: Mean forecast error variance decomposition across all EMEs. Results are based on
median outcomes of the respective posterior distributions.
The graph reveals that the liability dollarization setup outperforms the bench-
mark model in accounting for the variation in output, consumption and real
exchange rates at all forecast horizons. The superiority of the framework with lia-
bility dollarization is most perceivable for consumption. Yet we also observe that
the benchmark model explains a larger portion of the variability in real interest
rates. We explain this peculiar result for the real interest rate by a change in the
importance of interest rate shocks once we augment the model with liability dol-
larization. Recall that both our models abstract from any exogenous disturbances
in the interest rate like world interest rate or country premium shocks. Nonethe-
less, our estimation procedure implicitly controls for such interest rate shocks by
the inclusion of a dynamic measurement error. In light of this interpretation, our
exercise suggests that once countries can only borrow in foreign currency, interest
rate shocks apparently become more important.28 By and large, we therefore infer
28Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), and Chang and
Ferna´ndez (2013) have augmented their SOE models with interest rate shocks. These authors
stress the merits of this model extension for explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging
markets. In particular, Chang and Ferna´ndez (2013) show that interest rate shocks are amplified
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that the model with liability dollarization fits the data in EMEs better than the
benchmark setup.
Furthermore, estimation results are generally in strong favor of our theoretical
framework. Though being quite stylized, the structural model performs very well,
especially in capturing the dynamics of the main macroeconomic aggregates, i.e.
output and consumption. Regarding exchange rates, we observe that only about
20 to 30 percent of the variation can be attributed to shocks characterized in the
theoretical model. This finding is owed to the fact our models cannot produce
such high volatilities in exchange rates we observe in the data.
2.6 Model Analysis
This section examines in how far our theoretical model helps us in understanding
macroeconomic dynamics in emerging markets. As the previous section has
demonstrated, the model with liability dollarization outperforms the benchmark
setup in fitting the data. Hence, we confidently treat the liability dollarization
framework as the more appropriate model for EMEs and focus on the analysis
of the extended setup for this country group. For comparison, we analyze the
benchmark model for EMEs in Appendix A.
We begin with implementing a forecast error variance decomposition to assess
the relative importance of different shocks in explaining macroeconomic fluctua-
tions. We then turn to an impulse response analysis of the three structural shocks
in our liability dollarization setup. Subsequently, we compare model implied
business cycle moments with their empirical counterparts to demonstrate that
our model succeeds in replicating various stylized business cycle facts. Finally,
we show the model’s ability to account for the sudden stop in Mexico’s capital
inflows during the Tequila Crisis of 1994–1995.
by financial frictions. This underpins our finding that the off–model dynamics of interest rates
play a greater role in the setup with liability dollarization.
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2.6.1 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
In what follows, we study the relative contribution of various shocks in driving
the dynamics in our theoretical economy. For this purpose, we perform a forecast
error variance decomposition of the structural part of our model, evaluated at the
median of the posterior distributions for each country.
Figure 2.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – EMEs
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dollarization. Results are based on median outcomes of the respective posterior distributions.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 plot the average forecast error variance decomposition
of selected variables across all EMEs and developed countries, respectively.29
Certain patterns are worth emphasizing. First, in both emerging markets and
developed countries, transitory shocks are the driving force behind output in the
short–run. Looking at the developed world, we observe this particular feature
not only in the short–run but also in the long–run. In EMEs, on the contrary,
the permanent productivity process gains importance over longer horizons and
eventually becomes the major determinant of output fluctuations in the long–run.
Moreover, in both cohorts, trend shocks predominantly account for consumption
29Forecast error variance decompositions for all six countries, as well as for both models for the
cohort of EMEs, can be found in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 2.5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Developed Economies
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Notes: Mean forecast error variance decomposition across all developed countries. Results are
based on median outcomes of the respective posterior distributions.
variation over all forecast horizons. But permanent shocks are relatively more
important for consumption fluctuations in EMEs than in advanced economies.
Second, transitory technology disturbances generally play a minor role for the
dynamics in the cost of borrowing. It is essentially growth shocks that account
for interest rate variations in advanced countries. In EMEs, however, foreign
demand shocks also seem to govern interest rate dynamics to a non–negligible
extent, especially in the short–run. This finding indicates that changes in external
demand may have important feedback effects on the interest rate in emerging
markets.
Third, both transitory productivity and foreign demand disturbances explain
a considerable share of the variation in the real exchange rate in industrialized
economies. By contrast, it is permanent shocks that dominate relative interna-
tional price movements in EMEs over all forecast horizons.
Finally, this predominance of trend shocks in emerging markets is even more
striking if we look at the forecast error variance decomposition of the current
account to output ratio. Figure 2.4 suggests that virtually all fluctuation in CAY can
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be attributed to permanent productivity shocks. Similarly, more than 60 percent
of the forecast error variance of the valuation effects to GDP ratio is determined by
innovations to the non–stationary technology process. Foreign demand shocks
account for about one third of the variation in VALY , while the influence of transitory
technology shocks again is trifling.
In a nutshell, our exercise suggests that transitory productivity shocks are
far more important in explaining fluctuations of macroeconomic aggregates in
industrialized countries compared to EMEs. As opposed to Garcı´a-Cicco et al.
(2010) and Chang and Ferna´ndez (2013), we conclude that even though we account
for financial frictions in our model, both transitory and, above all, permanent
disturbances play a role in explaining business cycle variations in EMEs. This in
turn is concurrent with the findings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), who argue
that macroeconomic fluctuations in EMEs are mainly driven by trend shocks.
Thus, we largely find support for their famous hypothesis that ”the cycle is the
trend“.30
2.6.2 Impulse Response Analysis
Next, we shed more light on the mechanics of our model describing EMEs. To this
end, we parametrize the liability dollarization setup at the median of the posterior
distributions and compute impulse responses to the three structural shocks for
each country.
Permanent versus Transitory Productivity Shocks
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 plot selected impulse responses to a one percent permanent
and transitory productivity disturbance, respectively.
A positive trend shock leads to an increase in consumption and foreign debt
relative to income. On the contrary, the effects on CY and
D
Y are reverse following
a positive transitory shock. These opposite responses follow from the optimal
30In a recent study, Naoussi and Tripier (2013) estimate the framework of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) for a number of developed, emerging markets, and developing economies. They find that
permanent shocks are much more important in developing countries and emerging markets than
in advanced economies. Therefore, their results corroborate the notion that ”the cycle is the trend“,
too.
43
Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent permanent productivity shock in the model with
liability dollarization for all EMEs evaluated at the median of the respective posterior
distribution.
Figure 2.7: Impulse Responses – Transitory Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent transitory productivity shock in the model with
liability dollarization for all EMEs evaluated at the median of the respective posterior
distribution.
44
savings behavior of the representative consumer and have the same interpretation
as in the model of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). After a positive growth shock,
households do not only realize higher income today but also anticipate higher
income in the future. The expectation of higher future income is due to the fact
that (i) the positive impact on productivity is permanent and does not vanish over
time, (ii) adjustment costs imply a gradual change in capital, and, (iii) in addition,
growth shocks are persistent (ρg > 0). Since agents prefer a smooth consumption
path over time, it is optimal to raise consumption by more than the initial increase
in output. In fact, households borrow on international capital markets in order
to finance their optimal consumption plan and additional investment, which
explains the excess response of debt relative to GDP. In contrast, this consumption
smoothing rationale also induces households to curb international borrowing, i.e.
they save after a positive transitory shock, because income is expected to revert to
its long–run equilibrium path in the future. As a result, consumption reacts less
strongly than output such that CY falls on impact.
A permanent shock also reduces the price of the composite consumption good
p, whereas a temporary productivity innovation raises the price level. This can
be explained as follows. Positive technology shocks lead to instantaneous jumps
in income. As explained above, if shocks are permanent, people do not only
benefit from higher income today but also anticipate even higher income in the
future. Hence, households sharply raise their demand for home–produced goods
(in form of consumption and investment) on impact. This increase in demand
actually overshoots the initial rise in supply, which drives up the price of home–
produced goods. As a consequence, the relative price of composite consumption
expressed in terms of home–produced goods p falls. On the contrary, the initial
increase in demand falls short of the one in supply after a transitory shock, such
that the price of home–produced goods must decline in equilibrium and the
relative price of total consumption p rises.
Due to imperfect substitutability between home and foreign goods the relative
change of the domestic price of the foreign good pF must always be stronger than
the one of the price of the overall consumption index p. This follows immediately
from the definition of the price index in equation (2.9). As a consequence, the real
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exchange rate in equation (2.14) appreciates (depreciates) following a positive
trend (transitory) productivity shock.
The response of the real interest rate is in principle ambiguous. A higher
expected debt to income ratio after a permanent shock puts an upward pressure
on the interest rate. At the same time, however, the associated real appreciation
reduces the debt burden, which dampens the increase in the interest rate. Inter-
estingly, our results suggest that the real appreciation effect outweighs the debt to
income ratio effect in the case of Mexico, while the effects largely offset each other
in South Africa and Turkey. Regarding the reaction after a temporary productivity
shock, we witness a fall in the real interest rate in all three countries.
Irrespective of its nature, a positive productivity shock induces households
to consume more. Consequently, consumption of both home and foreign goods
goes up, too. As described above, the price of foreign goods relative to home
goods pF falls after a positive trend shock. This means that the rest of the world
experiences a real depreciation and thus demands less goods produced in the
home country c?H (see equation (2.15)). In sum, the home country exports less
while at the same time the value of its imports increases such that net exports
decline. In contrast, domestic exports rise after a transitory shock because of a
real appreciation abroad. Hence, the increase in both imports and exports leave
the overall impact on the trade balance unclear. In our exercise at hand, these
two counteracting effects largely cancel out such that we observe a rather weak
response of the net exports to output ratio.
The deterioration of the trade balance together with higher interest payments
on foreign debt translates into a worsening of the current account to income
ratio after a trend shock. Furthermore, the associated real appreciation reduces
the amount of outstanding foreign debt and therefore initially generates positive
valuation effects (see equation (2.26)). The change in the net foreign asset position
in (2.22) is given by the sum of the current account and valuation effects. As a
result, positive valuation effects in fact dampen the negative change in foreign
assets induced by the fall in the current account. In the case of Mexico, these
valuation effects exceed the drop in the current account such that the value of net
foreign assets actually goes up on impact.
46
The response of CAY to a transitory shock is slightly positive in Mexico and
Turkey, but negative in South Africa. In Mexico, for instance, the fall in interest
payments on foreign debt obligations more than compensates the deterioration
of the trade balance such that there is a positive reaction of the current account.
Likewise, the real depreciation leads to negative valuation effects, which have a
negative impact on the net foreign asset position. What is striking is that these
external balance sheet effects are strong enough to generate a fall in net foreign
assets in countries where we observe an initial increase in the current account,
namely Mexico and Turkey.
Foreign Demand Shock
Figure 2.8 displays impulse responses to a one percent increase in foreign con-
sumption. By and large, outcomes do not vary substantially across countries.
Figure 2.8: Impulse Responses – Foreign Demand Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent foreign demand shock in the model with liability
dollarization for all EMEs evaluated at the median of the respective posterior distribution.
A positive shock to foreign consumption c? directly translates into a rise in
domestic exports c?H. Consequently, net exports increase on impact. Furthermore,
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higher demand for domestically produced goods, ceteris paribus, puts an upward
pressure on the price of home goods such that the relative prices of foreign goods
pF and composite consumption p fall. Since the relative drop in pF prevails the
decrease in p, the real exchange rate appreciates.
The favorable movement in the real exchange rate entails a positive wealth
effect, which induces domestic households to consume more. As a matter of fact,
the relative increase in consumption c is larger than the one in output y such that
the consumption to GDP ratio rises.31 Also, households substitute consumption of
relatively more expensive home goods cH for relatively cheaper foreign goods cF.
This somewhat dampens the positive reaction of the trade balance and explains
its reversal in the periods after the shock.
In addition, the external debt to income ratio falls. Although consumption
becomes cheaper, real appreciation drives up the price of consumption today
expressed in units of consumption tomorrow (see equation (2.22)). Agents know
that the demand shock is only temporary and anticipate a real depreciation in
the future. Therefore, they have an incentive to save more, i.e they reduce their
international debt holdings.32 A lower DY , along with an appreciated real exchange
rate, pushes down the real interest rate. The resulting cut in interest payments
plus higher net exports lead to an increase in the current account, which in turn
increases the domestic foreign asset position. Positive valuation effects, originated
by real appreciation, eventually boost the improvement of the external balance
sheet.
Stabilizing or Destabilizing Valuation Effects?
Our impulse response analysis illustrates that the impact of valuation effects on
the net foreign asset position depends on the nature of the underlying shock. On
the one hand, valuation effects mitigate the change in net foreign assets induced
by the decline in the current account following a permanent productivity shock.
Hence, they have a stabilizing impact on the external balance sheet in this case. On
31The increase in output initiated by higher foreign demand for home–produced goods is
dampened by lower domestic absorption (i.e. lower domestic consumption of the home good and
lower investment).
32We can think of domestic households investing in foreign goods by reducing the amount of
international debt. In other words, they go long in foreign goods.
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the other hand, valuation effects amplify the influence of the current account on
net foreign assets after a foreign demand shock. Regarding transitory technology
shocks, the effect is generally unclear. In our exercise, transitory productivity
shocks entail external balance sheet effects that counteract the reaction of the
current account in Mexico and Turkey, but reinforce it in South Africa. Having
said this, our findings conflict with the implications of the model of Nguyen
(2011), which predicts stabilizing (amplifying) valuation effects after a transitory
(permanent) technology shock.
2.6.3 Business Cycle Moments
In this subsection, we gauge our structural model’s ability to reproduce various
business cycle patterns. To this end, we simulate the respective model evaluated
at the median of the posterior distributions for each country. We generate data
covering a time span of 100 periods and subsequently compute various moments
based on the detrended series of our variables. On the whole, we repeat this
exercise 5,000 times. Table 2.6 compares empirical moments with their model
generated counterparts, which correspond to the median across all simulations.
Empirical moments are calculated using quarterly real data from the IFS, apart
from those involving valuation effects for which only annual data from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) are available. All series, except for the net exports to output
ratio and valuation effects, have been logged, seasonally adjusted and filtered
using the HP filter with smoothing parameter 1,600.
Consistent with the data, the model predicts generally higher standard de-
viations of income, consumption, and the net exports to output ratio in EMEs
than in advanced economies. Hence, our theoretical economy can well account
for the empirical regularity that macroeconomic fluctuations are more severe in
emerging markets as compared to developed countries.
Furthermore, the model is not only able to generate excess volatility in con-
sumption relative to output in EMEs, but also matches relative consumption
volatilities in advanced countries quite well. This observation raises the ques-
tion of why? On the one hand, as shown in Section 2.6.1, our estimation results
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suggest that macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs are predominantly driven by the
non–stationary productivity component. On the other hand, the preceding sub-
section has demonstrated that consumption overshoots output after a permanent
technology shock. It is the interplay of these two features that explains the excess
volatility of consumption.
Table 2.6: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model Data Model Data Model
EmergingMarket Economies
Mexico S. Africa Turkey
σ(Y) 2.42 5.31 1.60 4.25 3.70 6.30
σ(C) 3.68 6.71 2.46 5.08 5.72 7.65
σ(NX/Y) 6.63 1.58 4.04 0.95 3.42 1.46
σ(e) 9.63 7.71 8.70 5.05 9.54 7.47
σ(C)/σ(Y) 1.52 1.57 1.54 1.41 1.55 1.45
ρ(NX/Y,Y) −0.17 −0.10 −0.40 −0.19 −0.56 −0.27
ρ(e,NX/Y) −0.31 −0.62 −0.12 −0.43 −0.45 −0.48
ρ((NX/Y)t, (NX/Y)t−1) 0.97 0.69 0.85 0.67 0.84 0.57
ρ((VAL/Y)t, (CA/Y)t) −0.58 −0.34 −0.75 −0.30 −0.05 −0.38
ρ((VAL/Y)t, et) 0.45 0.29 −0.31 0.28 0.19 0.30
Developed Economies
Canada Sweden Switzerland
σ(Y) 1.42 4.13 1.75 4.57 1.76 3.68
σ(C) 1.36 4.12 1.51 4.00 1.44 3.11
σ(NX/Y) 1.96 0.54 2.77 0.45 3.74 0.65
σ(e) 3.41 5.34 8.81 4.61 7.94 5.53
σ(C)/σ(Y) 0.96 1.00 0.86 0.77 0.82 0.71
ρ(NX/Y,Y) 0.01 −0.36 −0.01 −0.39 −0.17 0.27
ρ(e,NX/Y) −0.03 −0.21 −0.07 −0.14 −0.02 −0.59
ρ((NX/Y)t, (NX/Y)t−1) 0.93 0.28 0.94 0.15 0.84 0.49
Notes: Standard deviations are expressed in percentages except for the model implied standard
deviation of the net exports to output ratio, which is expressed in percentage points. Empirical
moments are calculated using quarterly data taken from the IFS, apart from those involving
valuation effects for which only annual data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) are available.
All series, except for the net exports over output ratio and valuation effects, are real per capita
variables, have been logged, seasonally adjusted and filtered using the HP filter with smoothing
parameter λ = 1, 600. Theoretical moments are based on sample moments of model generated
data. For the group of EMEs, we have used the liability dollarization framework. Each theoretical
economy is simulated 5,000 times with a sample size of 100. Median outcomes are reported.
Our model also succeeds in generating a negative correlation between the
net exports to GDP ratio and income in EMEs. Yet it struggles to match this
moment from a quantitative point of view. In fact, the model understates the
countercyclicality of the net exports to output ratio in EMEs, but it also overstates
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this countercyclicality for the cohort of advanced economies, except Switzerland.
Recall that permanent technology shocks induce households to purchase more
foreign goods, while the real depreciation experienced by the rest of the world
cuts the external demand for home goods. This leads to a deterioration of the
home country’s trade balance and explains why our model generates a negative
correlation between the net exports to GDP ratio and income. The fact that we
cannot replicate the high degree of countercyclicality of NXY in EMEs is due to
the relatively persistent non–stationary productivity process. Indeed, the higher
the autocorrelation of the permanent technology process, the weaker the counter-
cyclicality of the trade balance. As a matter of fact, if trend shocks are persistent
enough, the income effect on labor supply induces households to work less after
a positive permanent shock. In this scenario, output falls, which actually implies
a positive correlation between income and net exports.33
Our model suggests that real exchange rates are in general more volatile in
EMEs than in developed economies. This prediction is in line with what we
observe in the data. Furthermore, the model reproduces the negative correlation
between the real exchange rate and the net exports to output ratio in EMEs. In
contrast, the benchmark model has difficulties in replicating the weak relationship
between these two variables in the group of industrialized countries.
A key contribution of the paper by Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) is that their model
can account for the empirically observed downward sloping autocorrelation func-
tion of NXY . Interestingly, our benchmark model exhibits a fairly low first–order
serial correlation of the net exports to income ratio in developed economies,
whereas the liability dollarization setup matches this moment better for EMEs.
As Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) point out, it is important to allow for a ψ that is sig-
nificantly different from zero in order to obtain a falling autocorrelation function
of NXY . The reason for that is as follows. For instance, after a positive permanent
shock, households increase their international debt holdings and run a trade bal-
ance deficit. In case of a high debt–elasticity ψ, the rise in debt relative to GDP
33Accordingly, our model’s weak performance regarding the countercyclicality of the trade
balance might be explained by our preference specification. As we have already mentioned in
Section 2.3, our choice of Cobb–Douglas period utility implies an income effect on labor supply.
In contrast, other researchers in this strand of the literature use GHH preferences, which do not
feature income effects on labor supply.
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in turn raises the real interest rate. This induces households to consume less and
save more, which leads to an improvement of the trade balance. On the other
hand, ifψ is close to zero (as for example in the calibration of Aguiar and Gopinath
2007) the feedback effect of changes in DY on the cost of borrowing is virtually shut
down, which results in an autocorrelation function of NXY that resembles a near
unit root process. In fact, our estimates of ψ in the benchmark economy are quite
high compared to our liability dollarization framework. This might help us to ex-
plain why the model understates the first–order autocorrelation of NXY , especially
for advanced economies.
Table 2.6 also provides meaningful insights with respect to the role of valu-
ation effects in EMEs. Not surprisingly, they are positively correlated with the
real exchange rate in our model. This feature is consistent with our descriptive
findings for Mexico and Turkey. More importantly, our model predicts a negative
relationship between valuation effects and the current account in all three EMEs.
As a matter of fact, this is line with the negative correlation between VALY and
CA
Y
in the data, especially for Mexico and South Africa. Consequently, we find that,
on average, valuation effects have a stabilizing impact on the net foreign asset
position. In light of our discussion in Section 2.6.2, this outcome can be explained
by the fact that EMEs are predominantly exposed to trend shocks.
2.6.4 Mexico’s Tequila Crisis
Finally, we investigate the performance of our model in crisis times. Over the
last two decades, many EMEs have experienced severe balance of payments
(BOP) crises, such as Mexico during the Tequila crisis of 1994–1995; Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand during the Asian crisis of 1997;
or Argentina in 2001. A typical feature of BOP crises in emerging markets is the
sudden stop in capital inflows, which usually brings about a reversal in current
accounts and net exports, a drop in output, consumption, and investment, as well
as exchange rate depreciations (see Mendoza 2010).
In what follows, we examine whether our theoretical framework is capable of
replicating Mexico’s sudden stop during the Tequila Crisis of 1994–1995. To do
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so, we adopt a similar approach as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). We calibrate
our liability dollarization model at the median of the posterior distributions for
Mexico. We use data on output, consumption, real interest rates, and real ex-
change rates and implement the Kalman filter to generate the unobservable state
variables. Subsequently, we feed the obtained states into the model to compute
time series for our control variables.
Figure 2.9 shows the true and predicted net exports to output ratio in Mexico
between 1993Q1 and 1997Q4. As is evident from the figure, our model can
reproduce the reversal in the Mexican trade balance between 1994 and 1995. At
a first glance, however, our model seems to struggle to quantitatively match the
dramatic change in NXY . It predicts an increase in the net exports to output ratio by
2.2 percentage points between the third quarter of 1994 and the second quarter of
1995, whereas the actual net exports to output ratio increased by as much as 7.7
percentage points. Note, however, that the steady state level of the trade balance
to GDP ratio is much lower than its empirical counterpart.34 If we look at the
change of NXY relative to its long–run mean rather than the absolute change, we
actually find that our model performs quite well also from a quantitative point of
view.
The remaining question is then why does our framework succeed in explaining
the sudden stop in capital flows. The shock series produced by the Kalman filter
indicate that the Mexican economy was hit by a strong negative permanent shock
in the fourth quarter of 1994. As we have discussed in Section 2.6.2, a negative
trend shock leads to an increase in the net exports to output ratio. In addition, a
large negative permanent shock causes a sharp fall in output and consumption,
as well as a real depreciation, which is also in line with what we observe in the
data. What is more, our liability dollarization model suggests that sudden stops
are associated with negative valuation effects. As a result, balance sheet effects
actually dampened the increase in Mexico’s net foreign asset position during the
Tequila crisis according to the model.
34Recall from Section 2.4.2 that we do not pin down the steady state net exports to output ratio
in our calibration exercise.
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Figure 2.9: Mexico’s Tequila Crisis of 1994–1995
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Notes: Actual versus predicted net exports to output ratio for the Mexican economy between the
first quarter of 1993 and the fourth quarter of 1997.
2.7 Conclusion
We develop a small open economy DSGE model featuring a non–stationary pro-
ductivity process, differentiated home and foreign goods, and endogenous ex-
change rate movements to study the importance of financial frictions and trend
shocks in explaining macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs. We also extend our
benchmark setup and introduce liability dollarization as a special form of finan-
cial market distortions in emerging markets. This model modification allows us
to analyze the impact of valuation effects on the external balance sheet in these
countries.
In the empirical part of the paper, we estimate our model using Bayesian
techniques for a group of EMEs. Furthermore, in order to investigate the difference
between emerging and advanced economies, we perform our estimation exercise
also for a group of developed countries. We account for off–model dynamics
by allowing for a (vector–)autoregressive measurement error in our estimation
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procedure. As a matter of fact, this constitutes to a novel approach in this strand
of the literature.
Our results show that the co–existence of financial frictions and trend shocks
helps to explain macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs. In particular, incorporating
liability dollarization in our framework improves the model fit. Our analysis sug-
gests that trend shocks are the driving force behind macroeconomic fluctuations
in EMEs. Therefore, we find support for the famous hypothesis that ”the cycle is
the trend“, even though we include financial market distortions in our setup.
Our liability dollarization model succeeds in replicating certain stylized facts
about emerging market business cycles: (i) it predicts more severe macroeco-
nomic fluctuations in EMEs than in developed countries, (ii) it matches the excess
volatility of consumption relative to output, (iii) it qualitatively reproduces the
countercyclicality of the net exports to output ratio, although it falls short to
match this moment on a quantitative basis, and (iv) it can replicate the sudden
stop of capital inflows during the Mexican Tequila Crisis between 1994 and 1995.
Interestingly, our liability dollarization framework suggests that valuation effects
on average have a stabilizing impact on the net foreign asset position in EMEs.
In this vein, we also contribute to a currently active line of research on external
balance sheet effects, which so far has mainly focused on developed economies.
Admittedly, the introduction of liability dollarization as a from of financial
frictions in our model is fairly simple. One could go one step further and study
the implications liability dollarization in the presence of other credit market dis-
tortions. In particular, we could build on the literature on credit frictions in
macroeconomics (see Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, Bernanke et al. 1999) and incor-
porate collateral constraints in the model. In that case, the amount of debt depends
on the agent’s net worth, which is subject to exchange rate variations due to lia-
bility dollarization. It would then be interesting to see how the combination of
amplification effects, resulting from the imposition of collateral constraints, and
liability dollarization affects macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs.
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Chapter 3
A Small Open Economy in the Great
Depression: the Case of Switzerland
3.1 Introduction
Recent research has shown that Switzerland’s dismal performance during the
1930s was mainly due to its exchange rate policy (Bordo et al., 2007; Bordo and
James, 2007). Thanks to a high gold cover ratio, the Swiss National Bank was able
to defend the old parity against any speculative attack, thus preventing an early
devaluation of the Swiss franc that would have restored the competitiveness of
Switzerland’s exporting sectors. This exchange rate policy was motivated by a
variety of reasons, yet the widespread gold standard mentality certainly played
a key role. The strong belief that a devaluation would lead to inflation and that
the gold standard was the only reliable guarantee for prosperity and stability,
led economies to stay on gold as long as possible – a decision which implied
a lagged recovery from the Great Depression (e.g. Balderston, 2003; Feinstein
et al., 2008).1 As (Straumann, 2010, p. 129–142) shows, this was also the case
for Switzerland. Only when the last major trading partner, France (see Table
3.1), decided to devalue its currency, Switzerland was ready to change course. In
September 1936, the Swiss franc was devalued by 30 percent.
1“A further aspect of great significance was the widespread belief in financial and political circles that it
was essential to return to the pre–war gold standard if the growth and prosperity of the pre–1914 era were
to be re–established, whatever the sacrifices their countries would have to make in oder to force down wages
and prices so that the pre–war value of the currency could be restored.” (Feinstein et al., 2008, p. 1)
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To demonstrate the consequence of Switzerland’s defense of the gold standard,
we adapt the famous “contracting spiral of world trade”–graph, first published
by the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research (O¨sterreichisches Institut
fu¨r Konjunkturforschung) in 1933 (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1995), to Swiss exports
(Figure 3.1). Real exports fell by 50 percent until June 1932, followed by a weak
recovery to about 60–70 percent of the October 1929 level. The consequence of
the decision to join the Gold Bloc in 1933 (together with Belgium, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Poland) was that exports stayed at this level until end of
1936. Due to the overvalued Swiss franc, the Swiss exporting sectors profited less
from the recovery of the world economy than small European countries with a
devalued currency such as the Scandinavian countries.
Table 3.1: Major Trading Partners of Switzerland in the Interwar Period
County Export Share Import Share
Germany 17.43% 27.25%
France 13.09% 16.15%
Italy 8.22% 7.62%
United Kingdom 12.19% 5.53%
United States 7.24% 6.57%
Total 58.18% 63.12%
Notes: Average country shares of total exports and imports during 1929–1936. Source:
Swiss Economic and Social History Online Database (www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat), Tables
L.18, L.19, L.22 ,L.23.
The Swiss National Bank’s defense of the old gold parity was particularly
detrimental as Switzerland’s prices were extraordinarily sticky during this pe-
riod. As a matter of fact, regulations protecting individual economic sectors and
fixing prices dramatically increased during the crisis. Instead of enabling the
downward adjustment, the government sought to cushion the negative effects of
an overvalued currency by containing competition. Almost any pressure group,
in particular Swiss farmers, was able to obtain protection and subsidies. In many
historical accounts, the rise of these corporatist policies in the 1930s has been
hailed as the beginning of a fruitful cooperation between capital and labor. But in
the context of an orthodox gold standard policy, these rigidities proved to be fatal.
Therefore, understanding the nature of Switzerland’s economic crisis during the
57
Figure 3.1: Swiss Exports, January 1929 – December 1936
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Notes: Real exports, October 1929=100; Source: Monatsstatistik des auswa¨rtigen Handels der
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58
1930s requires not only a thorough analysis of the exchange rate policy, but also a
better grasp of how prices adjusted before and after 1929.
Besides the exchange rate policy and the stickiness of prices, there is a third
feature defining the course of Switzerland’s economic crisis. The ample gold
reserves may have prevented the Swiss National Bank from leaving the gold
standard at an early state of the crisis. But on the other hand, they also allowed
the central bank to refrain from increasing interest rates in the face of speculative
attacks. From 1931 to 1936 when the devaluation enabled the central bank to reflate
the economy nominal interests remained close to zero. By contrast, Belgium and
France, which also defended the gold standard until the mid–1930s were forced to
increase their interest rates whenever investors mistrusted their currencies. Thus,
the usual constraints of the gold standard did not apply until 1936 for the case of
Switzerland.
In this paper, we try to account for these different aspects of the Swiss crisis.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we provide a new monthly dataset cover-
ing the performance of the real economy from January 1926 to December 1938.
Second, we estimate the structural parameters of a New Keynesian small open
economy model for Switzerland in the spirit of Clarida et al. (2000, 2001) and Galı´
and Monacelli (2005), going beyond the calibration exercise in Bordo et al. (2007).
We explicitly take into account the fact that Switzerland was not forced to increase
nominal interest rates during the Gold Bloc period due to the massive gold inflow
starting with the German crisis in June 1931 and intensifying after Britain went
off gold. Following Ireland (2004), the model incorporates a vector autoregres-
sive measurement error component capturing the dynamics in the data which are
not represented by the economic part. This feature allows to assess the model’s
suitability for the data under analysis. Moreover, it is possible to compare the
relative importance of the structural shocks (foreign demand shock and terms of
trade shock) with the contribution of the measurement error block by looking at
the decomposition of the forecast error variance. The results show that the eco-
nomic part of the model contributes a significant variance share. The structural
approach enables us to embark on a counterfactual experiment by simulating the
Swiss economy in the case of a devaluation of the Swiss franc in September 1931,
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the month at which the UK left gold.
Our results show that the terms of trade shock played an important role for
the Swiss economy during the Interwar Period. While foreign demand was
recovering after 1932, the terms of trade further deteriorated. Consequently, the
latter effect dominated the foreign demand impulse and led to a long lasting
recession, which only ended when Switzerland left gold in September 1936. As
a result, our counterfactual analysis implies that in case of an earlier devaluation
of the Swiss franc, the economy would have recovered a lot faster and reached
its steady state level shortly after leaving gold: the decision to defend the parity
turned out to be extremely costly. This finding is in line with the successful
recovery of Sweden after leaving gold together with the UK (Rathke et al., 2011).
Our third contribution is that we provide a thorough discussion of how prices
behaved from 1926 to 1938. In particular, we detect severe price rigidities, in-
duced by a high degree of cartelization and regulatory measures, as an important
characteristic of the Swiss economy in the Interwar Period. Moreover, our esti-
mation results not only confirm this finding but also emphasize the cost of it. A
counterfactual analysis shows that a lower degree of price stickiness would have
been beneficial for the Swiss economy. This result highlights the potential benefits
of an internal devaluation and the cost of corporatist policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 motivates
and outlines the underlying model. In Section 3.3 we present the data and our
estimation strategy. Section 3.4 discussed the results and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The underlying model corresponds to the basic New Keynesian small open econ-
omy model as introduced by Galı´ and Monacelli (2005) and Galı´ (2008). Already
in the Interwar years, the Swiss economy was characterized by a high degree of
openness.2 Thus, we believe it is important to model open economy character-
istics explicitly. Moreover, we follow Calvo (1983) by modeling nominal price
rigidities. This seems to be an important stylized fact for the period under analy-
2E.g. in 1928 exports accounted for 20 percent of GDP (Source: Die Volkswirtschaft, 1924–1944).
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sis: a large share of domestic prices and wages was fixed by the government. Not
only did it own the national monopoly for mail, telegram and telephone services
and the Swiss federal railway, but also began to stabilize agricultural prices in the
midst of the depression (Rutz, 1970, p. 180–184).
Price rigidities became an issue already in the 1920s, illustrated by the in-
creasing difference between wholesale and consumer prices after the recession
of 1921/22 (Kaufmann 1952, Marbach 1952, p. 747; see upper part of Figure 3.4).
Especially the degree of cartelization of the Swiss economy was blamed for this
development.3 Regional monthly prices for important consumption goods pro-
vide an impression of price stickiness in the 1920s. The data on regional prices
cover the period 1924–1929.4 From 33 municipalities,5 the most frequent prices
per month are reported for 15 consumption goods,6 which amounts to a total of
495 time series. Counting the frequency of monthly price changes in these price
series reveals a very low modus of 0.07, which is depicted in Figure 3.2.
The regional variation is not very high (25% quantile: 0.080; 50% quantile:
0.090; 75% quantile: 0.110; Figure 3.3), suggesting that price stickiness was a
3Commenting on the first results of the cartel enqueˆte of the Preisbildungskommission in 1937,
Fritz Marbach, a member of the commission from 1931 to 1965 and president from 1939 on, stated
that free pricing was the exception rather than the rule (“[...] im allgemeinen darf man aber wohl
behaupten, dass der Kartellpreis und nicht der ‘freie Preis’ die Regel ist”; Marbach 1937, p. 34). He
repeats this assessment in his overview article on cartels in the 1955 edition of the Handbuch der
Schweizerischen Volkswirtschaft (“Der freie Preis ist in der schweizerischen Wirtschaft eine Aussnahme.”
Marbach, 1955, p. 19). The stability of cartelization in Switzerland can be explained by the attitude
of the public (see Katzenstein 1985, 2003 and the discussion in Straumann 2010, p. 344–345 for
the importance of democratic corporatism for European small open economies). Illustrating this
phenomenon, Marbach joked that the Swiss are in principle in favor of free markets, under the con-
dition that they are exempt (“Der Schweizer ist dem Prinzip des freien Wettbewerbes (allerdings nimmt
er sich dabei nur allzuleicht selber aus) im grossen und ganzen recht gewogen.” Marbach, 1952, p. 754).
For an overview of cartelization in Switzerland, see Eidgeno¨ssisches Volkswirtschaftsdepartement
(1957) and Schro¨ter (2011).
4For 1924 to 1927, they come from the Sozialstatistische Mitteilungen, edited by the Eidg. Arbeits–
amt. After 1927, the source is the Wirtschaftliche und sozialstatistische Mitteilungen, edited by the
Eidg. Volkswirtschaftsdepartement.
5Aarau, Arbon, Baden, Basle, Berne, Biel, La Chaux–de–Fonds, Chur, Frauenfeld, Fribourg,
Geneva, Glarus , Herisau, Langenthal, Lausanne, Liestal, Le Locle, Lugano, Luzern, Neuchaˆtel,
Olten, Porrentruy, Rorschach, St. Gall, St–Imier, St. Moritz, Schaffhausen, Schwyz, Sion,
Solothurn, Vevey, Winterthur, Zurich, Zug. We take these municipalities as representative for
the respective canton (Figure 3.3).
6Beef (Ochsenfleisch mit Knochen, zum Sieden), pork (frisches mageres Schweinefleisch mit Knochen),
veal (Kalbsfleisch, 1. Qualita¨t mit Knochen), fat (inla¨ndisches Schweineschmalz, frisches Nierenfett), but-
ter (Tafelbutter), cheese (Emmentaler–, Greyerzer– oder Appenzellerka¨se, 1. Qualita¨t), milk (Vollmilch),
bread (Vollbrot), flour (Weissmehl), pasta (offene Teigwaren, Mittelqualita¨t), sugar (Kristallzucker weiss),
potatoes (neue inla¨ndische Kartoffeln), eggs (inla¨ndische Trinkeier), coal (Braunkohlenbriketts, ins Haus
geliefert).
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Figure 3.2: Price Stickiness, 1924–1929
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Notes: Gaussian kernel density estimator, bandwidth: (Pagan and Ullah, 1999, equation 2.50);
data sources: see text.
regionally wide spread phenomenon. The cantons with a low degree of price
stickiness as compared to the rest are Zurich, St. Gall, Lucerne, Solothurn, and
Ticino, ranging from the alpine South to the industrialized North–West of Switzer-
land.
In order to address the issue, the ministry of economics (Eid. Volkswirtschafts-
departement, EVD) installed a new committee to study price formation (Preisbil-
dungskommission) in 1926, but without any control rights.7
A department for price controls (Preiskontrollstelle) was founded in 1931, in
response to the Great Depression. Its main purpose was to monitor the influence
of import restrictions on prices and to prevent unjustified price increases. In
the beginning, it lacked effectiveness, because it depended heavily on voluntary
cooperation. The lower part of Figure 3.4 illustrates this lack of effectiveness:
wholesale prices kept falling faster than consumer prices. As a consequence and in
fear of inflationary pressure due to the devaluation of the Swiss franc in September
7For the following, see Lautner (1950, p. 1–12), Eidgeno¨ssische Zentralstelle fu¨r
Kriegswirtschaft (1950, p. 877–887), and Marbach (1952).
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Figure 3.3: Regional Price Stickiness, 1924–1929
Notes: Frequency of monthly price changes; 33 municipalities, 15 prices (179 potential changes;
data sources: see text); 25% quantile: 0.080; 50% quantile: 0.090; 75% quantile: 0.110. There are
no prices available for Central Switzerland cantons such as Uri and Obwalden/Nidwalden, and
also for Appenzell Innerrhoden.
1936, the Swiss parliament decided to implement direct price controls in 1936. The
Preiskontrollstelle was authorized to collect necessary data and regulate prices.
These regulations had two purposes: to protect consumers against unjustified
price increases, and also to protect producers from price dumping. For example,
milk prices were pegged by compulsory cartels and quotas, and export of watches
became only possible conditional to complying with the price regulations of the
watch industry (Hug, 1938, p. 364–366). Almost all prices were regulated (goods
and services, gas, electricity, rents), and from September 1936 on, could only be
increased with official approval, and even with approval, the adjustment had to be
stepwise (Hug, 1938, p. 362). The effectiveness of this regulatory intervention can
be seen from the lower part of Figure 3.4: while wholesale prices started to increase
steeply after 1936, the increase in consumer prices was only moderate. In 1950,
the central office for war economics (Eidgeno¨ssische Zentralstelle fu¨r Kriegswirtschaft)
reported overall success: due to the interventions, consumer prices adjusted much
slower in the period 1939–1946 than in 1914–1921, when there was no intervention
(Eidgeno¨ssische Zentralstelle fu¨r Kriegswirtschaft, 1950, p. 898).
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Lastly, as stated in the introduction, we do not include a gold standard mecha-
nism. To motivate our choice of model, we follow Bernanke (1995) and decompose
Swiss money supply (M1) in the period 1922–1936 into contributions of the money
multiplier (M1/BASE, BASE: monetary base), the inverse of the gold backing ra-
tio (BASE/RES; RES: international reserves), the ratio of international reserves to
gold (RES/GOLD), and the gold reserves of the Swiss National Bank, expressed
in domestic currency (GOLD = PGOLD ×QGOLD):
M1 =
M1
BASE
× BASE
RES
× RES
GOLD
× PGOLD ×QGOLD (3.1)
Figure 3.4: Producer and Consumer Price Indices, 1926–1938
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Source: Swiss Economic and Social History Online Database (www.fsw.uzh.ch/hstat/), Table
H.1
The results reported in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5 indicate that Switzerland did
not fully commit to the rules of the game of the Gold Standard during the Interwar
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Period: the ratio of the monetary base to international reserves (BASE/RES) is not
stable and hence the cover ratio was significantly varying over time. In fact, it
went up from 78 percent in 1925 to almost 100 percent in 1931. Consequently, an
inflow of international currency reserves and gold reserves did not fully translate
into an increase of the monetary base proportional to the cover ratio. Therefore,
we refrain from including a particular Gold Standard mechanism into the model
as opposed to e.g. Bordo et al. (2007).
Table 3.2: Decomposition of Swiss Money Supply, 1922–1936
Year M1 M1BASE
BASE
RES
RES
GOLD PGOLD QGOLD
RES
BASE
1922 2395 2.10 1.60 1.12 3.44 186.00 0.62
1923 2327 2.14 1.50 1.15 3.44 182.76 0.66
1924 2285 2.21 1.31 1.33 3.44 172.63 0.76
1925 2411 2.41 1.29 1.40 3.44 161.95 0.78
1926 2538 2.51 1.32 1.41 3.44 158.51 0.76
1927 2652 2.48 1.38 1.34 3.44 168.79 0.73
1928 2792 2.43 1.37 1.45 3.44 168.48 0.73
1929 3122 2.60 1.22 1.59 3.44 180.04 0.82
1930 3232 2.48 1.22 1.50 3.44 207.51 0.82
1931 4006 1.56 1.05 1.05 3.44 683.12 0.95
1932 4066 1.53 1.04 1.04 3.44 719.30 0.97
1933 3675 1.68 1.09 1.01 3.44 581.59 0.92
1934 3439 1.67 1.08 1.00 3.44 555.89 0.93
1935 3136 1.79 1.25 1.01 3.44 404.24 0.80
1936 3934 1.41 1.01 1.02 3.44 788.52 0.99
Notes: M1, the monetary base (BASE), the gold reserves (GOLD), and the total reserves (RES)
are measured in millions of Swiss francs. The gold parity (PGOLD) corresponds to the price of
one gram of gold in Swiss francs. QGOLD denotes the quantity of gold reserves in tons.
Source: Swiss National Bank
www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/histz gm/source (T1.3 and T2.2)
www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/histz snb/source (T1.1)
www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/histz snb book/source (page 31)
Ultimately, we would like to assess whether an overvalued currency or the
worldwide economic downturn was the main determinant of the long lasting re-
cession in Switzerland. Consequently, we model both terms of trade and foreign
demand as exogenous structural shocks. Using the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium approach allows to measure over–/undervaluation of the Swiss franc
and to conduct counterfactual analysis in a straightforward way. Furthermore,
we study the role of price rigidities and its importance during the Interwar Period
65
Figure 3.5: Decomposition of Swiss Money Supply, 1922–1936
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in Switzerland. Therefore, we allow for monopolistic competition and nominal
rigidities. The home economy is infinitesimal small and does not affect the econ-
omy of the rest of the world, and markets are assumed to be complete, i.e. agents
trade a full set of state contingent bonds. In every period, economic agents form
rational expectations, the representative household maximizes expected lifetime
utility, and firms maximize expected profits. A sketch of the model is depicted in
Figure 3.6: Model Overview
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Figure 3.6, while more detailed description of the model, which corresponds to a
basic New Open Economy Model, is presented below.
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3.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by an infinitely lived representative household who
seeks to maximize
E0
 ∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct,Nt)
 with U(Ct,Nt) =  C1−σt1 − σ − N
1+η
t
1 + η

by optimally choosing consumption Ct and labor input Nt. Its period t budget
constraint looks as follows:
PtCt + QtBt+1 = WtNt + Bt, (3.2)
where Qt denotes the price of a one–period discount bond paying off one unit
of domestic currency at time t + 1, Et
[
Qt,t+1
] ≡ Qt = 1Rt . Pt, Bt, Wt, σ, η, and β
denote the consumer price index, bond holdings, the nominal wage, the inverse
of the elasticity of substitution, the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply,
and the discount factor respectively. Moreover, we impose a standard no–Ponzi
condition, lim
j→∞
Et
[
Bt+τ∏τ
j=0 Rt+ j
]
= 0, which implies that the period budget constraint
always holds with equality. Ct denotes a consumption composite index, i.e.
Ct =
(
(1 − γ) 1a
(
Cht
) a−1
a
+ γ
1
a
(
C ft
) a−1
a
) a
a−1
, (3.3)
where C ft refers to one single foreign good, C
h
t ≡
(∫ 1
0
(
Cht, j
) θ
θ−1 d j
) θ
θ−1
corresponds
to a Dixit–Stiglitz Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregate of domestic
goods, and Cht, j a domestic variety j. The exact composition C
h
t and C
f
t is optimally
chosen by the households according to the demand functions
Cht =
(
Pht
Pt
)−a
Ct(1 − γ) ; C ft =
P ftPt
−a Ctγ. (3.4)
Moreover, P ft captures the foreign price of the foreign produced good, the pref-
erence parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] represents a measure of home bias,8 a > 0 governs
8Since it is equal to the import share, it can also be interpreted as a natural measure of openness
(Galı´, 2008).
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the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, and θ > 0 denotes
the elasticity of substitution between domestic varieties. The household’s utility
maximization problem at period t can be summarized as
max
{Cτ,Nτ,Bτ+1}
Et
 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
 C1−στ1 − σ − N1+ητ1 + η

s.t. PτCτ + QτBτ+1 ≤WτNτ + Bτ,
(3.5)
yielding the following two standard optimality conditions:
Nηt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
; (3.6)
Et
[
Qt,t+1
]
= Qt = βEt
[(Ct+1
Ct
)−σ ( Pt
Pt+1
)]
. (3.7)
Equation (3.6) captures optimal static labor supply decision, i.e. marginal rate of
substitution between labor and leisure is equal to the real wage rate, while the
inter–temporal Euler equation is represented by equation (3.7).
3.2.2 Firms
Firm j produces output Yt, j using the production technology
Yt, j = Nt, j, (3.8)
with labor as the only input factor. Profits are maximized by minimizing costs for
a given amount of output, i.e.
min
{Nt, j}
Wt
Pht
Nt, j, s.t. Yt, j = Nt, j. (3.9)
The resulting first order condition contains the real marginal costs of production,
which is denoted by Ψt. Since marginal costs are constant, Ψt is also equal to the
real average cost or real unit cost of production:
Wt
Pht
−Ψt = 0⇔ Ψt = Wt
Pht
= Wrt . (3.10)
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In equilibrium, goods market clearing implies
Yt = Cht + C
h?
t , (3.11)
which implies that aggregate output Yt is fully absorbed by domestic consumption
of the domestically produced good Cht and foreign consumption of the domestic
good Ch?t . This leads to the demand functions for variety j,
Cht, j + C
h?
t, j =
Pht, jPht

−θ
Yt. (3.12)
Pht, j denotes the price of domestic variety j, and P
h
t corresponds to the price index
of domestic goods.
Prices are sticky in the sense that with a probability ω firms are not allowed
to optimally update their price at the beginning of the period. As stated above,
price stickiness is an important stylized fact for the period under analysis: a large
share of domestic prices and wages was fixed by the government. The pricing
mechanism used here goes back to Calvo (1983). P¯ht, j denotes the price set by firm
j in period t, which implies P(Pht+τ, j = P¯
h
t, j) = ω
τ. Moreover, since all firms are
identical and face identical demand curves, P¯ht, j = P¯
h
t .
Therefore, period t profit of firm j, conditional on being allowed to reset its
price is
pit, j =
(
P¯ht − Pht Ψt
)
(Cht, j + C
h?
t, j ) =
(
P¯ht − Pht Ψt
) ( P¯ht
Pht
)−θ
Yt, (3.13)
where Pht Ψt corresponds to the nominal unit costs. Conditional on being allowed
to reset its price level, firm j maximizes the expected current market value of
profits while the price remains effective. In particular,
max
{P¯ht }
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
ωτQt,t+τ
(
P¯ht − Pht+τΨt+τ
) ( P¯ht
Pht+τ
)−θ
Yt+τ
 , (3.14)
where Qt,t+τ = βτΛt+τΛt denotes the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs.
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The first order condition with respect to P¯ht is
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
ωτQt,t+τ
Λt+τ
Λt
Yt+τ
(1 − θ) ( P¯htPht+τ
)−θ
+ θ
(
P¯ht
Pht+τ
)−θ−1
Ψt+τ

 = 0. (3.15)
3.2.3 Global Characteristics
Exchange Rate & Terms of Trade
We assume that the law of one price holds, i.e.
P ft = StP
?
t , (3.16)
where P?t , P
f
t , St denote the foreign price of the foreign produced good denoted
in foreign currency, the foreign price of the foreign produced good denoted in
domestic currency, and the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the price of
foreign currency in terms of domestic currency respectively. The real exchange
rate is
Φt =
P ft
Pt
=
StP?t
Pt
, (3.17)
and corresponds to the price of a foreign good in terms of domestic consumption
bundles, while the terms of trade, the price of a foreign good in terms of domestic
goods, is defined as
∆t =
P ft
Pht
=
StP?t
Pht
, (3.18)
and follows an exogenous9 and stationary first–order autoregressive (AR(1)) pro-
cess in logs,
ln(∆t) = ρδ ln(∆t−1) + δt , 
δ
t ∼ N(0, σ2δ), (3.19)
where ρδ < 1 characterizes the persistence parameter and σ2δ the variance of the
shock δt .
9We are aware of the fact that this specification is not fully consistent with the underlying
model, because prices are endogenously determined. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) point out that
an estimation of the full structural model including endogenous terms of trade turned out to be
too restrictive and therefore lead to implausible estimates. Consequently, we decided to to follow
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) by treating the terms of trade as an exogenous process.
71
Foreign Country
The domestic economy is an infinitesimal small open economy whereas the for-
eign economy can be thought of as an aggregate of infinitely many identical
infinitesimal small open economies. Therefore, in the aggregate, net exports of
all foreign economies will sum up to zero, which implies C?t = Y
?
t . Foreign con-
sumption C?t is equal to foreign demand Y
?
t , which follows an exogenous and
stationary AR(1) process in logs,
ln(Y?t ) = (1 − ρ?) ln(Y?) + ρ? ln(Y?t−1) + ?t , ?t ∼ N(0, σ2y?), (3.20)
with a persistence parameter ρ? smaller than one and a variance σ2y? of the shock
?t .
International Trade
Exports are denoted in domestic goods and given by
EXt = Ch?t . (3.21)
For imports (denoted in domestic goods), we have
IMt =
P ft
Pht
C ft (3.22)
Net exports (denoted in domestic goods) are the difference between exports and
imports,
NXt = EXt − IMt. (3.23)
International Risk Sharing
International risk sharing under complete markets implies that the stochastic
discount factor among different countries is equal to (Chari et al., 2002b)
Qt,t+1 = β
(Ct+1
Ct
)−σ Pt
Pt+1
= β
(
C?t+1
C?t
)−σ StP?t
St+1P?t+1
, (3.24)
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where P?t denotes the foreign consumer price index, and which implies the fol-
lowing international risk sharing condition:10
(
C?t
Ct
)−σ
= Φt. (3.25)
As a result, complete markets lead to this this simple relationship linking the real
exchange rate to the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption of domestic
and foreign households.
3.2.4 Market Clearing and Aggregate Production Function
The firm level production function is represented by
Nt, j = Yt, j. (3.26)
Labor market clearing implies
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt, jd j, (3.27)
which enables us to compute the aggregate production function
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Yt, jd j =
∫ 1
0
Pht, jPht

−θ (
Cht + C
h?
t
)
d j =
=Yt
∫ 1
0
Pht, jPht

−θ
d j︸           ︷︷           ︸
ζt
= Ytζt ⇔
Yt =
Nt
ζt
. (3.28)
ζt can be seen as a measrure of price dispersion. The full set of optimality condi-
tions can be found in Appendix B.1.
10
(
C?t
Ct
)−σ
=
(
C?0
C0
)−σ
1
Φ0︸       ︷︷       ︸
µ
Φt = µΦt represents the general form of the risk sharing condition.
Without loss of generality we set the initial condition µ equal to one.
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3.3 Data and Estimation Method
For the estimation exercise, we use monthly data of industrial production, infla-
tion, and net exports, ranging from January 1926 to December 1938. An official
industrial production index is not available before 1965 (Cascioni, 2000, p. 281).
Already in the 1930s, this situation was deemed unsatisfactory, at least from the
viewpoint of the Federal Statistical Office.11 The problem of the missing Swiss
production index (Das Problem einer schweizerischen Produktionsstatistik) was dis-
cussed at the 1936 meeting of the the Swiss Statistical Society (Schweizerische Statis-
tische Gesellschaft). The overview in the Statistisches Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft
published by the German statistical office in 1936 (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1936)
showed that of the 80 countries in the collection, 54 had industrial production
statistics, Switzerland not being among them. To explain the situation, industrial
representatives (building, engineering, textile and printing) listed the general re-
luctance of the industry providing the data,12 the high cost of data collection, and
the availability of high quality trade statistics, which sufficed the needs of the
mainly export oriented Swiss industry, therefore making a production index su-
perfluous.13 Because of the lack of contemporaneous data, we could switch to the
sectoral estimates provided by David (1995), but these series are only at an annual
frequency. Therefore, we decided to use the business cycle indicators published
in the period of interest as a proxy, and take SBB (Swiss Federal Railway) freight
data, as well as indicators for silk and watch production,14 which represent the
two most important export industries in Switzerland in the Interwar Period.15
Inflation data is calculated based on the consumer price index taken from
the Federal Statistical Office.16 Based on household accounts from 1912, 1920,
and 1921 for skilled laborers, unskilled laborers and employees, the index was
11“Ein grosser Teil der schweizerischen Bevo¨lkerung ist auf Gedeih und Verderb auf den Ertrag der
industriellen Anlagen und auf ihre Bescha¨ftigung in ihnen angewiesen. Wie gross ist dieser Ertrag? Wir
kennen ihn nicht.” (Schwarz, 1936, p. 147)
12“Dann muss die Verbandsleitung auch mit einer Abneigung der Mitglieder rechnen, Dinge bekannt–
zugeben, welche die Grundlagen des Gescha¨fts betreffen. Diese Einstellung wa¨re besonders seitens der
welschen Mitglieder zu gegenwa¨rtigen, welche sich schon heute u¨ber einen angeblich u¨berwuchernden
‘esprit de police’ der Verba¨nde beklagen.” (Marti, 1936, p. 176)
13See the contributions by Cattani (1936), Bu¨hler-Krayer (1936), Fischer (1936), and Marti (1936).
14Source: SNB monthly reports (1926–1929, 1936–1938) and Die Volkswirtschaft (1930–1936).
15See Figure B.1 in Appendix B.2 for a time series of of the export shares of the two industries.
16Landesindex fu¨r Konsumentenpreise, www.statistik.admin.ch (cc-d-05.02.17.xls).
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first published in January 1922 by the Federal Office of Labour (Eidgeno¨ssisches
Arbeitsamt), first only for food. Because of critique by employee organizations and
trade unions, it was extended to other expenditure groups and, after the revision
in 1926, consisted of food, fuel (soap), clothing and rent.17
As already mentioned, there are high quality trade statistics available for
Switzerland, both by volume and value, at monthly frequency.18 The Federal
Customs Office (Eidgeno¨ssische Oberzolldirektion) publishes these data since 1885.
We use the Monatsstatistik des auswa¨rtigen Handels der Schweiz, 1926–1938.19
The solution of the model described in Section 3.2 leads to a non–linear system
of expectational first–order difference equations, which we log–linearize around
its deterministic steady state,20 before solving it using the method proposed by
Klein (2000). The solution of the model provides the policy functions, which can
be written in state space form as
xt =Zαt;
αt =Tαt−1 + Rνt, νt ∼ N(0,Q),
(3.29)
where xt is a 3 × 1 vector of observables (output, inflation, and net exports), and
αt is the 2 × 1 unobservable state vector driven by the two structural shocks in νt
with variance Q. The model is of course a highly stylized representation of the
Swiss economy in the 1930s. Therefore, we follow Ireland (2004) and incorporate
a dynamic measurement error with a vector autoregressive (VAR) structure into
the state vector to allow for off–model dynamics in the data:
κt = Aκt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0,Σ). (3.30)
17See Gordon (1939) and Koch (2000) for an overview. The index prior to 1926 is described
in detail in Eidgeno¨ssisches Arbeitsamt (1923), the revised index in Bundesamt fu¨r Industrie,
Gewerbe und Arbeit (1935).
18See Acklin (1939) and Balmer and Zurwerra (2000) for an overview.
19All data are available on request.
20See page 135 in Appendix A.2 for further detail regarding the technique of log–linearization
applied.
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The structure of the extended state space model is therefore
xt =
(
Z I3
) αtκt
 ;αtκt
 =
T 00 A

αt−1κt−1
 +
R 00 I3

νtt
 .
(3.29′)
The setup allows to estimate the structural parameters of the model using
Maximum Likelihood or Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods.
We choose the Bayesian approach, since in this framework, it is straightforward
to impose parameter restrictions using the prior distribution. The restrictions are
necessary because there is no guarantee that the estimation algorithm results in
parameter estimates which make sense from an economic point of view. If this
turns out to be too restrictive, the measurement error variance will dominate the
variance of the structural model.
Lastly, we calibrate two structural parameters prior to the estimation exercise.
In particular, we set the subjective discount factor β equal to the conventional
value of 0.99 and the preference parameter γ equal to the import share of the
Swiss economy during the period of investigation.
We impose uniform priors with reasonable ranges for the structural parame-
ters to be as loose as possible (see Table 3.3).21 To generate the parameter chain, we
use the tailored randomized MCMC method proposed by Chib and Ramamurthy
(2010). The procedure is a modification of the standard Metropolis–Hastings al-
gorithm (e.g. Chib and Greenberg, 1995). In each simulation step, the parameters
are randomly combined into blocks. A proposal draw is generated from a mul-
tivariate t–distribution with a scale matrix derived at the conditional maximum
of the posterior. The proposal is accepted if the value of the posterior at the new
parameters is higher than for the old parameters. If not, it is accepted with an
21For the VAR–component, we require that the maximum absolute eigenvalue of A is less than
0.6 to ensure that the persistence in the model comes from the structural shocks. In addition, the
matrix Σ has to be positive semidefinite, and the maximum measurement error variance is not
allowed to take values of more than 60 percent of the variance of the corresponding observable
time series. This is similar to Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), who restrict the measurement error
variance “to absorb no more than 6 percent of the variance of the corresponding observable time
series” (p. 2519). Since the vectorized variance covariance matrix of the VAR part is given by
vec (Σκ) = (I32 −A ⊗A) vec (Σ), our choice is not overly restrictive.
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acceptance probability drawn from a uniform distribution U(0, 1), to ensure that
we find a global maximum.
Since our estimation approach requires stationary data, we detrend our time
series prior to estimation. Furthermore, in all our time series we observe a strong
seasonal pattern. Therefore, we also deseasonalize the time series before the
estimation. In particular, for output we use the cyclical component of a quadrat-
ically detrended and X–1222 deseasonalized time series. For net exports we use
a demeaned and X–12 seasonally adjusted time series, while for inflation we use
monthly growth rates of year–to–year differences of the consumer price index.
Data plots of the time series used for estimation can be found in Appendix B.2.
3.4 Results
This section presents the results and findings of our estimation exercise. Unless
otherwise mentioned, we focus on the results using SBB freight data as a proxy
for output. However, occasionally we also complement our findings with result
sets using silk or watch production instead of freight data.
3.4.1 Parameter Distributions
With the algorithm described in the previous section, we draw 400,000 replica-
tions, discarding the first 150,000 as burn–in. Geweke’s χ2–test (4% taper) is
used to assess convergence of the parameter chains (Geweke, 1992). Results of
the posterior distribution of the structural parameters23 are presented in Table
3.3 and show a presence of high persistence in foreign demand, terms of trade,
and prices. This finding underlines the fact that price rigidities seem to be an
important feature of the Swiss economy at this time.
3.4.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The decomposition of the forecast error variance, presented in Figure 3.7 of output
and inflation shows that the structural model, even though being quite stylized,
22Census Bureau’s X–12 ARIMA procedure
23Posterior distribution of measurement error components can be found in Appendix B.3.
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Table 3.3: Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Parameter Prior Dist. Median 90% Bands Gewekes χ2
β calibrated 0.99 - -
γ calibrated 0.25 - -
θ U ∼ [5,7] 6.425 [5.312,6.946] 0.358
η U ∼ [1.5,3] 2.660 [1.861,2.967] 0.875
σ U ∼ [1.5,3] 2.705 [2.026,2.969] 0.835
a U ∼ [3,6] 3.097 [3.009,3.373] 0.337
ω U ∼ [0.4,1] 0.995 [0.993,0.996] 0.878
ρy? U ∼ [0,1] 0.989 [0.983,0.993] 0.355
ρδ U ∼ [0,1] 0.999 [0.997,1.000] 0.189
σy? U ∼ [0.01,0.03] 0.020 [0.014,0.029] 0.615
σδ U ∼ [0.01,0.03] 0.010 [0.010,0.010] 0.371
Notes: Results are based on 400,000 draws, where the first 150,000 are discarded as burn–in
draws. SBB freight data is used for industrial production.
contributes a significant part to the dynamics in the data, especially in the long
run. Thus, we conclude that the choice of the model, though being quite styl-
ized, turned out to be appropriate and well–suited for explaining macroeconomic
fluctuations of the Swiss economy during the Interwar Period.
Furthermore, the structural model is more important for inflation than for
output – this demonstrates again that price rigidity is an important feature of the
Swiss economy in this period. Inflation is mainly driven by movements in terms
of trade both in the short and in the long run. Off–model dynamics are more
important for output, which indicates that the model is not able to capture all
the dynamics of this eventful period, especially in the short run. However, the
structural part of the model becomes more and more important at longer horizons
so that in the long run the measurement error only accounts for about 10 percent
of the variation in output. Regarding the two structural shocks, foreign demand
is slightly more important than terms of trade in the the short run, which in turn
becomes more important in the long run.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 report the relative importance of the shocks in case we use
silk or watch production as a proxy for output instead of SBB freight data. While
the results reveal a worse model fit in general for these two specifications, we find
qualitatively similar results for the forecast error variance decomposition. Hence,
the importance of terms of trade turns out to be a robust finding.
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Figure 3.7: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (SBB)
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Notes: Results are based on median outcomes of the posterior distribution, SBB freight data is
used for industrial production.
Figure 3.8: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Silk)
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Notes: Results are based on median outcomes of the posterior distribution, silk production is
used for industrial production.
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Figure 3.9: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Watches)
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Notes: Results are based on median outcomes of the posterior distribution, watch production is
used for industrial production.
3.4.3 Price Rigidities
Another robust finding is the presence of severe price rigidities. Figure 3.10
depicts the distribution of the average duration of a price being effective implied
by the estimated posterior distributions of ω. It reveals that independent of the
choice of the output time series ω seemed to be rather high, which translates
into a high degree of price stickiness. The remarkably high duration of prices
being effective of the watches model is in line with an observed high degree of
cartelization of the export sector as described in Section 3.2.
3.4.4 Estimated States
The fact that terms of trade and foreign demand are modeled as exogenous pro-
cesses allows us to extract the model implied time series. The smoothed states
displayed in Figure 3.11 are based on on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribu-
tion and using the Kalman filter to generate the time series. The foreign demand
state shows the pattern of the business cycle for the main trading partners of
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Figure 3.10: Average duration of prices ( 11−ω )
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Notes: Average duration in months implies by the estimated posterior distributions.
Switzerland:24 a downturn starting mid 1928, the lower turning point in 1932/33,
and the recession 1936/37. This development should have helped Switzerland to
escape earlier from the Great Depression. However, the terms of trade state shows
that the Swiss franc stayed overvalued until autumn 1936. The sharp amelioration
of the terms of trade time series almost perfectly coincides with the devaluation
of the Swiss franc on September 26 in 1936. This finding is even more remarkable,
since we did not include any data on exchange rates or terms of trade in the
estimation exercise. A sharp decline after the outbreak of the Great Depression
in 1929 can be observed, and the terms of trade did not reach equilibrium until
the devaluation of the Swiss franc in September 1936. The forecast error vari-
ance decomposition of output reveals that terms of trade are more important than
foreign demand. Consequently, the positive effect of increasing foreign demand
after 1932/33 was overcompensated by the overvaluation of the Swiss franc, and
the escape from the Great Depression did not start before September 1936.
24See Table 3.1 for the import and export shares of the main trading partners in this period.
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Figure 3.11: Estimated Exogenous States
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Light–gray shaded area
represents 95% probability bands, dark–gray shaded area represents 68% probability bands,
black line represents median.
3.4.5 Counterfactual Experiments
Leaving Gold in 1931/33
What would have been the consequence of Switzerland leaving the Gold Standard
together with Britain on September 21, 1931? What would have happened in case
Switzerland did not participate in the Gold Block in July 1933 but devaluated
their currency instead? To address the issue, we simulate the case of an early
devaluation by setting the terms of trade state equal to one (i.e. the terms of trade
are in equilibrium) and use 5,000 draws from the posterior parameter distribution
and the Kalman filter to generate the counterfactual time series of interest. We
calculate the differences between the predicted log deviations of output from the
actual deviations, which is equal to percent differences in levels. As can be seen
from Figure 3.12, this difference turns out to be always positive after 1932. This
is in line with our previous interpretation: obviously, the overvaluation of the
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Swiss franc against the sterling bloc and the US dollar caused the Swiss exporting
sectors to profit less from the increasing demand after 1932/33 than small European
countries with a devalued currency such as the Scandinavian countries. At least,
there was some growth: in real terms, exports increased by 16 percent between
1932 and 1934. But in 1935, when sterling further weakened, the upward trend of
exports decelerated.
Figure 3.12: Estimated Gain of Leaving Gold in September 1931 / July 1933
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Light–gray shaded area
represents 95% probability bands, dark–gray shaded area represents 68% probability bands,
black line represents median.
Alleviating Price Rigidities
What would have been the implications for the Swiss economy of a lower degree
of price stickiness? Would a policy intervention decreasing the degree of carteliza-
tion have been beneficial? We draw 5,000 times from the posterior distribution
and set ω equal to a lower counterfactual value. As a consequence, firms are in
this experiment allowed to reset their price level more frequently. We analyze
two different scenarios: (i) strong intervention (small ω): the average duration of
prices being effective reduces from 182 to 50 months, and (ii) medium intervention
(medium ω): the average duration of prices being effective reduces from 182 to
83
100 months. As a next step, we estimate the counterfactual level of output implied
by the structural part of the model by generating counterfactual data. Figure 3.13
depicts the results and emphasizes the potential benefits of policies that reduce
price rigidities. In particular, the extent to which the economy is exposed to cycli-
cal fluctuations is significantly reduced with a lower ω. Hence, the severity of the
Great Depression might have been amplified by the rise of corporatist policies.
Figure 3.13: Counterfactual Price Rigidities
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution, median outcomes are
reported. Small ω implies an average duration of prices being effective of 50 months, while
medium ω implies 100 months. ω estimated implies a median duration of prices of 182 months.
3.5 Conlusion
As Choudhri and Kochin (1980) show, countries staying on gold, such as Nether-
lands, Belgium, Italy or Poland, faced a much more severe depression than the
Scandinavian countries or Spain, which never returned to gold. The Gold Bloc
countries stayed depressed, while the countries leaving gold early recovered
by 1935 (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985; Campa, 1990; Bernanke and James, 1991;
Eichengreen, 1992). The main determinants for the timing of abandoning the gold
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parity were deflationary pressure, the existence of banking crises, the gold cover
ratio, and the extent of trade integration (Wolf, 2007, 2008).
The decision of Britain to abandon the gold standard on September 21, 1931
was seen as a catastrophe by contemporary Swiss policy makers.25 Because of
the fear of inflationary pressure caused by a floating exchange rate and the fact
that the accumulated gold stock was big enough to avert speculative attacks,
Switzerland managed to stay on gold until September 26, 1936.
What were the consequences of this policy for the Swiss economy? In a
New Keynesian small open economy framework, we show that foreign demand
deviations from equilibrium started to increase in the second half of 1931. This
should have had a positive effect on Swiss output. However, at the same time, the
terms of trade deteriorated. Since the contribution of the terms of trade shock to
the forecast error variance of output was higher than the contribution of foreign
demand, the second effect dominated, and it took the Swiss economy until autumn
1936 to start recovering from the Great Depression.
Finally, we detect a severe degree of price rigidity of the Swiss economy
during the Interwar Period, which impeded an internal adjustment and therefore
also contributed to a prolonged recession.
25An example is the evaluation of this step as “disastrous” in the 25th Anniversary Festschrift of
the Swiss National Bank published in 1932: “Am 21. September 1931 gab das durch große Goldabzu¨ge
bedra¨ngte und dadurch in seinen Reserven bedrohte England die Goldwa¨hrung auf. Dieser Schritt war um
so verha¨ngnisvoller, als zahlreiche Staaten dem Beispiel Englands unmittelbar folgten” (Schweizerische
Nationalbank, 1932, p. 301/302).
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Chapter 4
The Role of Labor Market
Imperfections and Credit Constraints
in the German Great Depression
4.1 Introduction
Bru¨ning war an allem schuld.
L. A. Hahn (1963)
It is a long held public view that the economic policy of austerity under the
chancellorship of Heinrich Bru¨ning (March 1930 to June 1932), enforced by emer-
gency decrees based on article 48 of the Weimar constitution, is to be blamed
for deepening the depression and thus paving the path for the success of the
National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). The hypothesis debated in
the literature is that demand side policy would have been possible and that the
success of NSDAP was a consequence of wrong economic policy (Ritschl, 2002,
p. 32). The issues raised by Borchardt (1982) are taken as a point of departure:
(1) When would have been the right time to intervene? There was no reason
to act before spring/summer 1931, all crises before were different (e.g. the fast
recoveries 1920/21 and 1925/26). Moreover, because of lags in the response to
policy measures, it was too late in summer 1931 to stop the rapid increase in
unemployment. (2) What would have been the right alternative policy? Alter-
natives discussed in the literature, such as the proposed credit expansion had no
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legal base. Because of the political situation, foreign credits were unlikely. A
domestic monetary expansion was not possible because of the overriding aim to
end the reparation payments of the Bru¨ning government, the fear of inflation,
and the missing political support. (3) A further question in the literature is the
nature of the German crisis: In Borchardt’s view, the crisis in Germany was not
a cyclical phenomenon, but mainly structural. The German economy was sick
and characterized by too high real wages and ongoing distributional struggles.
This resulted in unfortunate initial conditions before the outbreak of the crisis,
therefore an anticyclical demand side policy would not have been appropriate to
solve the economic problems Germany had at this time.1 All these issues remain
unresolved, and this paper aims to contribute to the debate.
We study the situation in the framework of a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model, which allows to pin down the driving forces of the
business cycle in a straightforward manner. In particular, we extend the model by
Fisher and Hornstein (2002), by additionally modeling some of the key features
of the German economy for the period under analysis. We make it an open
economy, model labor market inefficiencies explicitly, and incorporate financial
market frictions. We address the issue of the structural problems of the labor
market measuring labor market frictions using a reduced form labor wedge (see
Chari et al. 2002a, 2007 or Bridji 2013). Furthermore, we choose a heterogeneous
agents framework to account for fact that the German economy was exposed
to severe borrowing constraints (Ritschl, 2002) during this period. In addition,
this extension yields the possibility to analyze different agents (capitalists and
workers) separately.
We estimate a range of structural parameters of the model using monthly time
series of output, consumption, and wages, all collected by the Institut fu¨r Konjunk-
turforschung in the 1920s and 1930s along the lines of Ireland (2004). This approach
implements an autoregressive structure for the measurement error, thus enabling
the highly restrictive, linearized solution of the DSGE model to compete with a
1On the Borchardt Controversy, see Borchardt (1982), Holtfrerich (1982, 1984, 1996), Ritschl
(1990, 2002), and the overview in Kruedener (1990), especially Borchardt (1990) and Holtfrerich
(1990). On the relative importance of high wages as opposed to high interest rates as a brake on
investment, see Voth (1995).
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more flexible time series model and to judge the goodness of fit. In principle, the
estimation can be done using Maximum Likelihood, but given the high number of
parameters to be estimated, numerical optimization is cumbersome, and it is more
convenient to apply a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique.
Our results suggest that the German economy was characterized by severe
structural problems. We find that the labor wedge (i.e. a wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and the marginal prod-
uct of labor) plays a dominant role in explaining the downturn of the German
business cycle. Furthermore, variations in total factor productivity (TFP), another
supply side disturbance, also significantly contributed to the contraction of the
economy. Regarding demand side policies, the model predicts a limited role for
government interventions. Thus, expansionary fiscal policies would not have
sufficed to prevent the German economy from falling into a depression. Conse-
quently, our results support the point of view of Borchardt (1982) and highlight the
importance of structural problems in the economy. Moreover, we find that (i) the
economy was characterized by credit constraints as highlighted by Ritschl (2002)
and (ii) capitalists suffered less during the Great Depression than the workers,
since they were able to use financial markets to smooth consumption.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section
motivates and presents the model in detail. Section 4.3 presents the data used and
the estimation approach. The results are discussed in Section 4.4, and Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 The Model
We take the model used by Fisher and Hornstein (2002) as our point of departure.
Additionally, for the purpose of our analysis, we extend the model on various
dimensions. First, we make it a small open economy Real Business Cycle (RBC)
model as introduced by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) and applied by e.g.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) in order to allow for open economy characteristics. In
particular, we introduce a foreign interest rate, foreign debt, and thus also current
account dynamics. This is motivated by the fact that the German economy was
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already quite open at that time, with an average ratio of 35 percent of exports
and imports over output between 1925 and 1935.2 In this regard, also Ritschl and
Sarferaz (2014) highlight the importance of international financial movements as
a transmission channel of the Great Depression.
Moreover, we augment the model with a financial friction by adapting a het-
erogeneous agents framework (see e.g. Judd 1985 and Angelopoulos et al. 2011).
That is, we explicitly model capitalists and workers, where the latter type does
not have access to domestic or international capital markets. The reason for this
model innovation is twofold. First, the German economy was exposed to severe
borrowing constraints during the Interwar Period as pointed out by Ritschl (2002,
2012, 2013). One major event here was the Young Plan in 1929, which ended the
transfer protection of credits, thus leading to a decrease in foreign credit supply.
Another factor imposing credit constraints on Germany was the outcome of the
elections on September 14, 1930. With a very high voters turnout of 82%, the
extreme parties to the right and left were successful, the NSDAP increasing the
share of votes from 2.6% to 18.3%, and the KPD from 10.6% to 13.1%. In addition,
the strained relationship with France, caused by a foreign policy which could be
interpreted as aggressive, led to further complicating the situation.3 On June 6,
1931, Bru¨ning issued the second emergency deflation decree, together with an
urgent demand to end reparations.4 This speech was interpreted as yet another
indication of German payment problems. In addition, there was the vulnerable
German banking sector, as described in e.g. Born (1967, p. 14–30), everything cul-
minating in the German banking crisis of 1931. Besides, this approach enables us
analyze capitalists and workers individually, and thus contribute to discussions
by Borchardt (1982) on distributional struggles.
In order to account for the role of the government, we follow Fisher and
Hornstein (2002) by incorporating government spending as an exogenous state
2See Table B.7.4 in Ritschl (2002)
3Examples are the decision to build two new battle cruisers for the navy, the negotiations about
an Austro–German customs union, and the exclusive bilateral trade agreements with Hungary
and Romania.
4“Die Einsetzung der letzten Kra¨fte und Reserven aller Bevo¨lkerungskreise gibt der deutschen Regierung
das Recht und macht es ihren eigenen Volk gegenu¨ber zur Pflicht, vor der Welt auszusprechen: Die Grenzen
dessen, was wir unserem Volk an Entbehrungen aufzuerlegen vermo¨gen, ist erreicht!” (in Winkler, 2005,
p. 409)
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variable. This allows us to analyze the importance of government spending
during that time and thus to contribute to discussions whether or not expansion-
ary government interventions could have prevented the German economy from
falling into a depression. In light of the capitalists/worker financial friction, this
shock becomes even more important. In our view, the interplay of government
expenditure and credit restrictions faced by Germany are especially important,
because all of the major plans discussed after 1931 to jump start the economy had
to deal with the problem of financing the proposed job creating measures.5
Furthermore, we introduce a labor wedge6 in the spirit of Chari et al. (2002a)
and Chari et al. (2007), which enables us to assess inefficiencies of the German
labor market present at that time. In fact, they also play an important role in
the Borchardt Controversy (e.g. Borchardt, 1980, 1990; Holtfrerich, 1984; Ritschl,
1990).
Finally, a standard transitory TFP shock is introduced. It enables us to capture
to what extent the economy was exposed to cyclical inefficiencies on the pro-
duction side. Consequently, this model framework enables us to address some
aspects of the Borchardt Controversy, while still being able to directly compare
the results to the ones of Fisher and Hornstein (2002) or Chari et al. (2002a). The
following Section 4.2.1 presents the model economy in detail.
4.2.1 The Economy
Producing Economy
The home economy is infinitesimal small and therefore does not influence any
prices of the rest of the world. What is more, we abstract from any kind of
5The suggestion in the second report of the Brauns commission (Kommission zum Studium der
Arbeitslosenfrage) in February 1931 was to finance the program by long run foreign credits (Ro¨pke,
1931, p. 442). Hans Scha¨ffer, on the other hand, in his Gedanken zur Krisenbeka¨mpfung (September 2,
1931, in Schulz et al. 1980, Vol. 4/II, p. 933–939, No. 299) saw as only possibility rediscount policy
of the Reichsbank, because obtaining foreign credits was unlikely, given the situation. This was
also the opinion of Wilhelm Lautenbach (Mo¨glichkeiten einer Konjunkturbelebung durch Investition
und Kreditausweitung, September 16/17, 1931, in Borchardt and Scho¨tz 1991, p. 307–325), who
proposed to finance a public infrastructure investment program by credits from the Reichsbank.
The so called WTB–plan (after the authors Wladimir Woytinski, Fritz Tarnow and Fritz Baade,
Wiederaufbau durch Arbeitsbeschaffung, Schneider 1975, p. 231–236) of the ADGB (Allgemeiner
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) was also relying on expansionary monetary policy.
6See Shimer (2009) for a detailed discussion on findings on the labor wedge.
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stochastic or deterministic trend in TFP growth. There is a representative firm
that produces homogeneous final goods in a perfectly competitive environment.
The production technology is described by the following neoclassical production
function:
yt = ztkαt (ht)
1−α, (4.1)
where yt denotes output, kt capital available at period t and ht labor input.7
Moreover, the production technology is exposed to fluctuations in TFP, captured
by zt, which is assumed to follow a first–order autoregressive (AR(1)) stationary
exogenous process in logs:
zt = z1−ρ
z
zρzt−1 exp(
z
t ) with 
z
t ∼ N(0, σ2z). (4.2)
Shocks to the level of TFP are captured by zt with variance σ
2
z . it represents the
level of investment and the capital stock follows a law of motion of the following
form:
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt, (4.3)
where φ governs the quadratic capital adjustment costs and δ corresponds to the
depreciation rate.
Factor Markets
Firms
Factor markets are competitive, resulting in a rental rate of capital equal to the
marginal product of capital
rt =
∂yt
∂kt
= α
yt
kt
(4.4)
and a wage rate (from the producers point of view) equal to the marginal product
of labor
7Note that in this class of models involuntary unemployment does not exist. Hence, we refrain
from drawing strong conclusions concerning the determinants of the surge in the unemployment
rate in Germany during the period under analysis.
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wt =
∂yt
∂ht
= (1 − α) yt
ht
. (4.5)
This implies zero profits and therefore under market clearing
yt = wtht + rtkt, (4.6)
and a capital (labor) share of α ((1 − α)) in the steady state.
Households: the Labor Wedge
Household’s labor income is not necessarily equal to the full wage paid by the
firms, because we allow for a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
of consumption for leisure and the marginal product of labor (i.e. the real wage)
along the lines of Chari et al. (2002a, 2007). Thus, the relevant labor income for the
agent’s maximization problem is equal to τtwtht. τt captures the extent of labor
market inefficiencies in a reduced form way and is allowed to vary over time
following a stationary exogenous AR(1) process in logs:
τt = τ
1−ρττρτt−1 exp(
τ
t ) 
τ
t ∼ N(0, σ2τ). (4.7)
As a result, the evolution of τt depends on the realizations of the shocks τt with
variance σ2τ. Furthermore, note that the wage difference resulting from the labor
wedge ((1-τt)wtht) is redistributed in the form of a lump–sum transfer.
Government
The amount of non–productive government expenditure is described by the fol-
lowing law of motion, represented by another stationary exogenous AR(1) process
in logs:
gt = g1−ρ
g
gρgt−1 exp(
g
t ) with 
g
t ∼ N(0, σ2g). (4.8)
It is financed by per capita lump–sum taxes tgt . The level of government expendi-
ture depends on shocks gt with variance σ
2
g. Thus, we abstract from government
debt and assume a balanced budget in every period. That is, in every period
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gt = t
g
t , where t
g
t denotes per capita lump sum transfers.The household however
is free to choose how to finance tgt in every period. One option for example is
the issuance of foreign debt dt, which captures the level of foreign debt of the
economy. Hence, in principle we allow for debt financed fiscal policy.
Households
Households form rational expectations and seek to maximize expected lifetime
utility
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tu(cτ, 1 − hτ), (4.9)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective discount factor and u(ct, 1 − ht) the period
utility function. It is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave in both
arguments consumption ct and (1−ht) leisure. We assume that preferences are the
same for both types of households (Angelopoulos et al., 2011), and follow Fisher
and Hornstein (2002) by using a log–linear utility function
u(ct, 1 − ht) = ln(ct) + η ln(1 − ht), (4.10)
where η determines the leisure weight in the utility function. We set the mass of
population equal to one, abstract from population growth in this model, and let λ
determine the fraction of capitalists. Consequently, there are λ ∈ [0, 1] households
of capitalists choosing their level of consumption, labor input, domestic capital,
and foreign debt in order to maximize utility. Contrary to that, (1−λ) households
composed of workers can only choose their optimal level of consumption and
labor input, because they do not have any access to financial markets. Finally,
note that the two agents do not differ with respect to labor productivity.
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Capitalists
The period t budget constraint of a capitalist is represented by:
τtwthkt + rtk
k
t + d
k
t+1 = c
k
t + i
k
t + (1 + r
d
t−1)d
k
t + t
g
t + t
t,k
t , (4.11)
where hkt , k
k
t , i
k
t , d
k
t , c
k
t correspond to a capitalist’s labor supply, capital, investment,
foreign debt, and consumption, respectively. All variables are expressed in per
capita terms. Moreover, rdt denotes the interest rate on foreign debt and t
t,k
t cap-
tures the aforementioned transfer resulting from the labor wedge. Thus, the left
hand side of equation (4.11) captures the disposable resources of a capitalist at
period t, composed of labor income τtwthkt , capital income rtk
k
t , and newly issued
international debt dkt+1. These available resources are absorbed by consumption
ckt , investment i
k
t , repayment of debt plus interest (1 + r
d
t−1)d
k
t , transfers due to the
labor wedge tt,kt , and lump–sum taxes t
g
t to finance government expenditure gt.
Consequently, the optimization problem of a capitalist at time t can be stated as
max
{ckγ,hkγ,kkγ+1,dkγ+1}
Et
∞∑
γ=t
βγ−t(u(ckγ, 1 − hkγ))
s.t. τγwγhkγ + rγk
k
γ + d
k
γ+1 ≥
ckγ + k
k
γ+1 − (1 − δ)kkγ +
φ
2
kkγ+1kkγ − 1

2
kkγ︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
ikγ
+(1 + rdγ−1)d
k
γ + t
t,k
γ + t
g
γ
taking as given kkt , d
k
t , zt, τt, and gt as well as the transversality condition
lim
j→∞
Et
[∏ j−2
s=0
dt+ j
1+rdt+s
]
= 0. Utility maximization yields the following optimality
conditions:
ckt
1 − hkt
= τtwt (4.12)
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1
ckt
[
1 + φ
(kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)]
= βEt
[ 1
ckt+1
(
rt+1 + (1 − δ) + φ
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)kkt+2
kkt+1
− φ
2
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)2] (4.13)
and
1
ckt
= βEt
[
1
ckt+1
(1 + rdt )
]
. (4.14)
Equation (4.12) represents the intratemporal labor–leisure trade–off condition in-
cluding a labor wedge, while (4.13) and (4.14) describe the intertemporal Euler
Equations with respect to capital and foreign debt holdings.
Workers
The period t budget constraint of a worker is represented by:
τtwthwt = c
w
t + t
g
t + t
t,w
t (4.15)
where hwt , c
k
t , t
t,w
t correspond to the worker’s labor supply, consumption, and trans-
fers resulting from the labor wedge, respectively. All variables are expressed in
per capita terms. The period t budget constraint takes into account that workers
are excluded from financial markets and only have one income source. Conse-
quently, their optimization problem at time t is static and is described below:
max
{cwγ ,hwγ }
Et
∞∑
γ=t
βγ−t(u(ckγ, 1 − hkγ))
s.t. τγwγhwγ ≥ cwγ + tt,wγ + tgγ
taking as given gt, zt, and τt. As optimality condition it only renders the intratem-
poral labor–leisure trade–off condition for workers (including the labor wedge)
cwt
1 − hwt
= τtwt. (4.16)
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Heterogeneous Agents: Aggregation
Since there are λ households of capitalists and 1 − λ households of workers, the
total economy’s capital stock is equal to kt = λkkt , total economy’s investment
is equal to it = λikt , and the total level of foreign debt is equal to dt = λd
k
t .
Furthermore, the total level of consumption is characterized by ct = λckt + (1−λ)cwt ,
while the overall labor supply is equal to ht = λhkt + (1 − λ)hwt .
Open Economy Characteristics
The open economy model is closed by a debt–elastic interest rate rule as proposed
by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003):
rdt = r
d + ψ
(
exp (dt+1 − d) − 1) . (4.17)
This approach has the advantage that besides being a convenient way of closing
the open economy model, it also nests a potentially meaningful structural inter-
pretation. That is, the parameter ψ governing the debt–elasticity of the economy
can be interpreted as a reduced form financial frication in the spirit of Garcı´a-Cicco
et al. (2010). The extent to which the foreign interest rate depends on foreign debt
dynamics might be driven by the degree of financial development. Additionally,
since we allow for a foreign interest rate and foreign debt, we also include current
account dynamics capturing changes in the net foreign asset position:
cat = −dt+1 + (1 + rdt )dt. (4.18)
Aggregation & Market Clearing
Finally, we can derive the standard aggregate resource constraint of the total
economy by combining the budget constraints of workers and capitalists:8
8Note that we define total transfers due to labor market inefficiencies to be equal to ttt ≡
λtt,kt + (1 − λ)tt,wt
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λ
(
τtwthkt + rtk
k
t + d
k
t+1
)
+ (1 − λ) (τtwthwt ) =
λ
ckt + kkt+1 − (1 − δ)kkt − φ2
(
kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)2
kkt + (1 + r
d
t−1)d
k
t + t
t,k
t + t
g
t

+ (1 − λ)
(
cwt + t
t,w
t + t
g
t
)
⇔ τtwtht + rtkt + dt+1 = ct + it + (1 + rdt−1)dt + gt + λtt,kt + (1 − λ)tt,wt
⇔ yt = wtht + rtkt = ct + it + gt + cat + (τt − 1)wtht + ttt︸             ︷︷             ︸
=0
⇔ wtht + rtkt = yt = ct + it + gt + cat (4.19)
The left hand side of (4.19) captures income side of the economy, while the right
hand side represents the expenditure side, both being equal to the produced
amount yt. A more detailed description of the model including all optimality
conditions as well as the derivation of the steady state values can be found in
Appendix C.1.
4.2.2 Model Solution
The above presented model represents a stationary system of non–linear first–
order difference equations. We log–linearize the model around its deterministic
steady state9 and therefore apply a first–order approximation. As a next step we
solve the linearized model applying the method proposed by Klein (2000). The
solution can then be expressed in a state space representation of the form
yt =Zαt
αt =Tαt−1 + Rηt, ηt ∼ N(0,Q),
(4.20)
where yt is an (n × 1) vector of control variables and αt represents the (m ×
1) unobservable state vector, which is driven by the exogenous processes ηt of
dimension (x × 1). The matrix R (m × x) links the state variables to the exogenous
9See page 135 in Appendix A.2 for further detail regarding the technique of log–linearization
applied.
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processes. In our case we have two endogenous state variables kt and dt, and three
exogenous state variables zt, gt, and τt, resulting in m = 5 and x = 3. Q represents
the variance covariance matrix of the state variables, where only the last three
elements on the main diagonal are non–zero and equal to σ2z , σ2g, and σ2τ. Z (n×m)
and T (m×m)represent policy functions of all the variables in the system. Finally,
we use this state space representation to estimate the model, which is described
in the next section.
4.3 Calibration, Data, and Estimation
4.3.1 Calibration
A set of structural parameters and steady state conditions is calibrated. We closely
follow the literature, particularly Fisher and Hornstein (2002), in order to assure
comparability to existing results. Table 4.1 reports the calibrated values. Having
monthly data available (see next section), we also use a monthly frequency for
the analysis, i.e. a time unit t in our theoretical economy is equal to one month.
Table 4.1: Calibrated Values
Parameter Description Value
β subjective discount factor 0.997
r steady state real interest rate 0.004
δ steady state depreciation rate 0.001
α capital share of the economy 0.25
ψ debt–elasticity of foreign interest rate 1
φ capital adjustment costs 0
h steady state labor supply 0.30
g
y steady state public expenditure quota 0.15
d
y steady state debt–to–GDP ratio 0.80
z steady state level of transitory TFP 1
τ steady state level of labor wedge 1
We use calibrated values of Fisher and Hornstein (2002) for β and δ and adjust
them to be consistent with a monthly frequency to derive steady state values for
β, r, and δ. With respect to the steady state capital share of the economy we also
follow Fisher and Hornstein (2002) and set it equal to 0.25. On an annual basis, this
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calibration would imply a capital–to–output ratio of about 5 and an interest rate of
about 5 percent. Also, regarding steady state labor supply h we follow Fisher and
Hornstein (2002) and set it equal to 0.3. We fix the debt–elasticity parameter ψ at
value 1, which implies a certain amount of financial frictions on the international
debt market. While e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) use the value 0.001, which
basically excludes any feedback effects from the interest rate to variations in the
level of debt, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) point out that this parameter needs to be
carefully calibrated or estimated. A too low value could result in imprecise or
misleading model predictions, particularly for the current account. Hence, given
the fact that Germany was exposed to severe external credit constraints in the
Interwar Period (Ritschl, 2002, 2012, 2013), we choose a calibration10 significantly
different from zero. We calibrate the steady state ratio of government spending
to be equal to 0.15 using data provided by Ritschl (2002) ranging from 1925–1935.
With respect to the steady state foreign debt–to–GDP we use data from Ritschl
and Sarferaz (2014). The average ratio from 1928–1932 is equal to 80 percent.
Moreover, we do not assume any inefficiencies on the production side or on the
labor market in the steady state and therefore set z and τ equal to 1. Finally,
we abstract from capital adjustment costs.11 All remaining structural parameters,
including the share of capitalists, are estimated.
4.3.2 Data
For the estimation exercise, we use monthly data collected by the Institut fu¨r
Konjunkturforschung on output (production index),12 consumption (approximated
10We are aware of the fact that an estimation of this parameter would be desirable. In our case
however, this is rather cumbersome, since the policy functions of our control variables we use
for the estimation are independent of the value of ψ. As a result, we cannot identify ψ. One
would require high quality monthly time series of real interest rates (preferably domestic and
international) and foreign debt to estimate ψ. Still, we conducted several robustness checks with
other values of ψ and concluded that the choice of ψ did not significantly alter our results.
11We also estimated the model with positive capital adjustment costs and could not detect any
major differences.
12Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1935, Section III B, p. 52 f.), Produktionsgu¨ter gesamt
(1928=100). For a discussion and critique of available production indices at this time, see Ritschl
(2004).
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by retail sales),13 and wages (hourly wages of workers).14 Furthermore, in order
to have data being consistent with the model, we require real and per capita time
series. Hence, we divide the series of output and consumption by population15
and deflate them using the consumer price index.16 As a next step, all three
time series are seasonally adjusted using using the Census Bureau’s X–12 ARIMA
procedure.
Figure 4.1: Data
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Notes: Normalized indices (Jan 1929=100) of seasonally adjusted real per capita output, real per
capita consumption, and real wages.
Figure 4.1 depicts the resulting time series and immediately points out that
there seems to be a divergence between wages and the other variables. While
both output and consumption experienced a severe deterioration during the Great
Depression, real wages even increased. This highlights the phenomenon of over-
13Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1933, Section VI A,p. 64), Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung
(1935, Section VI A, p. 78), Umsatzbewegung im Einzelhandel, Einzelhandel insgesamt (1928=100).
14Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1933, Section VIII D, p. 82), Stundenlo¨hne (Durchschnitt),
(1928=100).
15We use annual population data of the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and
construct monthly time series by linear interpolation.
16Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1933, Section IX C, p. 116 f.), Reichsindexziffern der Lebens–
haltungskosten, Lebenshaltung insgesamt (1913/14=100).
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valued and rigid wages in the German economy mentioned by Borchardt (1982).
Moreover, our estimation procedure requires the use of stationary data. Hence,
we need to choose an appropriate filter of in order make the time series stationary.
Thus, we decide to use deviations of a quadratic trend for the estimation.
4.3.3 Estimation
We adopt a Bayesian viewpoint for the estimation exercise. This approach allows
us to incorporate prior beliefs about the structural parameters of interest in a
convenient way. Furthermore, it yields computational advantages vis–a`–vis a
classical estimation approach.
What concerns the choice of the parameters to be estimated, we focus on the
persistence parameters and volatility of the exogenous shocks. Consequently,
estimation results will determine which shocks were the main determinants of
the German business cycle during the Great Depression. Additionally, we also
estimate the parameter λ (i.e. the share of capitalists in the economy), the reason
being twofold: First, a proper calibration would be rather cumbersome. One
option would be to use household survey data on savings (as Angelopoulos et al.
2011) in order to pin down down λ. Such data however is rather difficult to obtain
for the Interwar Period in Germany. Another approach would be to approximate
(1 − λ) using data on the share of workers and public servants. Still, one would
need to assume that those groups were excluded from financial markets. As
a result, we decided to estimate the parameter λ directly. All other structural
parameters are calibrated and reported in Table 4.1.
Our estimation strategy builds on Sargent (1989) and Ireland (2004) by in-
cluding (vector–)autoregressive ”measurement error” component to capture the
dynamics in the data that cannot be replicated by the structural model itself. Es-
pecially in turbulent times such as the Great Depression, a rather stylized model
certainly is not capable to account for all the dynamics in real macroeconomic time
series. Thus, the degree of importance of the measurement error in explaining
variations in the control variables may directly be interpreted as a measure of
model fit. Accordingly, for estimation purposes, our linearized model yields the
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following state space representation:
yt =Zαt + κt
κt =Aκt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0,Σ)
αt =Tαt−1 + Rηt, ηt ∼ N(0,Q)
(4.20′)
where yt is an (ne×1) vector of control variables used for the estimation. The state
space equation describing αt remains unchanged. Concerning the off–model
dynamics, κt is a (ne × 1) vector of measurement errors with a (ne × 1) vector
of shocks t with a variance–covariance matrix Σ. We assume that off–model
dynamics follow autoregressive processes, such that all off–diagonal entries of
the (ne × ne) coefficient matrix A are restricted to be equal to zero. Since we are
using output, consumption, and wages for the estimation, ne is equal to 3.
We apply a MCMC simulation using a Metropolis–Hastings algorithm within
the Gibbs sampler to derive posterior distributions of the parameters of interest.
In particular, we apply a Gibbs sampler to simulate the posterior distributions
of the parameters characterizing our exogenous processes, while we we add a
Metropolis–Hastings step in order to approximate the posterior distribution of
the capitalist share λ. Further details on the estimation algorithm can be found in
Appendix C.4.
The prior distributions are reported in Table 4.2 in Section 4.4.1. λ is naturally
bounded between zero and one. As a result, we choose a uniform distribution
between 0.00117 and 1. Regarding the autoregressive parameters of the structural
shocks we chose a normal distribution with mean 0.95. Since we are analyzing
a model with a monthly frequency, we expect rather persistent shocks. On the
contrary, we do not have any prior beliefs concerning the persistence parameters of
the measurement errors. Thus, we assume a normal distribution with zero mean.
Moreover, we harmonize the variance of the normal distributions of the prior
distributions of all autoregressive parameters to be equal to 0.01, thus allowing
for a relatively lose prior. Finally, we also harmonize the prior distributions for all
variance parameters to follow an inverse Gamma distribution implying a mean of
17We need some positive mass of capitalists to hold the economy’s capital.
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0.01 with variance 0.002. Note that this does not yield any further restrictions on
the measurement error components as opposed to e.g. Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Parameter Distributions
In our estimation exercise, we draw 70,000 replications, discarding the first 30,000
draws as burn–in. To break autocorrelation, we only regard every tenth draw for
further analysis. Geweke’s χ2–test is used to assess convergence of the parameter
chains (Geweke, 1992). Results of the posterior distribution of the parameters are
presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Prior & Posterior Distributions
Parameter Prior Dist. 90% Bands Post. Median 90% Bands χ2
λ U(0.001, 1) – 0.40 [0.28,0.59] 0.53
ρz N(0.95, 0.01) [0.79,1.11] 0.96 [0.93,0.99] 0.13
ρg N(0.95, 0.01) [0.79,1.12] 0.93 [0.86,0.98] 0.44
ρτ N(0.95, 0.01) [0.79,1.12] 0.98 [0.96,1.00] 0.64
ρy N(0, 0.01) [−0.16,0.16] 0.11 [−0.01,0.24] 0.48
ρc N(0, 0.01) [−0.16,0.16] −0.06 [−0.17,0.06] 0.52
ρw N(0, 0.01) [−0.16,0.16] 0.14 [0.02,0.27] 0.27
σ2z × 100 IG(2.05, 0.015) [0.31,4.01] 0.03 [0.03,0.04] 0.17
σ2g × 100 IG(2.05, 0.015) [0.31,4.01] 2.22 [1.20,3.93] 0.78
σ2τ × 100 IG(2.05, 0.015) [0.31,4.01] 0.15 [0.12,0.18] 0.62
σ2y × 100 IG(2.05, 0.015) [0.31,4.01] 0.07 [0.05,0.09] 0.53
σ2c × 100 IG(2.05, 0.015) [0.31,4.01] 0.09 [0.07,0.11] 0.20
σ2w × 100 IG(2.05, 0.015) [0.31,4.01] 0.02 [0.02,0.03] 0.92
Notes: Results are based on 70,000 draws from the posterior distribution, of which the first
30,000 draws were burned. To avoid autocorrelation issues, we only keep every 10th draw. The
χ2 figure denotes the p–value of Geweke’s χ2–test for convergence (4% taper).
We observe a mean of the parameter λ of 0.4. Data provided by Petzina et al.
(1978, p. 55) is in line with this estimate. Both in the years 1925 and 1933, the
share of workers and public servants was equal to about 67 percent. On the other
hand, the share of self employed and related family members working amounted
to about 33 percent. Hence, assuming that a subset of workers also had access to
financial markets, a share of 40 percent of capitalists seems to match the historical
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data.
All structural autoregressive parameters turn out to be quite persistent. Con-
cerning structural shocks, we observe the highest variance for government ex-
penditure, and the lowest for TFP. To what extent this translates into relative
importance of explaining the dynamics in the data, we conduct a forecast error
variance decomposition, which is presented in the following section.
4.4.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Model Fit
Before discussing the results, we are assessing the capability of the model fitting
the data we used for the estimation. For this purpose, we compute the fraction
of variance explained by the structural part of the model and compare it to the
off–model part. The results are presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Model Fit
Horizon 0 12 120
Variable \ Shock Structural ME Structural ME Structural ME
Output 72.8 27.2 96.2 3.8 98.3 1.7
Consumption 24.5 75.5 76.9 23.1 93.6 6.4
Wages 60.7 39.3 93.2 6.8 96.3 3.7
Notes: Forecast error variance decompositions (in percent) are based on median outcomes of
the posterior distribution. ME denotes measurement error, and it captures the extent to which
dynamics are driven by off–model dynamics.
First, we observe that the model is able to account for the large bulk of the
dynamics in the data, especially in the long run (i.e. forecast horizon of 120
months). Second, we find that the model fit improves at larger forecast horizons.
Third, the model performs best in explaining output variations, while for the case
of consumption the fit is worse, especially on impact (i.e. forecast horizon of 0
months). Hence, we conclude that the choice of the model, even though being
quite stylized, turned out to be appropriate in explaining the dynamics of the
German business cycle during the period under analysis.
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Aggregate Economy
Table 4.4 summarizes the relative contributions of the structural shocks disregard-
ing the effects of the measurement error. We find that both variations in TFP and
the labor wedge play an important role in explaining the German business cycle,
while government expenditure shocks only account for little dynamics. Shocks
to the labor wedge are particularly important in the long run, where they explain
50 percent or more of the variation in most variables. This result highlights the
presence of severe labor market frictions in the German economy. Moreover,
variations in TFP also account for a significant amount of the variation in most
variables. On the other hand, the influence of government expenditure shocks
varies from 3 to 7 percent, only for consumption it is slightly more pronounced.
Thus, one can conclude that the business cycle was not driven by government
expenditure shocks. Consequently, the results suggest that there was little scope
for countercyclical demand side policies.
Table 4.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Aggregate Economy
Horizon 0 12 120
Variable \ Shock zt gt τt zt gt τt zt gt τt
Output 41.8 4.6 53.6 36.9 2.9 60.2 25.4 1.5 73.1
Consumption 33.3 23.3 43.5 32.0 14.9 53.1 20.0 4.6 75.4
Wage 65.9 2.7 31.4 65.8 2.1 32.1 68.2 1.8 30.0
Capital 40.6 7.6 51.8 37.1 5.4 57.5 19.7 1.3 79.0
Labor Input 7.6 7.3 85.0 5.9 4.7 89.4 3.7 2.6 93.7
Foreign Debt 40.8 4.4 54.8 35.5 3.8 60.7 30.8 3.8 65.4
Investment 40.6 7.6 51.8 36.3 5.1 58.6 28.8 3.3 68.0
Return to Capital 41.8 4.6 53.6 36.6 3.9 59.5 31.6 3.9 64.5
Foreign Int. Rate 40.8 4.4 54.8 35.5 3.8 60.7 30.8 3.8 65.4
Current Account 40.8 4.4 54.8 37.4 4.0 58.6 32.3 3.9 63.8
Notes: Forecast error variance decompositions (in percent) are based on median outcomes of
the posterior distribution. Only fluctuations caused by structural shocks are considered.
Heterogeneous Agents
Table 4.5 sheds light on the relative importance of the structural shocks regarding
consumption and labor supply of capitalists and workers.
We observe that government spending is far more important for the worker
than for the capitalist, both for labor supply and consumption dynamics. One
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Table 4.5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Heterogeneous Agents
Horizon 0 12 120
Variable \ Shock zt gt τt zt gt τt zt gt τt
Cons. Capitalist 12.8 7.1 80.1 15.8 4.5 79.8 14.9 1.2 83.9
Cons. Worker 36.9 26.4 36.6 36.1 17.9 46.0 24.4 7.5 68.1
Labor Capitalist 23.3 0.3 76.4 18.9 0.1 81.0 12.9 0.1 87.0
LaborWorker 0.4 40.6 59.0 0.4 28.3 71.3 0.4 15.0 84.7
Notes: Forecast error variance decompositions (in percent) are based on median outcomes of the
posterior distribution. Only fluctuations caused by structural shocks are considered.
explanation could be the worker’s lack of access to financial markets. After a
positive government expenditure shock a worker must immediately adjust the
level of consumption and labor supply, while a capitalist can also issue new debt
or reduce investment in order to finance the increased need of gt. Furthermore,
also for these variables the labor wedge is the most important structural state
variable, while the evolution of TFP also accounts for some variations.
4.4.3 Impulse Response Analysis
Next, we present impulse response functions to structural shocks of a size of one
standard deviation. All impulse response functions are evaluated at the median
of the posterior distribution.
Total Factor Productivity Shock
Aggregate Economy
A positive shock to TFP leads ceteris paribus to an increase in output, the return
to capital, and the wage rate. Households increase investment and labor supply,
which further increases the level of output. This leads to an increased factor
income, resulting in an increase in consumption. Lastly, households also increase
their level of foreign debt to finance further investment, which leads to an increase
in the foreign interest rate. It it worth noting that impulse responses exhibit rather
persistent effects. For example, the capital stock is still above its steady state level
ten years after the shock.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Responses (zt–Shock): Aggregate Economy
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock evaluated at the median of the
posterior distribution.
Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses (zt–Shock): Heterogeneous Agents
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock evaluated at the median of the
posterior distribution.
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Heterogeneous Agents
The responses for the the two types of agents are different. While the responses
of the capitalists are similar to the ones of the aggregate economy (i.e. ck ↑ and
hk ↑), the implications for a worker’s household are different. In particular, it
consumes significantly more, while slightly reducing the level of labor supply.
Government Expenditure Shock
Aggregate Economy
A positive shock to gt leads to a decrease in private consumption, investment and
thus subsequently the capital stock. In order to countervail this negative dispos-
able income shock, labor supply increases and leads eventually to an increase in
output and a decrease in the wage rate. The level of foreign debt increases, which
implies some degree of external funding of the increased need of government
spending.
Figure 4.4: Impulse Responses (gt–Shock): Aggregate Economy
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock evaluated at the median of the
posterior distribution.
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Heterogeneous Agents
Again we observe opposing effects for both types of households. While workers
increase their labor supply in order to finance the government spending shock
and to cushion the decrease in consumption, capitalists even work less and use
foreign debt to finance gt. It is important to point out that the responses of workers
are far more pronounced, which supports the findings on the importance of the
government spending shock for workers in the previous section.
Figure 4.5: Impulse Responses (gt–Shock): Heterogeneous Agents
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock evaluated at the median of the
posterior distribution.
Labor Wedge Shock
Aggregate Economy
Finally, we analyze a positive shock to the labor wedge τt. Note that the dynamics
are similar to the ones of a negative labor tax shock. Clearly, an increase in the
labor wedge leads to a strong increase in labor supply, which significantly reduces
the real wage. The boost in labor supply increases output and thus the marginal
product of capital, resulting in increased investment activities. Consequently, a
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labor wedge shock yields expansionary effects on output and further leads to a
positive reaction of aggregate private consumption.
Figure 4.6: Impulse Responses (τt–Shock): Aggregate Economy
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock evaluated at the median of the
posterior distribution.
Heterogeneous Agents
Qualitatively, both types of households react similarly to a positive shock to the
labor wedge. In particular, both agents increase their labor supply and level of
consumption. Quantitatively however we observe differences. While the labor
supply response of the capitalist is quite pronounced, the worker’s consumption
response outperforms the one of the capitalist.
4.4.4 Model Generated Time Series
Exogenous State Variables
In this section we present model generated time series of the unobservable state
variables. For this purpose, we draw 5,000 times from the posterior distribu-
tion, solve the model, and generate smoothed time series of the exogenous state
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Figure 4.7: Impulse Responses (τt–Shock): Heterogeneous Agents
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock evaluated at the median of the
posterior distribution.
Figure 4.8: Model Generated State Variables
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Light–gray shaded area
represents 95% probability bands, dark–gray shaded area represents 68% probability bands,
black line represents median.
111
variables using the Kalman filter. Results are presented in Figure 4.8.
We find that the evolution of the level of TFP coincides with the pattern of
output. That is, it starts to severely deteriorate after 1929, with a lower turning
point around 1932 and a strong recovery thereafter. Hence, we confirm the
results of Fisher and Hornstein (2002), who also detect a strong procyclicality of
productivity. Admittedly, variations in TFP yield a wide range of interpretations.
Taking it literally, a decrease would translate into period of technical regress,
which might not have been a major reason for the economic downturn. However,
as we do not explicitly model a financial channel, a decrease in TFP could capture
an increase in inefficiencies in the financial intermediation sector along the lines
of Bernanke (1983). In particular, he points out the strong negative effects on the
real economy during the Great Depression caused by escalating costs of credit
intermediation. As Germany was severely hit by a banking crisis in 1931, such an
explanation would coincide with the observed deterioration of TFP intensifying
after 1931.
The evolution of the labor wedge follows a similar pattern.Note that the labor
wedge was about 20 percent above steady state from 1927–1930 which is in line
with the interpretation of Borchardt (1982) that the labor market suffered severe
structural problems prior to the Great Depression. Moreover, during the con-
tractionary phase the labor wedge deteriorated. Parts of the decrease could be
attributed to to Bru¨nings wage cuts enforced by emergency decrees. This result
is also in line with Shimer (2009), who finds that for the case of the US economy
inefficiencies on the labor market tend to increase during recessions.
The amount of government expenditure is complemented by a plot charac-
terizing the implied public expenditure quota. Interestingly, we observe a sharp
increase after 1932. In 1933, the public expenditure quota reached deviations of
up to 100 percent. This captures well the demand side policies of the NSDAP
being in place, while the economy was still in a depression. Hence, we identify
expansionary fiscal policy shocks after 1932/33. However, it clearly did not suffice
to fully stabilize the economy.
We do not observe a lot of uncertainty with respect to the evolution of TFP and
the labor wedge, as the the probability bands are rather narrow. This does not
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hold true for the case of government expenditure, where we clearly see a larger
degree of uncertainty.
Heterogeneous Agents
Figure 4.9 depicts estimated time series of capitalists’s and workers level of con-
sumption and labor supply.
Figure 4.9: Model Generated Control Variables
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Light–gray shaded area
represents 95% probability bands, dark–gray shaded area represents 68% probability bands,
black line represents median.
We observe that the qualitative implications for capitalists and workers were
similar. That is, both suffered a decline in consumption and reduced their level
of labor supply. In quantitative terms however one can point out that the level
of consumption of the capitalist varied far less than the one of the worker. This
is probably due to the fact that they could use asset markets to sustain a more
smoothed consumption path, while workers on the other hand simply had to
cut their level of consumption during bad times. Concerning the labor supply
response we find that capitalists reacted in a far more volatile way. This may
also be attributed to the fact that labor income is not their only source of income.
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We have seen that the labor wedge deteriorated during the Great Depression (see
Figure 4.8), thus capitalists reduced their amount of labor supply and could use
other sources of income instead. Hence, workers were in general more vulnerable
compared to capitalists.
4.4.5 Business Cycle Accounting
Output
In this section we look at the contribution of each shock to the observed time series.
In particular, we draw 5,000 times from the posterior distribution, simulate the
model, and recover the smoothed time series of the exogenous states using the
Kalman filter. Thereafter, we compute our control and endogenous state variables
in four different ways: (i) using all shocks18 (ii) only using the zt–shock time series
(iii) only using the gt–shock time series (iv) only using the τt–shock time series.
For the cases (ii)–(iv) the remaining exogenous processes are assumed to be in
equilibrium throughout the whole period. Note that the result of (i) is equal to
the sum of (ii)–(iv), since the resulting time series are a linear combinations of the
exogenous shock contributions. Thus, such a business cycle accounting approach
represents a straightforward way of decomposing variations in the observable
variables into contributions of the exogenous shocks. Figure 4.10 presents the
outcome for output.
We clearly observe that the labor wedge was playing a dominant role for the
evolution of German output during the Interwar Period. This underpins the
structural problems, or even sickness of the economy, as pointed out by Borchardt
(1982). Also TFP played a significant role in driving output. Both shock time se-
ries seem to be highly correlated with the business cycle of output. Government
spending on the contrary did not play a major role. This interpretation is in line
with the forecast error variance analysis of Section 4.4.2. Interestingly, we can
again detect a positive contribution of government spending in 1932/33, resulting
in a positive deviation of output of about 5 percent. This again confirms the fact
18Note that for the case of our observable control variables, we match the data perfectly. For
variables not used for the estimation, we generate a model implied time series, which we use as a
benchmark.
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Figure 4.10: Decomposition of Output Cycle
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Notes: Black line corresponds to actual stationary output data. Blue line, red line, and green line
depict counterfactual model generated data by only considering TFP shocks, government
expenditure shocks, or labor wedge shocks, respectively. Results are based on 5,000 draws from
the posterior distribution. Median outcomes are reported.
Figure 4.11: Decomposition of Consumption and Wage Cycle
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Notes: Black line corresponds to actual stationary consumption or wage data, respectively. Blue
line, red line, and green line depict counterfactual model generated data by only considering TFP
shocks, government expenditure shocks, or labor wedge shocks, respectively. Results are based
on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Median outcomes are reported.
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that government expenditure was expansionary at that time, but not sufficient to
explain the full recovery of the economy. Even a doubling of the public expendi-
ture would not have sufficed. Thus, any suggested public expenditure programs
discussed at that time would have yielded minor effects.
Consumption and Wages
The pattern for consumption is similar to the one of output. The only remarkable
difference is that government expenditure was more important. This does not
hold true for the case of wages, where the picture is strikingly different. In
fact, TFP and the labor wedge seem to affect the evolution of the real wage in
opposing directions. Focusing on the Great Depression, we observe in the data
a downturn in wages relative to the trend occurring in 1932. This coincides with
Bru¨nings emergency decree’s, including wage cuts. The strong positive effect of
the labor wedge is accompanied by downwards pressure on the wage caused by
a deterioration in TFP. Likewise, we can observe that the sharp increase of the real
wage from 1929 to 1931 can be attributed to shocks to the labor wedge and TFP.
Figure 4.12: Decomposition of the Cycle of Further Control Variables
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Notes: Black line corresponds to model generated data. Blue line, red line, and green line depict
counterfactual model generated data by only considering TFP shocks, government expenditure
shocks, or labor wedge shocks, respectively. Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior
distribution. Median outcomes are reported.
116
Heterogeneous Agents
Lastly, we do the same exercise for model generated data of ck, hk, cw, and hw and
depict the results in Figure 4.12.
We find a dominant role of the labor wedge in explaining dynamics. In
addition, we see that government expenditure shocks play a more important role
for workers than for capitalists. In particular, we see a positive response of the
worker’s level of labor supply caused by government spending shocks occurring
in 1932/33. This might be attributed to expansionary fiscal measures implemented
by the NSDAP.
4.5 Conclusion
We develop a DSGE model to analyze the dynamics of the German economy
during the Great Depression. Estimation results suggest that the model fits the
data quite well. Hence, we take this as a result in favor of our model choice.
Our findings support the views of Borchardt (1982) and Ritschl (2002). In par-
ticular, our analysis highlights that the German economy was characterized by
severe labor market distortions and borrowing constraints during the Interwar
Period, while the scope for expansionary demand side policies was rather lim-
ited. Moreover, this result is also in line with Fisher and Hornstein (2002), who
also identifies overvalued real wages as the most important factor explaining the
recession. Hence, Bru¨ning could not have avoided the severe downturn of the
economy, even if he had had the legal base and political support to implement
debt–financed expansionary fiscal policies. Furthermore, we find that workers
were disproportionately hit by the consequences of the economic downturn com-
pared to capitalists.
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Appendix A
Appendix to “Business Cycles in
Emerging Markets: the Role of
Liability Dollarization and Valuation
Effects”
The following presents an extensive appendix to the paper ”Business Cycles in
Emerging Markets: the Role of Liability Dollarization and Valuation Effects”.
A.1 Model
This section describes the model environment of our framework with liability
dollarization.
A.1.1 Model Framework
The economy is represented by:
118
Production Technology
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α Production Function
zt = z
ρz
t−1 exp(
z
t ) Transitory Technology Process
Γt = gtΓt−1 =
t∏
s=0
gs, gt = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t−1 exp(
g
t ) Permanent Technology Process
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It − φ2
(Kt+1
Kt
− µg
)2
Kt Law of Motion of Capital
with zt ∼ N(0, σ2z) and gt ∼ N(0, σ2g).
Consumption
Ct =
[
θ
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
Consumption Index
u(Ct, 1 − lt) = [C
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ]1−σ
1 − σ Household Period Utility Function
C?t = (C
?)1−ρc(C?t−1)
ρc exp(ct) Foreign Consumption Process
with ct ∼ N(0, σ2c ).
Price Indices
et =
pt
pF,t
Real Exchange Rate
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[
pt+1Dt+1
et+1Yt+1
]
− pD
eY
)
− 1
)
Interest Rate
pt =
[
θp1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η Domestic Price Index
tott =
pH,t
pF,t
Terms of Trade
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Aggregation
Yt + pt
Dt+1
et
= ptCt + It + pt
Dt
et
(1 + rt−1) Resource Constraint
NXt = pH,tC?H,t − pF,tCF,t Net Exports
CAt = −rt−1pt Dtet + NXt Current Account
∆NFAt = CAt + VALt Change in Net Foreign Asset Position
VALt = Dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
Valuation Effects
Yt = pH,t(CH,t + C?H,t + It) Good Market Clearing
Since there is no population growth in this model, the mass of population is set
equal to one. Moreover, the home–produced good serves as nume´raire, i.e. we
normalize its price pH,t to one. Accordingly, everything is expressed in units of
the home good instead of the domestic currency.
A.1.2 Detrending the Variables
The variables Yt, Ct, CH,t, CF,t, It, Kt, and Dt as well as C?H,t and C
?
t exhibit a
common stochastic trend.1 They need to be detrended in order to obtain system
of stationary variables. Consequently, the relevant variables are detrended in the
following way:
xt ≡ Xt
Γt−1
,
where xt denotes the stationary counterpart of Xt. Hence, our relevant equations
in detrended form are given by
• Production Function
yt =
Yt
Γt−1
=
ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α
Γt−1
= ztk1−αt (gtlt)
α
1In general, foreign and domestic variables can exhibit different stochastic trends. However,
to keep the model tractable, we assume that domestic and foreign variables share a cointegrating
relationship with cointegraing vector β = [1,−1]′.
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• Law of Motion of Capital
gtkt+1 =
ΓtKt+1
ΓtΓt−1
=
(1 − δ)Kt + It
Γt−1
− φ
2
(Kt+1Γt
ΓtΓt−1
Γt−1
Kt
− µg
)2 Kt
Γt−1
= (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
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− µg
)2
kt
• Consumption Index
ct =
Ct
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θ
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
ηC
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η
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] η
η−1
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) η−1
η
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(
CF,t
Γt−1
) η−1
η

η
η−1
ct =
[
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
.
• Utility Function
u(Ct, 1 − lt) = (C
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ =
Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
(Cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ
= Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
((
Ct
Γt−1
)γ
(1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
1 − σ
= Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1︸︷︷︸
≡κt−1
(cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ︸              ︷︷              ︸
u(ct,1−lt)
= κt−1u(ct, 1 − lt)
• Resource Constraint
yt =
Yt
Γt−1
=
ptCt + It + pt Dtet (1 + rt−1)
Γt−1
−Γtpt
Dt+1
et
Γt−1Γt
= ptct+it+pt
dt
et
(1+rt−1)−gtpt dt+1et
A.1.3 Maximization Problem of the Household
The optimization problem of the representative household can be decomposed
into two stages. The first stage describes the intratemporal optimization prob-
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lem and derives optimal consumption of home and foreign goods. The second
stage is the intertemporal optimization problem, which determines the optimal
intertemporal consumption and saving behavior.
First Stage – Intratemporal Optimization
The detrended consumption index is given by
ct =
[
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
,
where cH,t denotes detrended consumption of the home good, cF,t denotes de-
trended consumption of the foreign good, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of home goods in
consumption, and η ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between
home and foreign goods.
The price index pt is defined as the minimum expenditure required to buy one
unit of the detrended composite good ct, given the prices of the home and foreign
goods. Accordingly, the representative agent solves the minimization problem
min
{cH,t,cF,t}
ptct = pH,tcH,t + pF,tcF,t
s.t. ct =
[
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
= 1.
We set up the Lagrangian
L = pH,tcH,t + pF,tcF,t − pt [ct − 1] ,
where we can use pt as the Lagrange multiplier because it determines the shadow
price of consumption. First–order conditions can then be derived as
∂L
∂cH,t
= pH,t − pt
(
η
η − 1
) [
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1−1
θ
1
η
(
η − 1
η
)
c
η−1
η −1
H,t = 0
⇔ pH,t = ptc
1
η
t θ
1
η c
− 1η
H,t
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and
∂L
∂cF,t
= pF,t − pt
(
η
η − 1
) [
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1−1
(1 − θ) 1η
(
η − 1
η
)
c
η−1
η −1
F,t = 0
⇔ pF,t = ptc
1
η
t (1 − θ)
1
η c
− 1η
F,t .
Hence, we get
cH,t = θ
(
pt
pH,t
)η
ct
cF,t = (1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct.
Note that we can combine and rearrange the above equations for cH,t and cF,t to
obtain
cH,t
cF,t
=
θ
1 − θ
(
pH,t
pF,t
)−η
.
From this equation, we can easily show that the elasticity of intratemporal substi-
tution between home and foreign consumption goods is given by η:
d log
(
cH,t
cF,t
)
d log
(
pH,t
pF,t
) = −η,
i.e. if the relative price of home consumption increases by 1 percent, relative home
consumption declines by η percent.
As a next step, we derive the consumption price index pt:
ptct = pH,tcH,t + pF,tcF,t
⇔ ptct = pH,tθ
(
pt
pH,t
)η
ct + pF,t(1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct
⇔ pt = θpηt p1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)pηt p1−ηF,t
⇔ p1−ηt = θp1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
⇔ pt =
[
θp1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η
.
Since we normalize the price of home goods to one, our equations determining
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the consumption of home goods and the price index simplify to
cH,t = θp
η
t ct
pt =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η
.
Second Stage – Intertemporal Optimization
Combining the detrended versions of production, law of motion of capital, and
the resource constraint yields the aggregate resource constraint of the economy
as a function of capital, labor, consumption and foreign debt. As a result, the
representative household’s optimization problem at time t can be stated as
max
{cτ,lτ,kτ+1,dτ+1}
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(κτ−1u(cτ, 1 − lτ))
s.t. zτk1−ατ (gτlτ)
α+(1 − δ)kτ + gτpτdτ+1eτ ≥
pτcτ + gτkτ+1 +
φ
2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ + pτ
dτ
eτ
(1 + rτ−1),
taking as given kt, dt, as well as the transversality condition lim
j→∞
Et
[∏ j−2
s=0
dt+ j
1+rt+s
]
= 0.
Accordingly, the optimization problem yields the following Lagrangian:
L =Et
 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(
κτ−1u(cτ, 1 − lτ) + λτ
(
zτk1−ατ (gτlτ)
α + gτpτ
dτ+1
eτ
+ (1 − δ)kτ
−pτcτ − gτkτ+1 − φ2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ − pτdτeτ (1 + rτ−1)
))
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with the following first order conditions:
(I)
∂L
∂ct
= κt−1
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
− λtpt = 0
⇔ κt−1∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂ct = λtpt
⇒ κtEt
[
∂u(ct+1, 1 − lt+1)
∂ct+1
]
= Et
[
λt+1pt+1
]
(II)
∂L
∂lt
= κt−1
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂lt
+ λt
∂yt
∂lt
= 0
⇔ − κt−1∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂lt = λt
∂yt
∂lt
(III)
∂L
∂kt+1
= −λt
[
gt
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))]
+ Et
[
βλt+1
(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
= 0
⇔ λt
[
gt
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))]
= Et
[
βλt+1
(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
(IV)
∂L
∂dt+1
= λtgt
pt
et
− βEt
[
λt+1
pt+1
et+1
(1 + rt)
]
= 0
⇔ λtgt ptet = βEt
[
λt+1
pt+1
et+1
(1 + rt)
]
(V)
∂L
∂λt
= yt + (1 − δ)kt + pt gtdt+1et
− ct − gtkt+1 − φ2
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt − pt dtet (1 + rt−1) = 0
⇔ yt + (1 − δ)kt + pt gtdt+1et =
ptct + gtkt+1 +
φ
2
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt + pt
dt
et
(1 + rt−1)
A.1.4 International Prices and Trade
The representative agent’s problem in the rest of the world is analogous to the
home country. However, the domestic economy is infinitesimally small. That is,
the rest of the world is approximately closed and only consumes goods produced
abroad. Accordingly, the price index of the foreign consumption composite p?t
boils down to the foreign price of goods produced in the rest of the world p?F,t, i.e.
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p?t = p
?
F,t. We assume that the law of one price holds:
pF,t =
p?F,t
st
=
p?t
st
,
and
pH,t =
p?H,t
st
,
where st represents the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of the domestic
currency in terms of the foreign currency. Since the domestic price of home goods
is normalized to one, the nominal exchange rate simply equals the foreign price
of home goods p?H,t. The real exchange rate is the price of the domestic composite
consumption good in units of the foreign composite consumption good:2
et =
ptst
p?t
=
ptst
p?F,t
=
ptst
pF,tst
=
pt
pF,t
.
Terms of trade are defined as the price of home–produced goods in terms of
imported foreign goods:
tott =
pH,t
pF,t
=
1
pF,t
.
Let c?t denote detrended foreign consumption. We assume that the rest of the
world has the same composite consumption index as the domestic economy.
Hence, from the perspective of the home economy, foreign demand for the home
2Despite the assumption that the law of one price holds for our individual goods, purchasing
power parity is not fulfilled. Thus, the real exchange rate is not equal to one in our setup. At first
glance, this seems somewhat bewildering. However, not that the home country is infinitesimally
small from the viewpoint of the rest of the world such that foreign composite consumption consists
only of foreign goods. Therefore, we generally have ptst , p?t and et , 1. Monacelli (2005) calls
this the “law of one price gap”.
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good is given by
c?H,t = θ
?
(
p?t
p?H,t
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
( p?F,t
p?H,t
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
(
pF,tst
pH,tst
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
(
pF,t
pH,t
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
( 1
tott
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?pη
?
F,t c
?
t .
Imports are given by pF,tcF,t, such that net exports can be calculated as
nxt = pH,tc?H,t − pF,tcF,t = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t.
A.1.5 Current Account and Valuation Effects
The change in the net foreign asset position equals the current account adjusted
for valuation effects:
∆NFAt = CAt + VALt.
It is straightforward to derive valuation effects in this model. The current account
is equal to the sum of negative interest payments on foreign debt and net exports:
CAt = −rt−1pt Dtet + NXt.
Also, recall that the aggregate resource constraint given by
Yt + pt
Dt+1
et
= ptCt + It + pt
Dt
et
(1 + rt−1).
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We can then rearrange the resource constraint to get
Yt − ptCt − It − rt−1pt Dtet = pt
(
−Dt+1
et
+
Dt
et
)
⇔ Yt − ptCt − It︸         ︷︷         ︸
= Primary Current Account
−rt−1pt Dtet = −pt
Dt+1
et
+ pt
Dt
et
− pt−1 Dtet−1 + pt−1
Dt
et−1
⇔ Yt − It︸︷︷︸
= Net Output
−pH,tCH,t − pF,tCF,t︸                ︷︷                ︸
=−ptCt
−rt−1pt Dtet = −pt
Dt+1
et
+ pt−1
Dt
et−1︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
=∆NFAt
+pt
Dt
et
− pt−1 Dtet−1
⇔ pH,tC?H,t + pH,tCH,t + It︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
=Yt by good market equilibrium
−It − pH,tCH,t − pF,tCF,t − rt−1pt Dtet
= ∆NFAt + pt
Dt
et
− pt−1 Dtet−1
⇔ pH,tC?H,t − pF,tCF,t︸              ︷︷              ︸
=NXt
−rt−1pt Dtet − pt
Dt
et
+ pt−1
Dt
et−1
= ∆NFAt
⇔ ∆NFAt = NXt − rt−1pt Dtet + Dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
︸          ︷︷          ︸
=VALt
⇔ ∆NFAt = CAt + VALt.
Hence, valuation effects are given by
VALt = Dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
.
Next, we take a look at the current account, net foreign asset position and
valuation effects in stationary form. Let us first consider the current account:
cat =
CAt
Γt−1
= −rt−1pt Dt
Γt−1et
+
NXt
Γt−1
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,t
C?H,tΓ
?
t−1
Γt−1Γ?t−1
− pF,t CF,t
Γt−1
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,t
C?H,tΓ
?
t−1
Γt−1Γ?t−1
− pF,tcF,t
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,tc
?
H,t
Γ?t−1
Γt−1︸︷︷︸
=1
−pF,tcF,t
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⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,tc
?
H,t − pF,tcF,t
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + nxt,
where we use the assumption that both the domestic small open economy and
the rest of the world share a common stochastic trend component: Γt−1 = Γ?t−1.The
stationary expression for the change in the net foreign asset position is given by
∆NFAt
Γt−1
= −Dt+1
Γt
Γt
Γt−1
pt
et
+
Dt
Γt−1
pt−1
et−1
∆n f at = −gtpt dt+1et + pt−1
dt
et−1
.
Finally, detrended valuation effects can be derived as
VALt
Γt−1
=
Dt
Γt−1
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
valt = dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
.
A.1.6 Model Summary
Eventually, we can summarize our model, which is described by the following
optimality and necessary conditions:
• Production Function
yt = ztkαt (gtlt)
1−α (A.1)
• Period t Resource Constraint
yt = ptct + it + pt
dt
et
(1 + rt−1) − pt gtdt+1et (A.2)
• Law of Motion of Capital
gtkt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
gtkt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt (A.3)
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• Investment Euler Equation
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[ pt
pt+1
∂u(ct+1, 1 − lt+1)
∂ct+1(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
(A.4)
• Labor–Leisure Trade–off
−pt∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂lt =
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
∂yt
∂lt
(A.5)
• Bond Euler Equation
∂u(ct, lt)
∂ct
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[
∂u(ct+1, lt+1)
∂ct+1
et
et+1
(1 + rt)
]
(A.6)
• Interest Rate
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[
pt+1dt+1
et+1yt+1
]
− pd
ey
)
− 1
)
(A.7)
• Consumption of the Home Good
cH,t = θp
η
t ct (A.8)
• Consumption of the Foreign Good
cF,t = (1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct (A.9)
• Price of Consumption
pt =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η (A.10)
• Exchange Rate
et =
pt
pF,t
(A.11)
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• Exports of Home Goods
c?H,t = θ
?pη
?
F,t c
?
t (A.12)
• Good Market Clearing
yt = c?H,t + cH,t + it (A.13)
• Net Exports
nxt = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t (A.14)
• Current Account
cat = −rt−1pt dtet + c
?
H,t − pF,tcF,t (A.15)
• Change in NFA
∆n f at = −gtpt dt+1et + pt−1
dt
et−1
(A.16)
• Valuation Effects
valt = dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
= ∆n f at − cat (A.17)
• Transitory Technology Process
zt+1 = z
ρz
t exp(
z
t+1) (A.18)
• Permanent Technology Process
gt+1 = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t exp(
g
t+1) (A.19)
• Foreign Consumption Process
c?t+1 = (c
?
t )
ρc exp(ct+1) (A.20)
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Moreover, note that
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
=
γ(cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
ct
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂lt
= − (1 − γ)(c
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
(1 − lt)
∂yt
∂kt
= α
yt
kt
∂yt
∂lt
= (1 − α) yt
lt
Steady States
We now turn to the derivation of the deterministic steady state.
• From (A.18), z = 1.
• From (A.19), g = µg.
• From (A.20), c? = 1.
• From (A.6), r = µ1−γ(1−σ)g 1β − 1.
• From (A.4) and (A.6):
µγ(1−δ)−1g β
(
α
y
k
+ 1 − δ
)
= µγ(1−δ)−1g β(1 + r)
α
y
k
+ 1 − δ = 1 + r
k
y
=
α
r + δ
.
• From (A.3)
i =
(
µg − 1 + δ
)
k. (*)
• From (A.2) using (*)
y = pc + i + (1 + r − µg)pde
y = pc +
(
µg − 1 + δ
)
k + (1 + r − µg)pde
pc
y
= 1 +
(
1 − δ − µg
) k
y
+ (µg − 1 − r)pdey .
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• From (A.5)
1 − γ
γ
pc
1 − l = (1 − α)
y
l
pc
y
= (1 − α) γ
1 − γ
1 − l
l
l = (1 − α) γ
1 − γ
(
pc
y
+ (1 − α) γ
1 − γ
)−1
or, equivalently
γ =
pc
y
(
(1 − α)1 − l
l
+
pc
y
)−1
.
• From (A.1)
y = zkα
(
µgl
)1−α
y
k
= zkα−1
(
µgl
)1−α
k =
(
k
y
) 1
1−α
µglz
1
1−α .
• Accordingly, we get y = yk k, pde = pdey y, and pc = pcy y.
• From (*), we can determine i.
• From (A.16)
∆n f a =
pd
e
(
1 − µg
)
.
• From (A.17)
val = 0.
• From (A.15)
ca = ∆n f a.
• From (A.14) and (A.15)
nx = ca + r
pd
e
.
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• From (A.9) and (A.10), we can determine
pFcF =
[
θpη−1F + (1 − θ)
]−1
(1 − θ)pc.
Then we can insert this expression together with (A.12) in equation (A.14)
to derive a function of pF:
(1 − θ)(nx + pc) =
[
θθ?c?pη
?
F + (1 − θ)θ?c?pη
?−η−1
F − θnx
]
pη−1F .
Unless η = η? = 1, this function cannot be solved for pF analytically with
pencil and paper. However, we can apply numerical methods to obtain pF.
• From (A.10)
p =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF
] 1
1−η
• Then we can determine c as c = pcp .
• From (A.12)
c?H = θ
?pη
?
F c
?
• From (A.8)
cH = θpηc
• From (A.9)
cF = (1 − θ)
(
p
pF
)η
c
• From (A.11)
e =
p
pF
• Finally we have d = pde ep .
A.2 Solving the Model
Finally, we end up with a stationary system of 20 non–linear difference equations
(A.1)–(A.20) in 20 variables. The model features 3 exogenous state variables, 2
endogenous state variables and 15 control variables:
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• Vector of exogenous state variables:
xx,t =
[
zt gt c?t
]′
• Vector of endogenous state variables:
xe,t = [kt dt]
′
• Vector of control variables:
xc,t =
[
yt ct rt et it lt cH,t cF,t c?H,t pt pF,t nxt cat ∆n f at valt
]′
.
Unfortunately, the model does not have a closed form solution. Therefore, we
have to approximate its solution. We use a first–order approximation of the model
solution.
First, we log–linearize the system around its deterministic steady state. To
illustrate the straightforward concept of log–linearization, it is convenient to con-
sider a system of only two variables z and y. We can write the system as an
implicit function
f (z, y) = 0,
where z and y denote steady state values. Next, let us take the total differential to
get
∂ f (z, y)
∂z
dzt +
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
dyt = 0
⇔ ∂ f (z, y)
∂z
z
dzt
z
+
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
y
dyt
y
= 0.
Let ẑt denote log–deviations from the steady state. That is,
ẑt ≡ log
(zt
z
)
≈ zt − z
z
=
dzt
z
.
Consequently, our total differential from above can be rewritten as
0 =
∂ f (z, y)
∂z
z
dzt
z
+
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
y
dyt
y
≈
(
∂ f (z, y)
∂z
z
)
ẑt +
(
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
y
)
ŷt.
Applying this method to the optimality and necessary conditions in the model
at hand yields:
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• Production Function
ŷt = ẑt + αk̂t + (1 − α)ĝt + (1 − α)̂lt
• Period t Resource Constraint
ŷt =
pc
y
(p̂t + ĉt) +
i
y
ît +
pd
ey
(1 + r)
(
d̂t + p̂t − êt
)
+
pd
ey
rr̂t−1 +
pd
ey
µg
(
ĝt + Et
[
d̂t+1
]
+ p̂t − êt
)
• Law of Motion of Capital
ĝt + Et
[
k̂t+1
]
=
1 − δ
µg
k̂t +
i
µgk
ît
• Investment Euler Equation
(γ(1 − σ) − 1)ĉt − (1 − γ)(1 − σ)̂lt + φµg
(
ĝt + Et[k̂t+1] − k̂t
)
= µγ(1−σ)−1g β·[ (
α
y
k
+ 1 − δ
) (
(γ(1 − σ) − 1)ĝt + p̂t−p̂t+1 + (γ(1 − σ) − 1)Et[ĉt+1]−
(1 − γ)(1 − σ)Et[l̂t+1]
)
+α
y
k
(
Et[ŷt+1] − Et[k̂t+1]
)
+µ2gφ
(
Et[ĝt+1] + Et[k̂t+2] − Et[k̂t+1]
)]
• Labor–Leisure Trade–off
ŷt = p̂t + ĉt +
1
1 − l l̂t
• Bond Euler Equation
βµγ(1−σ)−1g (1 + r)
(
(γ(1 − σ) − 1)ĝt + êt − Et[êt+1] + r1 + r r̂t
)
=
(
1 − (1 − σ)γ) (Et[ĉt+1] − ĉt) + l1 − l ( 11 − lEt[l̂t+1] − l̂t)
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• Interest Rate
r̂t =
ψ
r
pd
ey
[
Et[d̂t+1] + Et[p̂t+1] − Et[ŷt+1] − Et[êt+1]
]
• Consumption of the Home Good
ĉH,t = ηp̂t + ĉt
• Consumption of the Foreign Good
ĉF,t = η
(
p̂t − p̂F,t
)
+ ĉt
• Price of Consumption
p̂t =
(1 − θ)p1−ηF
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF
p̂F,t
• Exchange Rate
êt = p̂t − p̂F,t
• Exports of Home Goods
ĉ?H,t = η
?p̂F,t + ĉ?t
• Good Market Clearing
ŷt =
c?H
y
ĉ?H,t +
cH
y
ĉH,t +
i
y
ît
• Net Exports
n̂xt =
c?H
nx
ĉ?H,t −
pFcF
nx
(
p̂F,t + ĉF,t
)
• Current Account
ĉat =
c?H
ca
ĉ?H,t −
pFcF
y
p̂F,t − pFcFy ĉF,t −
r
ca
pd
e
(
r̂t−1 + p̂t + d̂t − êt
)
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• Change in NFA
∆n f a∆̂n f at = − µg dpe
[
ĝt + Et[d̂t+1] + p̂t − êt
]
dp
e
[
d̂t + p̂t−1 − êt−1
]
⇔ ∆̂n f at = 1µg − 1
[
µg ĝt + µgEt[d̂t+1] − d̂t + µgp̂t − p̂t−1 − µgêt + êt−1
]
• Valuation Effects
Valuation effects are zero in steady state. Therefore, we cannot determine
its log–deviation from steady state. Absolute deviation from steady state is
given by
∆valt = ∆
(
∆n f at
) − ∆cat
• Transitory Technology Process
ẑt = ρzẑt−1 + zt
• Permanent Technology Process
ĝt = ρg ĝt−1 + 
g
t
• Foreign Consumption Process
ĉ?t = ρcĉ
?
t−1 + 
c
t
These conditions constitute a linear system of (expectational) difference equa-
tions of the form
A˜ Et
[̂
xt+1
]
= B˜ x̂t,
where
Et
[̂
xt+1
]
=

Et
[̂
xe,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xx,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xc,t+1
]
 =
Et
[̂
xs,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xc,t+1
]
 ,
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and x̂s,t+1 ≡ [̂xe,t+1 x̂x,t+1]′ denotes the vector of state variables in log–deviations
from steady state.
Second, we use the methodology suggested by Klein (2000) to solve the log–
linear approximation of the model. This approach allows to express the model in
state space form:
• Measurement Equation
x̂c,t = Z x̂s,t
• Transition Equation
x̂s,t = T x̂s,t−1 + Rt, t ∼ N(0,Σ)
with
R =

0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

t =

zt
gt
ct

Σ =

σ2z 0 0
0 σ2g 0
0 0 σ2c
 .
A.3 Estimation Results
A.3.1 Data for Estimation
Our estimation exercise relies on quarterly data of real per capita output and
consumption as well as real interest rates and real exchange rates. The data
section in the main text describes how we construct these real time series. Figures
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A.1 to A.12 plot the series of our four variables in logs and the associated cubic
trends for each country under investigation. The second row in each graph shows
the cycle of the corresponding variable calculated by the log deviation from the
cubic trend. Regarding real interest rates, the figures display the logarithm of the
gross real interest rate.
Figure A.1: Output and Consumption – Mexico
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Figure A.2: Interest and Exchange Rates – Mexico
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Figure A.3: Output and Consumption – South Africa
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Figure A.4: Interest and Exchange Rates – South Africa
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Figure A.5: Output and Consumption – Turkey
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Figure A.6: Interest and Exchange Rates – Turkey
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Figure A.7: Output and Consumption – Canada
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
9.8
10
10.2
10.4
10.6
10.8
Output
L o
g  
o f
 O
u t
p u
t
 
 
Data Cubic Trend
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
9
9.2
9.4
9.6
9.8
10
10.2
Consumption
L o
g  
o f
 C
o n
s u
m
p t
i o
n
 
 
Data Cubic Trend
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
L o
g  
D e
v i a
t i o
n  
f r o
m
 T
r e
n d
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
L o
g  
D e
v i a
t i o
n  
f r o
m
 T
r e
n d
143
Figure A.8: Interest and Exchange Rates – Canada
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Figure A.9: Output and Consumption – Sweden
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Figure A.10: Interest and Exchange Rates – Sweden
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Figure A.11: Output and Consumption – Switzerland
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Figure A.12: Interest and Exchange Rates – Switzerland
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A.3.2 Parameter Distributions
Table A.1 complements Table 5 in the main text and presents a detailed sum-
mary of the posterior distributions of our estimated parameters including those
determining the off–model dynamics.
146
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
:P
ri
or
&
Po
st
er
io
r
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
–
Em
er
gi
ng
M
ar
ke
tE
co
no
m
ie
s
Po
st
.
Po
st
.
χ
2
Po
st
.
Po
st
.
χ
2
Po
st
.
Po
st
.
χ
2
Po
st
.
Po
st
.
χ
2
Po
st
.
Po
st
.
χ
2
Po
st
.
Po
st
.
χ
2
M
ed
ia
n
90
%
Te
st
M
ed
ia
n
90
%
Te
st
M
ed
ia
n
90
%
Te
st
M
ed
ia
n
90
%
Te
st
M
ed
ia
n
90
%
Te
st
M
ed
ia
n
90
%
Te
st
M
e
x
ic
o
So
u
t
h
A
f
r
ic
a
T
u
r
k
e
y
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
Li
a
b
il
it
y
D
o
l
l
a
r
.
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
Li
a
b
il
it
y
D
o
l
l
a
r
.
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
Li
a
b
il
it
y
D
o
l
l
a
r
.
ψ
4.
34
2
[3
.3
15
,4
.8
85
]
0.
27
0.
21
6
[0
.0
88
,0
.4
88
]
0.
96
1.
66
4
[1
.1
15
,2
.6
68
]
0.
31
0.
27
5
[0
.1
58
,0
.4
20
]
0.
93
4.
06
7
[2
.7
43
,4
.8
30
]
0.
50
0.
45
5
[0
.1
26
,1
.1
82
]
0.
86
ρ
z
0.
62
2
[0
.4
87
,0
.7
44
]
0.
58
0.
70
8
[0
.5
74
,0
.8
28
]
0.
50
0.
91
8
[0
.8
74
,0
.9
58
]
0.
50
0.
78
2
[0
.6
79
,0
.8
63
]
0.
92
0.
69
1
[0
.5
52
,0
.8
03
]
0.
25
0.
64
8
[0
.5
12
,0
.7
63
]
0.
24
ρ
g
0.
75
1
[0
.6
37
,0
.8
45
]
0.
58
0.
79
0
[0
.6
32
,0
.8
90
]
0.
26
0.
82
7
[0
.7
67
,0
.8
86
]
0.
86
0.
79
7
[0
.6
90
,0
.8
69
]
0.
95
0.
62
9
[0
.5
08
,0
.7
41
]
0.
46
0.
70
5
[0
.5
61
,0
.8
11
]
0.
10
ρ
c
0.
68
9
[0
.4
58
,0
.8
75
]
0.
37
0.
54
7
[0
.3
65
,0
.7
26
]
0.
21
0.
62
6
[0
.4
42
,0
.8
15
]
0.
43
0.
65
4
[0
.4
66
,0
.7
98
]
0.
59
0.
64
6
[0
.4
28
,0
.8
22
]
0.
49
0.
50
7
[0
.3
38
,0
.6
55
]
0.
48
ρ
 y
0.
25
1
[-
0.
00
7,
0.
51
0]
0.
59
0.
22
1
[-
0.
03
7,
0.
50
4]
0.
98
0.
23
3
[0
.0
10
,0
.4
89
]
0.
94
0.
28
2
[0
.0
41
,0
.5
51
]
0.
35
0.
34
5
[0
.0
30
,0
.7
30
]
0.
48
0.
23
0
[-
0.
05
0,
0.
56
8]
0.
91
ρ
 c
0.
87
6
[0
.7
82
,0
.9
36
]
0.
74
0.
74
3
[0
.2
04
,0
.8
97
]
0.
65
0.
92
5
[0
.8
90
,0
.9
58
]
0.
82
0.
90
8
[0
.8
59
,0
.9
49
]
0.
36
0.
62
0
[0
.4
47
,0
.7
45
]
0.
31
0.
37
1
[0
.0
29
,0
.6
53
]
0.
37
ρ
 r
0.
70
8
[0
.6
25
,0
.7
87
]
0.
27
0.
74
7
[0
.6
76
,0
.8
20
]
0.
57
0.
43
4
[0
.1
86
,0
.6
86
]
0.
68
0.
80
2
[0
.5
48
,0
.8
88
]
0.
93
0.
50
3
[0
.3
64
,0
.6
26
]
0.
23
0.
51
2
[0
.3
84
,0
.6
26
]
0.
76
ρ
 e
0.
83
6
[0
.7
60
,0
.8
97
]
0.
58
0.
83
7
[0
.7
72
,0
.8
97
]
0.
62
0.
91
3
[0
.8
76
,0
.9
48
]
0.
80
0.
90
4
[0
.8
65
,0
.9
43
]
0.
15
0.
72
8
[0
.5
21
,0
.8
28
]
0.
08
0.
77
8
[0
.6
85
,0
.8
61
]
0.
63
σ
2 z
0.
03
4
[0
.0
28
,0
.0
43
]
0.
91
0.
03
6
[0
.0
29
,0
.0
44
]
0.
79
0.
01
5
[0
.0
14
,0
.0
18
]
0.
85
0.
02
0
[0
.0
17
,0
.0
23
]
0.
91
0.
06
2
[0
.0
49
,0
.0
78
]
0.
87
0.
05
9
[0
.0
45
,0
.0
75
]
0.
49
σ
2 g
0.
04
0
[0
.0
31
,0
.0
52
]
0.
26
0.
02
9
[0
.0
21
,0
.0
39
]
0.
83
0.
01
2
[0
.0
10
,0
.0
14
]
0.
22
0.
01
6
[0
.0
12
,0
.0
21
]
0.
86
0.
08
0
[0
.0
60
,0
.1
07
]
0.
14
0.
07
4
[0
.0
53
,0
.1
01
]
0.
66
σ
2 c
0.
12
8
[0
.0
82
,0
.2
01
]
0.
89
0.
18
9
[0
.1
06
,0
.3
70
]
0.
45
0.
08
2
[0
.0
59
,0
.1
10
]
0.
34
0.
08
6
[0
.0
58
,0
.1
37
]
0.
56
0.
20
1
[0
.1
14
,0
.3
84
]
0.
12
0.
19
2
[0
.1
03
,0
.4
28
]
0.
20
σ
2  y
0.
00
6
[0
.0
04
,0
.0
08
]
0.
26
0.
00
6
[0
.0
05
,0
.0
09
]
0.
32
0.
00
4
[0
.0
03
,0
.0
05
]
0.
33
0.
00
4
[0
.0
03
,0
.0
05
]
0.
55
0.
02
3
[0
.0
15
,0
.0
37
]
0.
83
0.
02
2
[0
.0
15
,0
.0
36
]
0.
36
σ
2  c
0.
02
4
[0
.0
19
,0
.0
31
]
0.
74
0.
02
7
[0
.0
19
,0
.0
38
]
0.
15
0.
01
7
[0
.0
14
,0
.0
21
]
0.
49
0.
01
4
[0
.0
11
,0
.0
18
]
0.
77
0.
09
2
[0
.0
69
,0
.1
19
]
0.
75
0.
05
9
[0
.0
38
,0
.0
88
]
0.
21
σ
2  r
0.
02
1
[0
.0
18
,0
.0
25
]
0.
60
0.
02
3
[0
.0
20
,0
.0
27
]
0.
95
0.
00
0
[0
.0
00
,0
.0
01
]
0.
17
0.
00
1
[0
.0
00
,0
.0
01
]
0.
66
0.
01
5
[0
.0
11
,0
.0
19
]
0.
63
0.
02
0
[0
.0
15
,0
.0
24
]
0.
89
σ
2  e
0.
32
0
[0
.2
60
,0
.3
87
]
0.
81
0.
33
0
[0
.2
69
,0
.3
99
]
0.
12
0.
28
4
[0
.2
51
,0
.3
20
]
0.
06
0.
27
2
[0
.2
38
,0
.3
07
]
0.
19
0.
56
0
[0
.4
11
,0
.6
89
]
0.
33
0.
67
1
[0
.5
49
,0
.8
16
]
0.
68
C
a
n
a
d
a
Sw
e
d
e
n
Sw
it
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
ψ
2.
33
5
[1
.6
46
,3
.5
73
]
0.
14
2.
49
0
[1
.4
86
,4
.1
03
]
0.
89
0.
16
5
[0
.1
41
,0
.1
93
]
0.
54
ρ
z
0.
90
1
[0
.8
52
,0
.9
48
]
0.
38
0.
88
5
[0
.8
29
,0
.9
39
]
0.
95
0.
88
0
[0
.8
26
,0
.9
31
]
0.
55
ρ
g
0.
75
7
[0
.6
76
,0
.8
32
]
0.
91
0.
59
7
[0
.4
88
,0
.7
06
]
0.
15
0.
59
6
[0
.4
86
,0
.6
99
]
0.
52
ρ
c
0.
92
0
[0
.8
60
,0
.9
58
]
0.
53
0.
73
8
[0
.5
23
,0
.8
78
]
0.
53
0.
69
7
[0
.5
15
,0
.8
35
]
0.
92
ρ
 y
0.
70
4
[0
.4
74
,0
.8
75
]
0.
47
0.
41
1
[0
.1
39
,0
.6
79
]
0.
37
0.
35
4
[0
.1
18
,0
.6
10
]
0.
43
ρ
 c
0.
82
7
[0
.7
01
,0
.8
94
]
0.
75
0.
77
3
[0
.6
51
,0
.8
65
]
0.
20
0.
83
0
[0
.7
61
,0
.8
87
]
0.
57
ρ
 r
0.
46
5
[0
.2
38
,0
.6
77
]
0.
76
0.
27
5
[0
.0
24
,0
.5
10
]
0.
71
0.
30
3
[0
.0
85
,0
.5
22
]
0.
87
ρ
 e
0.
91
3
[0
.8
63
,0
.9
53
]
0.
46
0.
87
8
[0
.8
29
,0
.9
25
]
0.
95
0.
93
1
[0
.8
96
,0
.9
64
]
0.
58
σ
2 z
0.
01
3
[0
.0
11
,0
.0
15
]
0.
70
0.
02
2
[0
.0
18
,0
.0
25
]
0.
46
0.
01
4
[0
.0
13
,0
.0
16
]
0.
48
σ
2 g
0.
00
9
[0
.0
08
,0
.0
11
]
0.
56
0.
01
8
[0
.0
15
,0
.0
22
]
0.
80
0.
01
2
[0
.0
10
,0
.0
14
]
0.
89
σ
2 c
0.
04
7
[0
.0
38
,0
.0
58
]
0.
88
0.
07
4
[0
.0
55
,0
.1
02
]
0.
55
0.
09
3
[0
.0
67
,0
.1
29
]
0.
25
σ
2  y
0.
00
4
[0
.0
03
,0
.0
05
]
0.
15
0.
00
7
[0
.0
05
,0
.0
09
]
0.
09
0.
00
4
[0
.0
03
,0
.0
05
]
0.
70
σ
2  c
0.
00
5
[0
.0
04
,0
.0
06
]
0.
76
0.
01
1
[0
.0
09
,0
.0
14
]
0.
83
0.
00
8
[0
.0
06
,0
.0
10
]
0.
92
σ
2  r
0.
00
0
[0
.0
00
,0
.0
00
]
0.
48
0.
00
0
[0
.0
00
,0
.0
00
]
0.
62
0.
00
0
[0
.0
00
,0
.0
00
]
0.
37
σ
2  e
0.
04
0
[0
.0
33
,0
.0
47
]
0.
74
0.
28
5
[0
.2
44
,0
.3
32
]
0.
85
0.
23
9
[0
.2
09
,0
.2
76
]
0.
33
N
ot
es
:
R
es
ul
ts
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
15
0,
00
0
dr
aw
s
fr
om
th
e
po
st
er
io
r
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
,o
fw
hi
ch
fo
r
EM
Es
10
0,
00
0,
an
d
fo
r
de
ve
lo
pe
d
ec
on
om
ie
s
th
e
fir
st
12
5,
00
0
dr
aw
s
w
er
e
bu
rn
ed
.
To
av
oi
d
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
is
su
es
,w
e
on
ly
ke
ep
ev
er
y
10
th
dr
aw
fo
r
de
ve
lo
pe
d
ec
on
om
ie
s,
an
d
ev
er
y
25
th
fo
r
EM
Es
.
Th
e
χ
2
fig
ur
e
de
no
te
s
th
e
p–
va
lu
e
of
G
ew
ek
e’
s
χ
2 –
te
st
fo
r
co
nv
er
ge
nc
e
(4
%
ta
pe
r)
.
V
ar
ia
nc
es
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s.
147
A.3.3 RandomWalk Component of the Solow Residual
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) assess the relative importance of trend shocks by
calculating the random walk component (RWC) of the Solow residual. Recall that
our production function is given by
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α.
Hence, we can define Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as
TFPt = ztΓ1−αt ,
such that our production function reads
Yt = TFPtKαt l
1−α
t .
Log output in first differences is then
∆ log(Yt) = ∆ log(TFPt) + α∆ log(Kt) + (1 − α)∆ log(lt),
where
∆ log(TFPt) = ∆ log(zt) + (1 − α)∆ log(Γt)
⇔ ∆ log(TFPt) = ∆ log(zt) + (1 − α) (log(gt) + log(Γt−1) − log(Γt−1))
⇔ ∆ log(TFPt) = ∆ log(zt) + (1 − α) log(gt)
is the famous Solow residual.
The variance of the Solow residual is given by the sum of the variance of
∆ log(zt) and the variance of (1 − α) log(gt). Let us first compute the variance of
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log(gt):
Var(log(gt)) = Var((1 − ρg)µg + ρg log(gt−1) + gt )
⇔ Var(log(gt)) = ρ2gVar(log(gt−1)) + σ2g
⇔ Var(log(gt)) =
σ2g
(1 − ρ2g)
,
where we use the fact that log(gt) follows a stationary AR(1) process such that
Var(log(gt)) = Var(log(gt−1)). Next, we calculate the variance of ∆ log(zt):
Var(∆ log(zt)) = Var(log(zt) − log(zt−1))
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = Var(ρz log(zt−1) + zt − log(zt−1))
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = Var(−(1 − ρz) log(zt−1) + zt )
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz)2Var(log(zt−1)) + σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz)2 σ
2
z
(1 − ρ2z)
+ σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz)2 σ
2
z
(1 + ρz)(1 − ρz) + σ
2
z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz) σ
2
z
(1 + ρz)
+ σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) =
(
1 − ρz
1 + ρz
+ 1
)
σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = 21 + ρzσ
2
z ,
where, again, we use the fact that log(zt) follows a stationary AR(1) process such
that Var(log(zt)) = Var(log(zt−1)). Accordingly, the variance of the Solow residual
is given by
Var(∆ log(TFPt)) = Var(∆ log(zt)) + (1 − α)2Var(log(gt))
⇔ Var(∆ log(TFPt)) = 2σ
2
z
1 + ρz
+
(1 − α)2σ2g
(1 − ρ2g)
.
The random walk component of the Solow residual is then the portion of the
variance of ∆ log(TFPt) that can be attributed to the non–stationary productivity
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component:
RWC =
(1−α)2σ2g
(1−ρ2g)
2σ2z
1+ρz
+
(1−α)2σ2g
(1−ρ2g)
.
Note that this equation is the counterpart of equation (14) in the paper by Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007).
Table A.2 summarizes the random walk component of the Solow residual as
well as the ratio of standard deviations σgσz computed at the median of the posterior
distribution. For Mexico and Canada we also report the GMM estimates obtained
by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). Our calculations suggest that the random walk
Table A.2: Random Walk Component and Volatility Ratio
Benchmark Liability AG (2007)
Dollarization
RandomWalk Component
EmergingMarkets
MEX 0.88 0.88 0.88
ZAF 0.92 0.89
TUR 0.79 0.85
Developed Economies
CAN 0.84 0.40
SWE 0.69
CHE 0.70
Ratio of Volatilities
EmergingMarkets
MEX 1.09 0.90 4.02
ZAF 0.89 0.89
TUR 1.14 1.12
Developed Economies
CAN 0.83 0.75
SWE 0.90
CHE 0.93
Notes: The table shows the random walk component of the Solow residual and the
ratio of volatilities σgσz calculated at the median of the posterior distribution.
component does not differ substantially across models. It is somewhat higher in
the model with liability dollarization than in the benchmark model for Turkey,
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whereas it is the reverse for South Africa. Moreover, we find that the RWC
is smaller in developed economies than in EMEs. This finding corroborates the
result of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and explains why our analysis finds support
for their hypothesis that ”the cycle is the trend“ in emerging markets.
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A.4 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
This section presents forecast error variance decompositions for the three EMEs
and developed economies in our analysis. In each specification, we focus on
the respective model parametrized at the median of the posterior distributions.
Figures A.16 to A.21 display the variance decompositions of the benchmark econ-
omy as well as the model with liability dollarization for Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey. Figures A.13 to A.15, show the variance decompositions of the benchmark
model for Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Figure A.13: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Canada
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution estimated for Canada.
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Figure A.14: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Sweden
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution estimated for Sweden.
Figure A.15: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Switzerland
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution estimated for Switzerland.
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Figure A.16: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Mexico Benchmark
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the benchmark model estimated for Mexico.
Figure A.17: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Mexico L. Dollarization
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the liability dollarization model estimated for Mexico.
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Figure A.18: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – S. Africa Benchmark
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the benchmark model estimated for South Africa.
Figure A.19: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – S. Africa L. Dollarization
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the liability dollarization model estimated for South Africa.
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Figure A.20: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Turkey Benchmark
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the benchmark model estimated for Turkey.
Figure A.21: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Turkey L. Dollarization
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the liability dollarization model estimated for Turkey.
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A.5 Impulse Responses
This section contrasts the impulse responses of the model with liability dollariza-
tion with those implied by the benchmark model. For this purpose, we choose
the same parametrization for both models. In particular, we calibrate the debt–
elasticity of the interest rate ψ and the parameters governing the exogenous pro-
cesses at the median of the posterior distributions estimated for Mexico in the
liability dollarization setup. That is, we set ψ = 0.216, ρz = 0.708, ρz = 0.790, and
ρz = 0.547.
Figures A.22, A.23, and A.24 show the impulse responses after a one percent
shock to the permanent productivity process, transitory productivity process, and
foreign consumption, respectively.
Figure A.22: Impulse Responses to a Permanent Shock
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Liability Dollarization Benchmark
Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent permanent productivity shock in benchmark and
liability dollarization model.
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Figure A.23: Impulse Responses to a Transitory Shock
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Liability Dollarization Benchmark
Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent transitory productivity shock in benchmark and
liability dollarization model.
Figure A.24: Impulse Responses to a Foreign Demand Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent foreign demand shock in benchmark and liability
dollarization model.
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A.6 Business Cycle Moments
Table A.3 shows model implied business cycle moments and their empirical coun-
terparts. The table complements the table presented in Section 6.3 in the main
text. Here, we simulate the benchmark and the liability dollarization model, each
evaluated at the median of the respective posterior distributions, for our three
EMEs. Again, we generate time series with 100 observations and subsequently
compute sample moments based on the detrended series of our variables. Table
A.3 reports the median of our calculated moments across all 5,000 simulations.
159
Ta
bl
e
A
.3
:B
us
in
es
s
C
yc
le
M
om
en
ts
in
Em
er
gi
ng
M
ar
ke
tE
co
no
m
ie
s
D
at
a
Li
ab
ili
ty
Be
nc
hm
ar
k
D
at
a
Li
ab
ili
ty
Be
nc
hm
ar
k
D
at
a
Li
ab
ili
ty
Be
nc
hm
ar
k
D
ol
la
ri
za
ti
on
D
ol
la
ri
za
ti
on
D
ol
la
ri
za
ti
on
M
e
x
ic
o
S.
A
f
r
ic
a
T
u
r
k
e
y
σ
(Y
)
2.
42
5.
31
5.
82
1.
60
4.
25
5.
57
3.
70
6.
30
6.
51
σ
(C
)
3.
68
6.
71
7.
05
2.
46
5.
08
5.
60
5.
72
7.
65
7.
12
σ
(N
X
/Y
)
6.
63
1.
58
0.
97
4.
04
0.
95
0.
53
3.
42
1.
46
0.
95
σ
(e
)
9.
63
7.
71
6.
78
8.
70
5.
05
5.
47
9.
54
7.
47
7.
14
σ
(C
)/
σ
(Y
)
1.
52
1.
57
1.
47
1.
54
1.
41
1.
01
1.
55
1.
45
1.
20
ρ
(C
,Y
)
0.
74
0.
77
0.
92
0.
67
0.
82
0.
91
0.
62
0.
86
0.
92
ρ
(N
X
/Y
,Y
)
−0
.1
7
−0
.1
0
−0
.4
5
−0
.4
0
−0
.1
9
−0
.3
2
−0
.5
6
−0
.2
7
−0
.5
2
ρ
(e
,N
X
/Y
)
−0
.3
1
−0
.6
2
−0
.2
5
−0
.1
2
−0
.4
3
−0
.0
6
−0
.4
5
−0
.4
8
−0
.1
9
ρ
(Y
t,
Y
t−
1)
0.
78
0.
88
0.
89
0.
81
0.
90
0.
96
0.
73
0.
83
0.
83
ρ
(C
t,
C
t−
1)
0.
75
0.
84
0.
83
0.
83
0.
86
0.
90
0.
70
0.
79
0.
76
ρ
((
N
X
/Y
) t
,(
N
X
/Y
) t−
1)
0.
97
0.
69
0.
29
0.
85
0.
67
0.
32
0.
84
0.
57
0.
17
ρ
(e
t,
e t
−1
)
0.
79
0.
83
0.
76
0.
80
0.
85
0.
84
0.
62
0.
81
0.
74
ρ
((
V
A
L/
Y
) t
,(
C
A
/Y
) t
)
−0
.5
8
−0
.3
4
−0
.7
5
−0
.3
0
−0
.0
5
−0
.3
8
ρ
((
V
A
L/
Y
) t
,e
t)
0.
45
0.
29
−0
.3
1
0.
28
0.
19
0.
30
N
ot
es
:
St
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
ns
ar
e
ex
pr
es
se
d
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
ex
ce
pt
fo
r
th
e
m
od
el
im
pl
ie
d
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
th
e
ne
t
ex
po
rt
s
to
ou
tp
ut
ra
ti
o,
w
hi
ch
is
ex
pr
es
se
d
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
po
in
ts
.E
m
pi
ri
ca
lm
om
en
ts
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
us
in
g
qu
ar
te
rl
y
da
ta
ta
ke
n
fr
om
th
e
IF
S,
ap
ar
tf
ro
m
th
os
e
in
vo
lv
in
g
va
lu
at
io
n
eff
ec
ts
fo
r
w
hi
ch
on
ly
an
nu
al
da
ta
fr
om
La
ne
an
d
M
ile
si
-F
er
re
tt
i(
20
07
)a
re
av
ai
la
bl
e.
A
ll
se
ri
es
,e
xc
ep
tf
or
th
e
ne
te
xp
or
ts
ov
er
ou
tp
ut
ra
ti
o
an
d
va
lu
at
io
n
eff
ec
ts
,a
re
re
al
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
va
ri
ab
le
s,
ha
ve
be
en
lo
gg
ed
,s
ea
so
na
lly
ad
ju
st
ed
an
d
fil
te
re
d
us
in
g
th
e
H
P
fil
te
r
w
it
h
sm
oo
th
in
g
pa
ra
m
et
er
λ
=
1,
60
0.
Th
eo
re
ti
ca
lm
om
en
ts
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
sa
m
pl
e
m
om
en
ts
of
m
od
el
ge
ne
ra
te
d
da
ta
.
Ea
ch
th
eo
re
ti
ca
le
co
no
m
y
is
si
m
ul
at
ed
5,
00
0
ti
m
es
w
it
h
a
sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
of
10
0.
M
ed
ia
n
ou
tc
om
es
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
.
160
Appendix B
Appendix to “A Small Open
Economy in the Great Depression:
the Case of Switzerland”
B.1 Optimality Conditions
.
• Consumption Composite Index:
Ct =
(
(1 − γ) 1a
(
Cht
) a−1
a
+ γ
1
a
(
C ft
) a−1
a
) a
a−1
(B.1)
• Consumer Price Index:
Pt =
(
(1 − γ)
(
Pht
)1−a
+ γ
(
P ft
)1−a) 11−a
(B.2)
• Demand Functions:
Cht =
(
Pht
Pt
)−a
Ct(1 − γ) (B.3)
C ft =
P ftPt
−a Ctγ (B.4)
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• Intratemporal Labor Leisure Trade–off:
Nηt
C−σt
=
Wt
Pt
(B.5)
• Terms of Trade:
∆t =
P ft
Pht
(B.6)
• Real Exchange Rate:
Φt =
P ft
Pt
(B.7)
• Real Marginal (average) Cost of Production:
Ψt =
Wt
Pht
(B.8)
• Aggregate Production Function:
Yt =
Nt
ζt
(B.9)
• Calvo Pricing:
A1,t =YtΨt + ωβEt
[(Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(Πt+1)−1(Πht+1)
θ+1A1,t+1
]
(B.10)
A2,t =Yt + ωβEt
[(Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(Πt+1)−1(Πht+1)
θA2,t+1
]
(B.11)
• Domestic Inflation:
1 =
(1 − ω) ( θA1,t(θ − 1)A2,t
)1−θ
+ ω
(
Πht
)θ−1
1
1−θ
(B.12)
• Exports:
EXt = Ch?t = γ∆
a
t Y
?
t (B.13)
• Imports:
IMt = ∆t
P ftPt
−a γCt (B.14)
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• Inflation Rate of Domestic Goods
Πht+1 =
Pht+1
Pht
(B.15)
• Domestic Inflation Rate
Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
(B.16)
• National Accounting Identity:
Yt = Cht + C
h?
t (B.17)
• International Risk Sharing Condition:
(
C?t
Ct
)−σ
= Φt (B.18)
• Foreign Demand (Exogenous Process):
ln(Y?t ) = (1 − ρ?) ln(Y?) + ρ? ln(Y?t−1) + ?,t, with ?t ∼ N(0, σ2?) (B.19)
• Terms of Trade (Exogenous Process):
ln(∆t) = ρδ ln(∆t−1) + δt , with 
δ
t ∼ N(0, σ2δ) (B.20)
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B.2 Supplementary Plots
Figure B.1: Export Shares
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Figure B.2: Data (Output SBB Freight)
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Figure B.3: Data (Output Silk Production)
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Figure B.4: Data (Output Watch Production)
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B.3 Additional Estimation Results
Figure B.5: Counterfactual Price Rigidities
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Notes: Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution, median outcomes are
reported. Small ω implies an average duration of prices being effective of 50 months, while
medium ω implies 100 months. ω estimated implies a median duration of prices of 182 months.
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Table B.1: Posterior Distributions of Non–Structural Parameters
Parameter Prior Dist. Median 90% Bands Gewekes χ2
a11 stationary 0.918 [0.745,1.082] 0.948
a21 stationary -0.774 [-1.040,-0.550] 0.693
a31 stationary -0.011 [-0.017,-0.006] 0.322
a12 stationary 0.257 [0.126,0.379] 0.431
a22 stationary -0.017 [-0.200,0.172] 0.358
a23 stationary 0.001 [-0.004,0.006] 0.588
a13 stationary 0.000 [-0.068,0.019] 0.451
a23 stationary 0.001 [-0.090,0.352] 0.515
a33 stationary 0.000 [-0.001,0.004] 0.581√
VAR(κy) positive definite 0.050 [0.045,0.056] 0.282√
VAR(κnx) positive definite 0.067 [0.060,0.074] 0.349√
VAR(κpi) positive definite 0.001 [0.000,0.001] 0.457
COV(κy, κnx) positive definite -0.001 [-0.002,-0.001] 0.700
COV(κy, κpi) positive definite 0.000 [0.000,0.000] 0.446
COV(κnx, κpi) positive definite 0.000 [0.000,0.000] 0.564
Notes: The VAR matrix is restricted to have a maximum absolute eigenvalue of 0.6 and
its entries are only allowed to take on absolute values smaller or equal to 2. The variance–
covariance matrix of the measurement error is restricted to be positive definite and its
entries on the main diagonal are only allowed to take on values, which are not larger than
60 percent of the variance of the corresponding data series. Results are based on 400,000
draws, where the first 150,000 are discarded as burn–in draws. SBB freight data is used for
industrial production.
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Appendix C
Appendix to “The Role of Labor
Market Imperfections and Credit
Constraints in the German Great
Depression”
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C.1 Model
C.1.1 Full Model
The economy is represented by:
Production Technology
yt = ztkαt (ht)
1−α Production Function
zt = z1−ρ
z
zρzt−1 exp(
z
t ) Transitory Technology Process
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt Law of Motion of Capital
rt =
∂yt
∂kt
= α
yt
kt
Return to Capital
wt =
∂yt
∂ht
= (1 − α) yt
ht
Wage Rate
with zt ∼ N(0, σ2z).
Heterogeneous Agents: Aggregation
kt = λkkt Capital Index
ht = λhkt + (1 − λ)hwt Labor Index
ct = λckt + (1 − λ)cwt Consumption Index
it = λikt Investment Index
dt = λdkt Foreign Debt Index
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Heterogeneous Agents: Utility Maximization
u(cit, 1 − hit) = ln(cit) + η ln(1 − hit) Agent’s Period Utility Function for i = k,w
τtwthkt + rtk
k
t + d
k
t+1 = c
k
t + i
k
t + (1 + r
d
t−1)d
k
t + t
g
t + t
t,k
t Capitalist’s Budget Constr.
kkt+1 = (1 − δ)kkt + ikt −
φ
2
(
kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)2
kkt Law of Motion of Capitalist’s Capital
τtwthwt = c
w
t + t
g
t + t
t,w
t Workers’s Budget Constraint
Maximization Problem Capitalist
The capitalist’s optimization problem at time t can be stated as
max
{ckγ,hkγ,kkγ+1,dkγ+1}
Et
∞∑
γ=t
βγ−t(u(ckγ, 1 − hkγ))
s.t. τγwγhkγ + rγk
k
γ + d
k
γ+1 ≥
ckγ + k
k
γ+1 − (1 − δ)kkγ +
φ
2
kkγ+1kkγ − 1

2
kkγ + (1 + r
d
γ−1)d
k
γ + t
t,k
γ + t
g
γ
taking as given kkt , d
k
t , zt, τt, gt, as well as the transversality condition
lim
j→∞
Et
[∏ j−2
s=0
dt+ j
1+rdt+s
]
= 0. Capitalist’s Lagrangian:
L =Et
 ∞∑
γ=t
βγ−t
(
u(ckγ, 1 − hkγ) + µkγ
(
τγwγhkγ + rγk
k
γ + d
k
γ+1
−ckγ − kkγ+1 + (1 − δ)kkγ −
φ
2
kkγ+1kkγ − 1

2
kkγ − (1 + rdγ−1)dkγ − tt,kγ − tgγ

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with the following first order conditions:
(I)
∂L
∂ckt
=
∂u(ckt , 1 − hkt )
∂ckt
− µkt = 0
⇔ ∂u(c
k
t , 1 − hkt )
∂ckt
= µkt
⇒ Et
[
∂u(ckt+1, 1 − hkt+1)
∂ckt+1
]
= Et
[
µkt+1
]
(II)
∂L
∂hkt
=
∂u(ckt , 1 − hkt )
∂hkt
+ µktτtwt = 0
⇔ − ∂u(c
k
t , 1 − hkt )
∂hkt
1
µkt
= τtwt
(III)
∂L
∂kkt+1
= −µkt
[
1 + φ
(kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)]
+ βEt
[
µkt+1
(
(rt+1 + (1 − δ))
+ φ
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)kkt+2
kkt+1
− φ
2
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)2)]
= 0
⇔ µkt
[
1 + φ
(kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)]
= βEt
[
µkt+1
(
rt+1 + (1 − δ) + φ
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)kkt+2
kkt+1
− φ
2
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)2]
(IV)
∂L
∂dkt+1
= µkt − βEt
[
µkt+1(1 + r
d
t )
]
= 0
⇔ µkt = βEt
[
µkt+1(1 + r
d
t )
]
(V)
∂L
∂µkt
= τtwthkt + rtk
k
t + d
k
t+1
− ckt − kkt+1 + (1 − δ)kkt +
φ
2
(
kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)2
kkt − (1 + rdt−1)dkt − tt,kt − tgt = 0
⇔ τtwthkt + rtkkt + dkt+1 =
ckt + k
k
t+1 − (1 − δ)kkt −
φ
2
(
kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)2
kkt + (1 + r
d
t−1)d
k
t + t
t,k
t + t
g
t
172
Maximization ProblemWorker
The worker’s optimization problem at time t can be stated as
max
{cwγ ,hwγ }
Et
∞∑
γ=t
βγ−t(u(ckγ, 1 − hkγ))
s.t. τγwγhwγ ≥ cwγ + tt,wγ + tgγ
taking as given kt, dt, zt, τt, as well as the transversality condition
lim
j→∞
Et
[∏ j−2
s=0
dt+ j
1+rt+s
]
= 0. Worker’s Lagrangian:
L =Et
 ∞∑
γ=t
βγ−t
(
u(cwγ , 1 − hwγ ) + µwγ
(
τγwγhwγ − cwγ − tt,wγ − tgγ
)
with the following first order conditions:
(I)
∂L
∂cwt
=
∂u(cwt , 1 − hwt )
∂cwt
− µwt = 0
⇔ ∂u(c
w
t , 1 − hwt )
∂cwt
= µwt
⇒ Et
[
∂u(cwt+1, 1 − hwt+1)
∂cwt+1
]
= Et
[
µwt+1
]
(II)
∂L
∂hwt
=
∂u(cwt , 1 − hwt )
∂hwt
+ µwt τtwt = 0
⇔ − ∂u(c
w
t , 1 − hwt )
∂hwt
1
µwt
= τtwt
(III)
∂L
∂λwt
= τtwthwt − cwt − tt,wt − tgt = 0
⇔ τtwthwt = cwt + tt,wt + tgt
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Open Economy Characteristics
rdt = r
d + ψ
(
exp (dt+1 − d) − 1) International Interest Rate
cat = −dt+1 + (1 + rdt )dt Current Account
Labor Market Inefficiencies
wtht = τtwtht + ttt Wages
ttt = λt
t,k
t + (1 − λ)tt,wt Total Lump-sum transfers
tt,it = (1 − τt)wthit Individual Lump-sum transfers for i = k,w
τt = τ
1−ρττρτt−1 exp(
τ
t ) Labor Wedge Process
Aggregation
tgt = gt Lump sum taxes
gt = g1−ρ
g
gρgt−1 exp(
g
t ) Government Spending Process
Yt = wtht + rtkt Market Clearing
λ
(
τtwthkt + rtk
k
t + d
k
t+1
)
+ (1 − λ) (τtwthwt ) =
λ
ckt + kkt+1 − (1 − δ)kkt − φ2
(
kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)2
kkt + (1 + r
d
t−1)d
k
t + t
t,k
t + t
g
t

+ (1 − λ)
(
cwt + t
t,w
t + t
g
t
)
⇔ τtwtht + rtkt + dt+1 = ct + it + (1 + rdt−1)dt + gt + λtt,kt + (1 − λ)tt,wt
⇔ yt = wtht + rtkt = ct + it + gt + cat + (τt − 1)wtht + ttt︸             ︷︷             ︸
=0
⇔ yt = ct + it + gt + cat Aggregate Resource Constraint
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C.1.2 Model Summary
Eventually, one can summarize the model, which is described by the following
optimality and necessary conditions:
• Production Function
yt = ztkαt (ht)
1−α (C.1)
• Period t Aggregate Resource Constraint
yt = ct + it + gt + cat (C.2)
• Law of Motion of Capital
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt (C.3)
• Period t Capitalist’s Budget Constraint
τtwthkt +rtk
k
t +d
k
t+1 = c
k
t +k
k
t+1−(1−δ)kkt−
φ
2
(
kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)2
kkt +(1+r
d
t−1)d
k
t +t
t,k
t +t
g
t (C.4)
• Period t Worker’s Budget Constraint
τtwthwt = c
w
t + t
t,w
t + t
g
t (C.5)
• Investment Euler Equation
∂u(ckt , 1 − hkt )
∂ckt
[
1 + φ
(kkt+1
kkt
− 1
)]
= βEt
[∂u(ckt+1, 1 − hkt+1)
∂ckt+1
(
rt+1 + (1 − δ) + φ
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)kkt+2
kkt+1
− φ
2
(kkt+2
kkt+1
− 1
)2]
(C.6)
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• Labor–Leisure Trade–off Capitalist
−
∂u(ckt ,1−hkt )
∂hkt
∂u(ckt ,1−hkt )
∂ckt
= τtwt (C.7)
• Labor–Leisure Trade–off Worker
−
∂u(cwt ,1−hwt )
∂hwt
∂u(cwt ,1−hwt )
∂cwt
= τtwt (C.8)
• Bond Euler Equation
∂u(ckt , h
k
t )
∂ckt
= βEt
[
∂u(ckt+1, h
k
t+1)
∂ct+1
(1 + rdt )
]
(C.9)
• International Interest Rate Rule
rdt = r
d + ψ
(
exp (dt+1 − d) − 1) (C.10)
• Current Account
cat = −dt+1 + (1 + rt−1)dt (C.11)
• Transitory Technology Process
zt+1 = z1−ρzz
ρz
t exp(
z
t+1) (C.12)
• Government Spending Process
gt+1 = g1−ρg g
ρg
t exp(
g
t+1) (C.13)
• Labor Wedge Process
τt+1 = τ
1−ρττρτt exp(
τ
t+1) (C.14)
• Return to Capital
rt = α
yt
kt
(C.15)
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• Wage Rate
wt = (1 − α) ytht (C.16)
• Capital
kt = λkkt (C.17)
• Debt
dt = λdkt (C.18)
• Hours
ht = λhkt + (1 − λ)hwt (C.19)
• Consumption
ct = λckt + (1 − λ)cwt (C.20)
• Investment
it = λikt (C.21)
Moreover, note that
∂u(cit, 1 − hit)
∂cit
=
1
cit
for i = k,w
∂u(cit, 1 − hit)
∂hit
= − η
(1 − ht) for i = k,w
C.2 Steady States
C.2.1 Calibration
• r: real return on capital
• δ: depreciation rate
• α: capital share in economy
• λ: share of capitalists in economy
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• h: hours
• φ: capital adjustment costs
• ψ: debt elasticity of foreign interest rate
• z: TFP
• gy : public expenditure quota
• dy : total economies debt-to-GDP ratio
• τ: steady state labor market wedge
C.2.2 Determining Remaining Steady State Values
• From (C.6), β = 11+r−δ
• From (C.6) and (C.9), r − δ = rd
• From (C.1) ky = αr
• From (C.1) k = ky
1
1−αh
• From (C.1) y = ( ky )−1k
• From (C.1) kk = kλ
• From (C.2) cy = 1 − δ ky − gy − rd dy
• From (C.3) i = δk
• From (C.21) ik = iλ
• From (C.16) w = (1 − α) yh
• From c = cy
• From g = gy
• From d = dy
• From (C.18) dk = dλ
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• From (C.11) ca = rdd
• From (C.4),(C.5),(C.7),(C.8),(C.19), and (C.20) get
(i) w(h − hw) + (r − δ)k = (c − cw) + rdd
(ii)
(
1 − h−(1−λ)hwλ
)
1
1−hw =
c−(1−λ)cw
λcw
and solve for hw and cw numerically.
• From (C.19) hk = h−(1−λ)hwλ
• From (C.20) ck = c−(1−λ)cwλ
• From (C.7) η = τwck1−hk
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C.3 Further Estimation Results
Evolution of the Capitalist Share
In order to assess the evolution of the degree of credit constraints, we have also
estimated an extended version of the model. In particular, instead of assuming
a constant λ over time, we modeled is as an exogenous process and therefore
allowed for variations. Figure C.1 presents the evolution of the share of the
capitalists, presented in deviations from its steady state level.1 We observe that
from 1927–1932 λt was well below steady state, while it took until the end of the
reparations until λt could reach equilibrium again.
Figure C.1: Time–Varying Share of Capitalists
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Results are based on 5,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Mean estimate of λ=0.275,
median percent deviations are reported.
1Note that the estimation of the extended model yields a median steady state value of λ of
0.275
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C.4 Metropolis–Hastings Algorithm within Gibbs
Sampler
This section sketches2 the algorithm I applied to derive posterior distributions
of the parameters of interest. The method corresponds to a MCMC simulation
using the Metropolis–Hastings (MH) algorithm within the Gibbs sampler. This
Bayesian approach is best characterized by Baye’s rule:
g(θ|y) = f (y|θ)g(θ)
f (y)
∝ f (y|θ)g(θ), (C.22)
where g(θ) is the prior distribution of the parameters containing non–sample
information, f (y|θ) is the likelihood of observing the data given the parameters
θ, and g(θ|y) the posterior density function of the hyperparameters θ conditional
on observing the data y.
As a first step, one needs to decide which parameters to estimate and by which
algorithm. The choice is to some extent motivated by the recognizability of the
conditional posterior distributions of the parameters. The main idea behind the
Gibbs sampling approach is to break the joint posterior distribution into separate
conditional posteriors, which have a known analytical representation. This is the
case for example for structural autoregressive parameters and their corresponding
variances as well as for the measurement error components. Conditional on
all other hyperparameters and the data, the solution of the linearized DSGE
model yields a linear state space representation and thus recognizable posterior
distributions. However, if one is interested in estimating a structural parameter,
whose distribution does not take a recognizable form,3 the Metropolis–Hastings
algorithm turns out to be well suited.
To keep this illustration simple, I assume that there is one autoregressive
parameter θG,1 and one variance θG,2 to be estimated with the Gibbs sampler,
while I estimate one additional structural parameterθMH using the MH algorithm.
2For a more detailed description of the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm see e.g. Chib and
Greenberg (1995). Concerning the Gibbs sampling approach see Casella and George (1992) or
Kim and Nelson (1999).
3Most of the remaining hyperparameters of a DSGE model, such as the share of capitalists λ,
would be an example.
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Note that one could easily apply this setup to a wider range of parameters. Before
starting one needs to choose the number of draws (N), select the estimation data y,
define prior distributions g(θ), and randomly choose starting values forθ0G = (θ
0
G,1,
θ0G,2)
′ and θ0MH. The steps of the algorithm are described below.
Start of the algorithm, for n = 1 : N
• Gibbs sampling step
– Solve the DSGE model for given values θn−1G and θ
n−1
MH
– Generate time series of unobservable state xn−1 using the Kalman Filter
– Draw θnG,1 from conditional posterior, i.e. g(θ
n
G,1|θn−1G,2 , θn−1MH, xn−1)
– Draw θnG,2 from conditional posterior, i.e. g(θ
n
G,2|θnG,1, θn−1MH, xn−1)
• Metropolis–Hastings step
– Generate candidate θ?MH from (random walk) proposal density:
4
θ?MH = θ
n−1
MH + 
MH
n (C.23)
– Conditional on the Gibbs draw, compute likelihoods for
(i) θn−1MH: g(θ
n−1
MH|θnG,y)
(ii) θ?MH: g(θ
?
MH|θnG,y)
– Compute acceptance ratio from moving from θn−1MH to θ
?
MH, with q(·)
being equal to the candidate generating density:
α(θn−1MH, θ
?
MH) = min
(
g(θ?MH|θnG,y)q(θn−1MH|θ?MH,y)
g(θn−1MH|θnG,y)q(θ?MH|θn−1MH,y)
, 1
)
. (C.24)
– If candidate is accepted set θnMH = θ
?
MH, otherwise θ
n
MH = θ
n−1
MH.
• If n < N go back to Gibbs sampling step
End of the algorithm
4MHn ∼ N(0, σ2MH) where σ2MH is chosen to obtain a mean acceptance ratio of 25 to 40 percent.
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